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The project context 
 
The modes of organisation to be promoted and the type of reforms to operate in cotton sectors 
historically organised according to a state monopoly model are the object of harsh debates. The most 
accurate question is on the respective places of the state and the market as modes of coordination. The 
liberalisation of cotton sectors was launched in anglophone Africa in the mid-1980s and started 
reaching Francophone countries at the beginning of the 1990s. 
The institutional evolution of cotton sectors in SSA took place gradually and entailed the assignment 
of new roles to the state, private operators and new players (e.g. collective entities…). Different stages 
of liberalisation and models of coordination (diverse combinations of collective action and regulation 
by the State) are observable in different countries. What is the relative performance of these different 
organisation modes is a relevant issue even though the institutional evolution is still underway. 
In the framework of the process of liberalisation, we can distinguish : 
  The first step which can be qualified as a rash one : the Government withdrew from the 
cotton sector without establishing specific regulations nor any specific assistance to the cotton 
stakeholders. It was not successful and it demonstrated the risks of destabilising economies 
and inducing serious consequences on health, environment, poverty, peace… It is now 
acknowledged that the market, as a coordination mechanism, cannot solve alone all problems 
within a cotton sector. 
 A second step of relative « cautiousness» : actions are oriented by the challenge of setting 
up an organisation mode where the market could play completely its role of enhancing 
competitiveness to induce better performance (better quality, price competitiveness…) but 
where the State and the collective action (a new coordination mechanism) keep the regulating 
role to avoid detrimental free riding strategies and to preserve the provision of numerous 
common goods (environment, health, genetic resources…)  
These questions of relative performance were however, up to now, fed by a very poor information 
basis. In most cases, it was limited to a comparison of the share producers get out the exportation 
price on FOB (free on board) basis. Résocot is devoted to improve this information basis.   








Resocot (Cottonet) is a regional device for the monitoring of cotton sectors in Sub-Saharan 
Africa which is devoted to the assessment of the relative performance of the various cotton 
sectors organisation modes. It aims to assist cotton sectors in their institutional evolution, to 
feed with information the processes of dialogue between the stakeholders at national and 
regional levels, and to contribute to the identification, by each country, of margins to gain in 
performance by taking into account experiences of the other countries of the network. The pilot 
phase which ends in July 2003, covered the campaigns 99-2000 to 2001-2002. This phase 
enabled to carry out methodology and tools which were applied to the cotton sectors of the six 
countries of the network (Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Ghana). 
Main outcomes pertain to a characterisation of the cotton sector organisation modes through a 
common grid and original assessment of their performance and progress margins. 
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UNIPHYTO :   Union des Professionnels Phytosanitaires 
UIRECOOPAG :   Union Régionale des Coopératives Agricoles 
URECODA-CI :  Union Régionale des Coopératives de Distribution de Produits Agricoles de 
CI 
URECOS-CI :   Union Régionale des Entreprises Coopératives de la zone des Savanes de 
Côte d’Ivoire 
UTEXI :   Union Industrielle Textile de Côte d’Ivoire 
 
10 Foreword 
A CD-ROM has been produced containing the output of the Resocot Project (CottonNet) in 
the form of texts, tables, graphs and reports of data analysis from the constructed databases, 
excluding the national reports and the present regional synthesis. Reference is frequently 
made to this CD-ROM in the present report because the two documents are complementary. 
 
The six cotton sectors of the Resocot Project have various cotton production levels, in 
particular with Ghana which has a very small production. In order to enable a quick vision of 
differences and similarities between these countries, we reproduced some statistic data at the 
end of the appendices which are extracted from the regional data base that has been set up and 




1.  The Resocot Projet is a research project which brought together teams of researchers 
from the North and Africa, not all of which were familiar with the theoretical approach 
used at the outset. This project aims at developing a methodology and materials to help 
assess the performance of the cotton commodity sectors of different countries and to 
assist the players concerned to steer these sectors towards improving their 
performance. At a time when several African sectors have already gone over to a inter-
professional type of management, the output from the project could prove useful for 
facilitating exchanges between stakeholders, so as to enable them to develop a 
common vision of the problems before deciding on the actions required to resolve 
them. Considering its aims, the project should be judged by the methods and tools 
developed rather than by the degree of accuracy of each sector analysis carried out 
with these methods and materials. The degree of accuracy is in effect limited by the 
fact that only a single actor (research) was involved in the undertaking, as opposed to 
all the stakeholders in the sector. Because of this, the Resocot Project should not be 
considered as being just another sector appraisal.  
2.  The Theory of New Institutional Economics (NIE) was chosen as the basis for the 
Resocot Project. This states that the institutions and the way they operate influence the 
performance of economic activities, and that their foundation is the stakeholders and 
the actions they undertake to coordinate with each other (understood in a broad 
sense)1. In practice, the theory was applied by first characterising the organisation 
mode operating in the sectors, identifying indicators of performance and defining the 
effect of the organisation mode on performance. One original feature of the project 
was that it made specific reference to the performance of the sector in satisfying the 
development goals, retaining three goals that have been agreed upon by international 
aid agencies: poverty reduction, environmental sustainability and competitiveness on 
the international market. So that the application of the methods and tools should lead 
to executive indications on how to manage the reorganisation of the cotton sectors, the 
Resocot Project is being run simultaneously in 6 countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Mali) where the cotton sector has undergone 
different institutional changes, in terms of degree of liberalisation, privatisation, or the 
retention of the original monopoly system, but also in terms of the degree to which the 
farmers are involved in the management of the sector.    
3.  The characterisation of the organisation mode of the sector began by the 
characterisation of each of the technical stages (from the acquisition of inputs to the 
sale of finished cotton products). The theoretical basis selected led to have this 
characterisation being based on an analysis of the stakeholders (their number, their 
nature, dominance, etc), on horizontal coordination (in the sense of coordination of the 
management of common or collectively owned resources, but also extended to 
coordination by intra-professional associations and inter-professional organisations 
throughout the technical stages), the vertical coordination (at the level of transactions, 
but extended to the level of service supply), price formation and terms and conditions 
of transactions. 
4.  The initiative of referring performance to the fulfilment of the development goals 
meant that the goals had first to be divided into partial objectives with more practical 
                                                 
1 An institution is a set of behavioural rules conceived by people for guiding interactions between them, partly to 
help each individual to anticipate what the others will do. It may, although this is not always the case, take the 
shape of an organisation in order to enforce these rules.  
12 and operational headings, achievable over a shorter time span. This was an original 
approach; to date, we have found no other examples of a similar approach being taken. 
This initiative then led us to retain the hypothesis, in accordance with NIE theory, that 
observed performance reveals the degree of coordination failure. Put another way, 
performance would be perfect if no coordination failures prevail, but since this absence 
of coordination failure cannot be realistically retained in developing countries (such as 
those involved in the Resocot Project), the observed non-optimal level of performance 
reveals the level of coordination failure. In accordance with the hypothesis retained, it 
is by pinpointing potential coordination failures that pertinent performance indicators 
may be identified and thence the list of information to be collected in order to assess 
these indicators. The output of this work of identification is another original product of 
this project.   
5.  The concept of coordination failures is familiar to economists and likely less for other 
people. Generally speaking, failures are mentioned for coordination by the State, they 
are more commonly pointed out, but market failures are also acknowledged.2. The first 
type of failures leads to inefficient outcomes as a consequence of missing financial 
resources, lack of competence or motivation from the State staff. The second type 
pertains in particular to the limitations of the market to manage non-private goods so 
that the mere search for maximising individual profit could induce harmful collective 
impacts.  
6.  The approach taken and the methodology developed, as well as the resulting 
methodology products are explained in more detail on the CD-ROM (Chapter 4 of the 
general report). To facilitate data capturing and data processing, a set of databases was 
created. This is described in chapter 5.1 of the general report of the CD-ROM. Results 
related to the project methodology derived from the exploitation of these databases, 
based on data collected by national teams, can be found in chapters 5.2 and 5.3.  
7.  The choice of referring performance to the development goals leads onto a great many 
variables or criteria for defining the 3 general goals of development. The vast quantity 
of information makes it difficult to reach general appreciations for each country that 
could lead to workable propositions. Another product of the project is the proposed 
qualitative and relative evaluation approach and the development of the tools for 
making graphical representations from them. In chapter 5.4 of the general report of the 
CD-ROM a detailed description of this approach is given along with some examples to 
illustrate its application.  
8.  The analysis of how the organisation mode affects the observed performance of the 
cotton sectors is a tough challenge; it concerns evolving economic and social systems 
for which the necessary hindsight is lacking. An approach is proposed for the analysis 
of how well the development goals are attained, using a large number of qualitative 
considerations which combine performance indicators with the organisation 
characteristics of the sectors. With the same aim of obtaining a synthetic view, 9 key 
factors of performance are proposed, corresponding to combinations of  qualitative 
considerations, which we believe could also be of use for evaluating other commodity 
channels. The position of one commodity channel in relation to these key factors gives 
an indication of the performance that can be expected if the organisation mode remains 
unchanged, or, more positively, this position provides an idea of the improvement in 
performance that would be obtained if the organisation mode were to be adjusted 
effectively. Details of the approach using qualitative considerations, the list of the key 
                                                 
2 For more detail, see: Fok, A. C. M. and Tazi, S., 2003. Filières cotonnières africaines : restructuration, 
défaillances de coordination, règles collectives. In: (Ed.) 'Séminaire S.H.S. du Cirad'. Proceedings of an 
International Symposium, Montpellier, 8-9 Septembre 2003. pp.23 
13 factors of performance, how these relate to qualitative considerations, and examples of 
how these are applied are given in chapter 5.5 of the general report of the CD-ROM.  
9.  All the methods and tools were applied to each of the countries involved in the 
Resocot Project. A list of products obtained per country may be accessed in chapter 6 
of the general report of the CD-ROM. Regional synthesis were made for all the 
products, and are presented in chapter 7 of the general report of the CD-ROM.  
10.  The present regional synthesis report proceeds from the exploitation of the great mass 
of information and results obtained. It makes no pretence of being an exhaustive and 
definitive exploitation of the results. The summary aims at extracting the salient facts 
and information, in order to put forward working propositions in the fields of the 
organisation modes of the sectors, the performance obtained and the effect of the 
organisation mode on performance. Wherever necessary, the methodology will be 
mentioned briefly, before referring the reader to more detailed accounts in the CD-
ROM. Although the project has a precise theoretical foundation (that differs from the 
one retained, explicitly or implicitly, in many expert studies), this document is aimed 
at a wide audience and we will therefore keep the discussion of economic theories to a 
minimum. 
11.  This report first examines the organisation of the cotton sectors according to the 
chosen descriptive framework. Attention is then turned to the performance obtained 
with respect to the development goals, followed by the effects of the organisation 
mode on performance. The final chapter deals with the topic of coordination failures 
revealed by the Resocot Project.   
12.  For convenience, the considerable differences that distinguish Ghana from the other 
countries are highlighted by referring the latter countries as the ‘francophone 
countries’. However, the reader should not take this to indicate that the Resocot Project 
attempts to emphasise the characteristics and achievements of the francophone 
countries. In the chapter on the analysis of the effects of the organisation mode on 
performance, we propose to use the rather laborious expressions ‘countries with 
organisation modes non-oriented towards liberalisation’ and ‘countries with 
liberalisation-oriented organisation modes’, in order to avoid adding to the idea that 
there is a relationship between one group of countries and a specific organisation 
mode.  
2 THE REAL ORGANISATION OF THE SECTORS BEYOND THE SPLIT 
BETWEEN STATE AND MARKET  
13.  The national teams associated with the Resocot Project have analysed the descriptions 
and the study of the organisation mode. These analyses can be found in the reports 
concerning the organisation and functioning of the sectors and in the summary tables 
(chapters 1.1 and 1.2 of the list of national documents and products on the CD-ROM). 
In chapter 7.2 of the general report of the CD-ROM the six countries are presented in a 
single table. A great deal of information is presented in these products (with a varying 
degree of detail depending on the country), providing the basis for the present regional 
synthesis. 
14.  For this regional synthesis report, we have chosen to present the organisation mode 
under five headings (stakeholders, horizontal coordination, vertical coordination, price 
formation and terms and conditions of transactions) according to the methodology 
chosen for the description and analysis of the national cotton sectors, but dealing with 
the sector as a whole rather than by technical stage. 
2.1.  Stakeholder landscapes and diversified systems of competition, not 
necessarily imposed by the institutional framework.  
14 2.1.1.  Diversified institutional framework beyond the contrast between liberalisation 
and monopoly  
15.  Few institutional frameworks favour total liberalisation of the sector, and it can 
even be stated that no examples of this option are to be found now. Ghana, which has 
kept with this option since the mid 1980s, has shown doubts about it since the 
2000/2001 season during which the government, by deciding to pass a policy of 
‘zoning’, gave the monopoly of different zones to different companies. From this point 
of view, it may appear out of place to refer to Ghana as illustrating a organisation 
mode directed by liberalisation as we do in this report. This misuse of language is of 
little consequence however, because the change in policy is recent and has not had 
time to fundamentally change the processes marked by almost fifteen years of total 
liberalisation.   
16.  A trend towards the liberalisation of certain stages is found however, the typical 
case being for input supply. The liberalisation of this part of the commodity chain is 
being sought in Burkina Faso, while it has already taken place in most of the countries. 
This type of liberalisation is regulated since the rules concerning the invitation to 
tender for input supply are stipulated by the State, cotton inter-professional 
organisations or simply the cotton companies, and because certain countries have, or 
are about to, put in place strict rules for product certification that the suppliers will be 
obliged to adhere to.  
17.  The trend towards targeted privatisation has become more usual. This concerns 
ginning, and is already operational in Benin and Côte d’Ivoire. With the opening of the 
capital of the sole cotton company of Burkina Faso to small farmers, it can be said that 
the privatisation of ginning is under way. In Mali, a decision has been made recently to 
move towards privatisation along the lines traced by Côte d’Ivoire with the attribution 
of monopoly zones. This type of privatisation has of course been the rule in Ghana 
since liberalisation in 1985. It should be noted however, that privatisation does not 
prevent the phenomenon of domination by one actor in particular. This happened in 
Benin after a relatively short time of privatisation, as had previously occurred in 
Ghana. Privatisation occurs also significantly in the transport of various products 
(inputs and cotton products) though to different and variable extents depending on the 
product concerned. Also, in the case of the transport of seedcotton, we find operation 
by entirely private (Ghana), by entirely cotton company (Cameroon) and by sharing 
between cotton companies and private operators. The trend towards a greater role for 
the private sector is evident in transport, but the influence of international aid agencies 
is not unrelated to this. 
18.  Regulation favouring monopoly systems still remain however, although the ways 
in which these operate have evolved. For ginning, while the regulations issued in the 
1970s conferring a monopoly rights over the entire country (Cameroon, Burkina Faso, 
and Mali for a short while still) are still being followed, we find:   
  the adoption of local monopolies (Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana)  
  and an administration system for the annual distribution of production quotas 
for ginning that is not explicitly linked to geographical criteria (Benin) and 
which are contested by certain ginners who feel that they are disadvantaged 
compared to others.  
19.  In the field of input supply to farmers, the principle of having a single distributor is 
applied in most of the countries, although not necessarily based on explicit regulations. 
In three countries (Mali, Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire), the farmers deal with two input 
suppliers, the cotton company and a farmers’ institution (cooperative, federation or 
trade union) but generally for different inputs. This is a process that has been initiated 
to prepare the way for the withdrawal of the cotton companies from input supply. It is 
15 supported in various ways by outside institutions, particularly on the financial side of 
farmer associations for buying and distributing inputs (support obtained in Côte 
d’Ivoire, but not yet in Mali).  In the case of supply carried out by farmers’ institutions, 
it can not be said that more satisfaction is always given to the farmers (discontent 
voiced in Mali), nor that financial viability is ensured (poor rate of repayment in Côte 
d’Ivoire), but the process is still in its early days.   
20.  Positions on the regulation of the supply of raw materials for industries down 
stream of cotton production have become less contrasted, following the phase of 
support to local processing industries. Concerning lint supply to the textile industry, 
the preferential controls profiting the textile industry over the obligation to supply it 
with raw material no longer exist, neither do those over the prices practiced in this 
supply. In all the countries, this is negotiated privately between buyers and sellers with 
occasional remonstrations from the textile industries (Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon). 
The same applies for supplies to oil mills, excepting Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. In 
Benin, the State had to issue a decree stating that the demand of local oil mills should 
be met before they would issue an export licence, and it administrates the export price. 
In Burkina Faso, exports have been limited to 10% of the available volume. In Mali, 
the one and only oil extractor (Huicoma) lost its exclusive right to buy cottonseed two 
seasons ago. This change opens up the possibility for traders to buy cottonseed, but at 
present this only concerns a small volume. In Côte d’Ivoire, the inter-professional 
organisation recommends that seeds be processed locally, whereas in Cameroon 
supply is automatic through the integration of ginning and oil extraction. In Ghana, 
there is no oil mill to process cottonseeds. 
21.  All the problems are not solved through regulations when these are contested by 
some of the stakeholders: this is the case for the ginners in Benin, who are protesting 
against the limit imposed on exportation, which they believe is more profitable.  
2.1.2.  The institutional framework does not necessarily lead to the system of 
competition desired 
22.  Not all the technical stages are subject to competition. In the case of local input supply, 
a suppliers’ oligopoly often exists, reducing the possibility of competition.  
23.  The system of competition does not necessarily operate in the most crucial stages. 
Even in the systems that have evolved towards liberalisation, there is no competition 
for the distribution of inputs to farmers (Ghana), who deal with a single distributor. 
24.  It is also interesting that dominance by one actor may occur even in a liberalised 
system. In Ghana, one company is in a very dominant position for supplying inputs to 
cotton companies, to the point of becoming their creditor, suggestive of a process of 
integration.  
2.1.3.  The lack of competition depends on the product or service and the technical 
stage  
 
25.  The situation of oligopoly (or duopoly) is particularly noticeable for fertiliser 
supply in the francophone countries, where two companies (Senchim and Hydrochem 
or an associated enterprise) dominate. 
26.  The situation is less clear-cut for pesticide supply, where there are a large, and 
increasing, number of suppliers.  However, vigilance is called for, since the same 
international supplier can be found behind several national companies. In addition, not 
all the companies are in a position to be able to comply with the new measures 
concerning the certification and authorisation of products. 
16 27.  The absence of competition may prevail due to the lack of interest from private 
operators. This is the case for cotton seeds and lint transport to local factories. The 
distances and volumes concerned are too small to interest the private operators.  
28.  The notion of competition is sometimes less pertinent than that of 
complementarity. This is the case of seed production which draws together cotton 
companies, research and seed producers in an accepted division of labour.  It is also 
the case for research, for which the public nature of the output makes the case for 
competition hard to sustain. Complementarity with national research bodies often 
predominates in this area where the cotton companies carry out the adaptive research. 
This complementarity is not always evident; in several countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Benin 
and Burkina Faso) the cotton companies are not involved in the conduct of applied 
research. 
2.1.4.  The lack of competition does not always depend on the organisation of the 
cotton sector  
29.  The prevailing lack of competition does not always depend on the organisation of the 
cotton sector itself, especially concerning operations downstream of cotton lint.  
30.  For both local processing of cotton seed or lint, there is usually a maximum of two 
buyers. When suppliers have a more or less official obligation to supply a local 
processing industry, with rather disadvantageous conditions, the sellers complain or 
supply the lowest quality.   
31.  In the field of storage activities at port or transit services, the countries, especially the 
landlocked countries, suffer from the situation of de facto oligopoly against which they 
have little control. 
2.1.5.  Effective competition in certain fields 
32.  There is competition in some areas however, even within the organisation modes 
dominated by monopoly systems (even if these systems are strongly promoted by the 
international aid agencies). These areas concern transportation (inputs, seedcotton and 
fibre) and the sale of lint for export.   
33.  For transportation, a large number of private operators may be involved, either 
exclusively, as is the case with the transport of lint (Mali and Burkina Faso), or in 
complement to other cotton companies which have their own trucks in the case of 
seedcotton transportation. In the latter case, when the cotton companies possess many 
trucks (Mali) they take advantage of their strong bargaining position to obtain the best 
conditions from the private operators (getting them to collect the seedcotton on the 
least well maintained tracks for example). In the opposite situation where the cotton 
companies are short of trucks, the private operators are better placed to impose their 
own conditions (in Côte d’Ivoire the transporters refuse to use certain tracks).   
34.  In the area of lint export, competition has been unquestionably improved as a 
consequence of a diversification of the forms of sale, going from an exclusive recourse 
to sales by commission agents to an increased recourse to traders, even though this 
change has happened in phases for the different countries (Côte d’Ivoire a long time 
ago, Mali very recently).   
2.1.6.  Some diversification in the type of actors involved  
35.  For all the countries concerned except Ghana, the intervention of national operators 
is rather limited (not taking into account the farmers themselves). Their action is 
more visible in the distribution of inputs, but these are national agents that can have 
very close ties with international companies. Their intervention in transportation is also 
important, but this is not specific to the cotton sector.  
17 36.  The international operators are playing an increasingly greater role, which has 
gone beyond the traditional limits of input supply. This trend is maintained by the 
pronounced intervention of cotton lint traders, some of which have even entered into a 
process of upstream integration over the past few years (Côte d’Ivoire and Benin). The 
intervention of the European banks in financing the marketing campaign in several 
countries should also be noted (Mali, Cameroon, Burkina Faso), but this is not a recent 
trend.    
37.  The role played by regional actors is particularly important in the field of 
fertiliser supply. It can also concern financing the input supply or the marketing 
campaign in certain countries (Benin and Ghana). Occasionally, the actors of other 
countries may intervene to buy cotton products, but this mainly concerns Cameroon, 
which sells to Chad and Nigeria from time to time.   
38.  Concerning the farmers, or rather their organisations, their involvement in the 
commercialisation of seedcotton and in the management of credit for inputs is 
longstanding and essentially corresponds to services externalized from the cotton 
companies. But farmers are steadily taking up more responsibility for the 
technical stages. They can be in charge of buying and distributing inputs, not in 
competition with other stakeholders but more or less in the place of the actors who did 
it before. The case of Côte d’Ivoire, where a ginning mill acquired by URESCO-CI (a 
federation of cooperatives) is in operation, is a first attempt at taking over ginning 
that the recent events in the country and insufficient hindsight prevent from being 
correctly appreciated.  
2.2.  Variable dimensions of horizontal coordination  
39.  While horizontal coordination is often understood in the narrow sense of coordination 
for  managing of common goods, the Resocot Project chose to include actions of intra-
professional and inter-professional coordination in this definition, which corresponds 
better to the common understanding of the term. In the present document, we first 
analyse coordination relating to common goods, and then address the various types of 
professional coordination. 
 
2.2.1.  Difficulties associated with scaling up in the coordinated management of 
common or collective resources  
40.  Actions of coordination are mainly noticeable in the francophone countries and 
have concerned : 
  the management of land resources,  
  the management of pests and the effects of pest control on human health,  
  and the development and diffusion of technical knowledge by research and 
extension (methods of preventing soil erosion, methods of sustainable 
management of cultivated areas or new pest control programmes). 
41.  Concerning the management of land resources, all the francophone countries (to a 
lesser extent in Benin however) have undertaken for a long time specific actions with 
financial backing from international aid agencies. Implementation has always involved 
the cotton companies and the farmers’organisations and has resulted in technical 
realisations of commendable quality, but which only affect a small number of villages. 
There seems to be a blockage to scaling up these actions, or this idea may have 
been abandoned. 
42.  More recently, moves have been made towards the adoption of new, more rational, 
pest control programmes that adjust treatment to the damage threshold of the pests 
(Staggered Targeted Control"Lutte étagée ciblée" or LEC). They only concern Mali 
18 and to a lesser extent Benin, while Cameroon, a forerunner in this field, has abandoned 
them, and an attempted experiment in Burkina Faso has been cut short. In both 
countries where the LEC is being promoted, the operation still concerns a small 
number of villages and area of cotton production, due in particular to the 
requirement that the farmers have an appropriate training.  
43.  A tendency to diversify the conditions of programming, financing and supervision 
for research is becoming stronger.  It is useful to point out that changes to end up 
with the monopoly of the national body for agronomy research are underway with the 
possibility of contributions from Universities or Faculties being considered. The 
coordination of research programmes is the subject of mechanism which is becoming 
more clearly defined (Mali, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso) in which the 
farmers have a larger role (Mali, Côte d’Ivoire), at least in theory. The modes of 
financing remain very different from country to country, even between 
francophone countries. Most often, the funding mechanism is not based on defined 
criteria, or on a multi-annual basis. The State and the cotton commodity sector are 
supposed to provide the funds but based on imprecise criteria, and with a big 
contribution from the cotton companies (Mali in particular, but also Cameroon and 
Benin). There is little basis on which to set the amount of funding required, so the 
decisions pertaining to financing are often discretionary, putting the researchers in 
the position of applicants and the cotton sectors/companies as sponsors. Côte d’Ivoire 
stands out from the rest in that it indicates a reference figure (400 million FCFA /year), 
but it is the option retained by Burkina Faso that appears most promising.  This 
links the amount to be funded to the production of cotton lint (1.5 FCFA/kg of lint 
sold), which corresponds to an approach put in place in economically developed cotton 
producing countries. The option chosen by Ghana deserves a mention; it aims at 
making the cotton companies pay for using of the products of research.  This approach, 
which is a bit surprising in its statement about products that are public goods, seems to 
have discouraged the cotton companies, with the result that research on cotton has 
virtually ceased to exist in this country.  
44.  In the field of responsibility for extension work, the changes are underway, with 
responsibility shared between the actors. The cotton companies are still the main 
suppliers of extension service in all countries studied. In Mali things are different 
however, with the cotton company sharing this role with village associations who have 
their own teams of technicians (made up of young literate and trained farmers). In 
Burkina Faso and Cameroon, there are also partnerships between the cotton companies 
and agents from the villages, but these operate in various ways. Where private cotton 
companies operate, the quality of service is considered inadequate (Ghana) and even 
disparaged (Côte d’Ivoire). Elsewhere, they may not involve themselves in extension 
work at all (Benin). Protestation against the poor quality of service in the field of 
extension work is an important part of the reason why the inter-professional 
organisations have taken on the responsibility for extension work (Côte d’Ivoire). This 
change is already operational in Benin, where the Inter-professional organisation 
called Association Interprofessionnelle du Coton(A.I.C.) has its own technical staff for 
this. There is also a trend towards reducing the number of staff involved in technical 
training. This is particularly drastic in Mali. Nonetheless, the financing of extension is 
still connected to the cotton sector, although no specific criteria are defined for it. 
2.2.2.  Variable role of more or less definite or updated regulations  
45.  Little regulation exists for the management of collective/common resources. The 
most manifest regulation concerns the management of pest pressure and the 
preservation of public health and deals with the certification of chemicals towards 
using less toxic products, in accordance with directions from regional and international 
bodies (Mali and Burkina Faso). In this field, practices regarding the destruction of 
19 harvest residues relate more to the pursuit of old habits than to up-dated 
recommendations. 
46.  Official regulations concerning privatisation/liberalisation are specific rather that 
general, as discussed above. 
47.  However, it should be emphasised that some regulations, while not always formal, 
are nonetheless specific, operational and effective. These concern the conditions and 
terms of international calls for tender for the acquisition of inputs (sometimes 
associated with distribution to farmers) for which the specifications are becoming 
increasingly restrictive for the suppliers. These regulations are expressed differently in 
the various francophone countries, whereas in Ghana the calls for tender are national, 
when they exist at all. These are regulations that have been recently revised, and that 
are under review (Benin and Mali). 
48.  Regulations are not necessarily required for achieving high efficiency. This is the 
case for seed production, with the establishment of seed production plan, distribution 
of seed production zones, allocation of financial incentives for good practice to seed 
producers, and management of ginning operations adjusted to ensure the varietal purity 
of the seeds. It is also the case for seed certification with, in theory, the public services 
sharing this role (depending on the national research service for example). Regulations 
are not necessary because it is in the interest of the executing actors to provide good 
quality and efficiency, so self-regulation operates. The end result is that regulations are 
replaced by the imposition of private rules which can be effective, as demonstrated by 
the absence of complaints about insufficient quantity or poor quality of seed. Similar 
private rules can be found in other fields also, particularly in decisions over seedcotton 
collection points (markets) to arrive at compromises that limit the transaction costs for 
the cotton company (Cameroon) while at the same time satisfying the need of 
proximity to the producers. 
2.2.3.  Diverse impacts of intra-professional coordination  
2.2.3.1.  Institutional recognition established almost everywhere, in various forms  
49.  Farmers’ representation has gained true recognition in practically all the 
countries concerned (except Ghana), and can play a dominating role in decisions 
related to the cotton sector in some of the francophone countries (Burkina Faso, Benin, 
Côte d’Ivoire) although it is not yet possible to generalise. It should be emphasised that 
in Ghana, so long after liberalisation, there is no recognised farmer representation and 
it is debatable just how representative are the farmers who haggle over prices with the 
ginners. In this country, the Cotton Farmers' Association has been set up for one year 
and active branches at the regions, districts and villages are yet to be established. The 
example of Ghana suggests that there is a paradox in a process of liberalisation which 
does not engender farmer representation while this could have served to reduce 
transaction costs. We can also confirm that liberalisation, which denies all 
coordination other than that of the market, cannot engender this type of representation.   
50.  Two main types of farmer groups are found, cooperatives (Côte d’Ivoire) and 
economic groups (the other francophone countries) with statutes that are variably 
defined and formal. Associations, which previously affected practically all farmers, are 
becoming confined to cotton producers, as a consequence of the same problems 
encountered for the management of joint liability. This is particularly effective in 
Burkina Faso and Cameroon. In Mali, the option chosen is not yet widely applied, 
while in Côte d’Ivoire cooperatives that can federate all farmers,  whatever their 
agricultural activity, are still preferred.  
51.  The movement of farmer groups to unite into federations is not widespread. Mali, 
although a forerunner in the process of setting up cotton farmers’ associations, is the 
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of the farmers arises from the process of federation (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina 
Faso and even Cameroon) or from an alternative, trade union type, structure (Mali).  
52.  At the same time as the farmers’ institutions are gaining recognition and power, there 
are signs of a trend towards disunion between farmers, so that, outside Burkina Faso 
and Cameroon, farmers’ representation tends to be multi-partite, even though a single 
entity often maintains dominance: several trades unions in Mali, several federations in 
Côte d’Ivoire, while in Benin the Fupro Federation is not unanimously supported by 
the farmers.  
2.2.3.2.  Associative movement and dissent between ginners in privatised contexts  
53.  The Associative movement among ginners began with liberalisation in the 
francophone countries, even though this movement is not perceptible in Ghana where 
privatisation took place earlier. The creation of an association is a new occurrence in 
Côte d’Ivoire, while in Benin there are already two different associations with 
opposing positions on the problem of the distribution of the ginning quotas.   
2.2.3.3.  Associative movement of the agricultural suppliers not widespread and hard to 
define  
54.  The process of coordination between input suppliers is definitely most obvious in Côte 
d’Ivoire (Uniphyto). This process is recent in Benin and has already led to two distinct 
associations being formed, while in Mali the association being created only aims at 
drawing together national enterprises. It is not easy to evaluate the impact of this 
process of coordination on the conditions of input acquisition. 
2.2.3.4.  Associative movement of transporters : variable impacts  
55.  In all the countries, the transporters are united in a trade union or federation on a local 
or national scale.  These institutions do not all have the same weight in negotiations 
with the cotton companies. With reference to the transport of seedcotton in particular, 
these institutions are weak in Mali and Burkina Faso, but stronger in Benin and Côte 
d’Ivoire.   
2.2.4.  Efficacy of coordination based on sustainable bilateral relations between 
cotton companies and the farmers  
56.  One expression of this efficacy concerns the quality of information for defining the 
needs in production factors and for estimating expected production, calling upon the 
system of coordination between farmers (farmer groups). The costs associated with 
this are minimal, while it enables the farmers to be supplied with appropriate 
quantities, which has for example the positive effect of limiting the costs in acquiring 
inputs. This type of coordination operates in countries where coordination between 
farmers has been working for a long time, such as in the francophone countries, but not 
in Ghana.  
2.2.5.  Range and limits of inter-professional coordination  
57.  Inter-professional coordination is effective in three countries (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and 
in some extent in Burkina Faso), but the extent of this coordination is variable. In 
Benin, it is not an exaggeration to say that the inter-professional organisation called 
A.I.C. carries out a vast range of functions, as did the discredited para-governmental 
bodies, has its say at any stage and even carries out certain tasks itself. In Côte 
d’Ivoire, Intercoton appears to be confining its role to the supervision of an increasing 
number of functions. In Burkina Faso, the management Committee of the cotton sector 
is limiting itself to steerage. 
58.  The activities of inter-professional bodies do not cover every technical stage of the 
commodity chain, and stages been looked after may vary between countries. In Benin, 
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technical staff. In Côte d’Ivoire in contrast, intensions to do this are only now being 
expressed. The A.I.C. of Benin also stands out for its supervision of input supply. On 
the other hand, inter-professional bodies take care of the grading of cotton fibre in both 
Benin and Côte d’Ivoire, but not in Burkina Faso.  
59.  Changing over to management by inter-professional bodies does not appear to 
guarantee short term efficiency, as it is illustrated by the disagreements over input 
supply in Benin. In general, it is too soon to judge whether management by inter-
professional body has any positive effect. 
 
 
2.3.  Relationship under Contract 
2.3.1.  Invitations for tender are common practice, but conditions vary  
60.  Resorting to invitation to tender is common practice but conditions and the way they 
are implemented differ between countries. Conditions may be set by the regulations in 
force, as for the acquisition of inputs in the francophone countries where the amounts 
demanded permit international calls to tender to be issued with stiff conditions and 
taking into account specifications concerning packaging and quality control. In Ghana, 
the invitations to tender, when they exist at all, are only sent out nationally. 
61.  Invitations to tender may be used for the transportation of cotton products (national 
invitations) but only in a small number of the countries covered by the Resocot 
Project.  
2.3.2.  Selected formalisation through contracts  
62.  The relationships between actors in the transactions concerning products or services 
are not systematically made formal with a contract. In general, contracts are 
established between actors upstream and downstream of cotton production, but this is 
not so often the case for the operations through production to the processing of cotton 
products. 
63.  Input supply is made formal by contracts in all the countries, but this practice can give 
rise to double contracts, as in Benin where the suppliers are linked to the CAGIA 
(farmers' cooperative in acquiring agricultural inputs) on the one hand and to the 
producer groups on the other.   
64.  The establishment of contracts does not apply to seed supply, in which a single 
distributor is associated with a large number of producer groups. Contracts are not 
used for the commercialisation of seedcotton either. This is due as much to the myriad 
of producers concerned as to the pursuit of an old, informal, practice, which has 
worked well. These practices are evolving a little in Benin, where a system of quota 
distribution of the seedcotton produced exists among the ginners. The farmers’ 
federation (FUPRO) enters into a contract with  the ginners by which it promises to 
supply them according to the agreed quotas. This is an unusual phenomenon in the 
framework of a commodity produced by individual farmers. 
65.  The transportation of seedcotton may be carried out under contract in Benin and Côte 
d’Ivoire. Elsewhere this is done by a simple assent and the hauliers are paid for the 
work done depending on the quantities transported and the distance covered. 
66.  All international sales are of course made formal with regular contracts for each 
transaction. This is also the case for local sales of fibre or cotton seed, in the form of 
annual agreements in which the quantity, price and delivery conditions are stipulated. 
It should be noted that these agreements are not always respected to the letter (Côte 
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extractors and spinners. These complaints relate to quantity and more often to quality, 
since the ginners tend to direct the poorer quality fibre towards the local market. 
2.4.  Price formation similar, despite different organisation modes  
67.  In the analysis of price formation, we distinguish cases in which the farmers are 
directly or indirectly affected. 
 
2.4.1.  A strong trend towards the administration of the prices that affect farmers 
directly 
68.  The stages concerned by the formation of these prices cover input supply to farmers 
(related to the stage of acquisition of inputs from suppliers), the supply of seed and 
buying the seedcotton produced by the farmers. For the formation of these prices, 
many similarities are found between countries.   
69.  The reduction of the tax burden is evident in all countries, particularly since the 
application of common rules within ECOWAS. This reduction concerns buying inputs 
and has a knock on effect on their supply. Mali stands out however because of the 
controversy over the extension of the tax on financial affairs ("Taxe sur les Affaires 
financières") to the input credit that farmers benefit from.   
70.  There is a general lack of competition in the farmgate price, applying as much to 
the selling prices of inputs as to the buying prices of seedcotton. This absence of 
competition also concerns Ghana, and this even before the system of local monopolies 
was adopted, demonstrating that the hypothesis of price competition following 
liberation is not always confirmed. 
71.  This absence of competition stems from the generalisation of the approach of price 
administration, whether in a public (Cameroon), inter-professional (Benin, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and even Mali even though there is no interprofessional 
institution) or private (Ghana) form. It is this administration of prices which is also 
behind the continued application of the same prices over the entire territory (pan-
territory prices) in all the countries. 
72.  In such an approach of price administration, the role of the State is theoretically very 
small, or at least shared to a greater extent with the other stakeholders. If reality seems 
to resemble the theory for the formation of input prices, its is less so in the case of 
seedcotton: the State  explicitly accepted to make up a complement to the price borne 
by the sector in Mali during the 2000/2001 season while in other countries the price 
paid to the farmers had never been as high as that set for the season when world prices 
were at their lowest…  
73.  This can be explained by the opening made to farmers in the price negotiation.  
This process applies in all the countries, even in Ghana, but it should be recognised 
that the negotiating power of farmers varies between countries; this is weaker or 
merely symbolic in Ghana and Cameroon. 
74.  Concerning the commercialisation of seedcotton, the principle of a minimum 
price and staggered payment (two-step payments) is also generalised.  Ghana is the 
only exception, with a fixed price, single payment, system.  Nonetheless, countries do 
vary in the way they calculate the minimum price and the post-sale complement paid 
for cotton fibre. In Benin and Côte d’Ivoire, and more recently in Mali, new formulas 
for calculating the buying price of seedcotton are being used.  Compared to the old 
formulas, which are still in force in Burkina Faso and Cameroon, the new ones differ 
by referring explicitly to the world price (rather than the cost price of lint) and by 
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calculation formulas are already being criticised, particularly in Côte d’Ivoire.   
75.  The  de facto abolition of the inter-annual stabilisation of the buying price of 
seedcotton seems to be established with the end of all financing of stabilisation 
funds, even though the question is resurfacing. This change should be qualified 
however: in fact, in order to avoid excessive inter-annual fluctuations, so-called 
« political » prices can come out of inter-professional negotiations. It is too soon to 
judge what the effects of a poorly anticipated drop in world prices would be on the 
financial viability of the cotton sectors and on the cohesion between its stakeholders, 
but the risk is real.  
76.  The cessation of all explicit subsidies to the use of inputs is also general to all the 
countries, with farmers paying the true price calculated in function with the acquisition 
price plus the demonstrated costs encountered up to delivery to the farmers. The modes 
of calculation are not explicit in any of the countries, but are the subject of discussions 
to which the farmers take part in some of the countries (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina 
Faso and Mali). This does not happen in Ghana, where farmers seem to have to bear 
the variations in exchange rates and steady inflation on their own. 
77.  Concerning seeds, a generalised mechanism exists to support their use, and is 
explicit in all francophone countries, though less so in Ghana. Farmers are supplied 
with seed free of cost, or only pay for the cost of seed treatment chemical. Production 
has a cost, however, particularly where a premium is paid to seed producers in the 
form of a higher buying price for seedcotton destined for planting seeds (Mali, Burkina 
Faso and Cameroon). This type of support is not controlled by specific regulations and 
is more a matter of following longstanding practice or lasting informal regulation of a 
private nature and which would be hard to change quickly. It would be incorrect to 
speak of subsidies for seed use, in that the cost of the support is not borne by public 
funding but by players of the sector in a viable and explicit manner. It should be noted 
that when the sector went over to being managed by the inter-professional organisation 
in Benin, the cost of seed to the sector was still explicitly retained. 
78.  Inputs are supplied to farmers on credit in all the countries, but the terms of credit 
vary a great deal. In Ghana, till 1996, this credit was not even preset clearly as such, 
since it is deduced in the calculation of the buying price of seedcotton. This country 
has explicit input credit since then. In other countries, the rate of credit is implicit 
(Cameroon). Where the rate of credit is specified it can vary between countries or from 
one supplier to another in the same country (case of Cameroon or Côte d’Ivoire, where 
cotton companies and farmer organisations may both supply inputs). Cash sales of 
inputs are considered or even encouraged with the application of an advantageous 
price differential, but in all the countries the volumes concerned by cash sales are 
insignificant, demonstrating that the sale of inputs on credit is a good solution to the 
farmers’ constraint of cash flow.  
2.4.2.  Dominance of market forces and negotiation on the prices affecting farmers 
indirectly  
79.  The technical stages concerned by these prices are the acquisition of inputs, the 
transportation of cotton products, ginning and the sale of cotton products. 
80.  Concerning relationships with the suppliers for the acquisition of inputs, Ghana stands 
out by its weak bargaining position due to the small volume of its demand. This 
demand may be split between several cotton companies.  
81.  For the transportation of cotton products, and also for inputs in certain cases, the prices 
are those of the market, negotiated according to more or less complex modalities. In 
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calculations that integrate many parametres : the condition of the tracks, distance, etc.  
82.  Charges for ginning services only exist in Ghana where cotton companies operate, or 
operated in the past, without a ginning unit. A common price for this service was 
decided by all the ginners, but was not respected. All the ginners with under-used 
capacity were tempted to gin more, and accepted lower prices in order to do this. 
83.  All exports of cotton products are carried out according to market prices, it is in local 
sales that relations vary with stakeholders down-line. The application of market prices 
is only imposed in Ghana. In the other countries prices are administered in such a way 
as to be of benefit to the spinners (Benin and Cameroon), or neutral (Mali and Côte 
d’Ivoire), or according to a principle of mutual advantages to cope with the risks of 
world market fluctuation (Burkina Faso). In all these procedures of price 
administration, the reference is most usually the world price (although certain 
countries have not abandoned the notion of the cost price for lint, as in Burkina Faso 
and Cameroon). The negotiated prices correspond to an average price to be applied 
throughout the year.   
84.  Concerning the supply of seeds to local oilseed crushing mills, prices are generally 
controlled (Burkina Faso, Mali and Benin). Cameroon differs from the others in that 
ginning and oil extraction are integrated. The fixed price does not necessarily suit the 
seed sellers: in Benin the ginners have the possibility to export and find it hard to 
accept their obligation to sell locally at a lower price than the one they could obtain 
from export. In Côte d’Ivoire, the privatisation of the ginning mills has also led to the 
use of negotiated market prices, although this is not entirely respected in practice. 
2.5.  Similarities, diversity and variable trends in conditions and terms of 
transactions  
85.  By following the sequence of technical stages in the sector, we now go on to an 
analysis of the  terms and conditions of transactions or of service provision for main 
areas of interest. In this, we do not address the special cases of integration such as for 
ginning (integration of buying and ginning valid in all countries, except for the low 
and declining production in Ghana) or the classing of lint. Concerning this last aspect, 
in certain countries a separation is underway for this function to be transferred from 
the ginners to inter-professional organisations (Benin and Côte d’Ivoire).   
2.5.1.  Advantageous conditions for financing the acquisition of inputs in a few 
countries  
86.  Credit is not granted by the input supplier in all countries. While this is not 
unexpected in Ghana, for various reasons (including the small volumes concerned), it 
is now the case in some African francophone countries also. In Benin, the system of 
calling for tender and the emergence of numerous national suppliers seem to be behind 
the discontinuation of credit provision from the international suppliers (who in fact are 
the same ones supplying products to the national suppliers and no longer to the actors 
in possession of a guarantee in the form of cotton lint). In consequence, the national 
suppliers are obliged to turn to the domestic financial market, which offers less 
advantageous conditions. In Mali, the farmers’ unions which had had to supply certain 
inputs found difficulty obtaining the products from the international suppliers because 
they could not present the required guarantee.  
87.  Supply credit is beneficial because the international operators have an indirect 
beneficial effect on advantageous interest rates on the international financial markets. 
Competition in Mali has even pushed these suppliers so that they themselves have 
decided to grant a supply credit of 360 days, while the contract conditions stipulate 
only 240 days. Considering the procedure of input repayment in this country, which is 
of a period well inferior to 360 days, this is a loan which contributes to the cash-flow 
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markets does not necessarily imply excessive penalisation, since preferential rates may 
be obtained (e.g. in Benin). In some cases loan conditions are generalised, with very 
high interest rates (45% in Ghana), which can weaken the financial viability of the 
cotton companies and enable the input suppliers to control them.    
88.  The possibility of paying for inputs in local currency is another advantage available in 
francophone countries due to the parity between the FCFA and the Euro and the 
effective control of inflation. The situation is quite different in Ghana where inflation 
is high and exchange rates fluctuate widely.    
2.5.2.  Common type of input sales to farmers  
89.  The nature of input sales has become explicit everywhere. This was not the case in 
Ghana where a method integrating the cost of the inputs was used to calculate the 
buying price of seedcotton. This method was introduced to reduce the losses related to 
the diversion of seedcotton by farmers (who were selling their production to a different 
ginner to the one who had supplied the inputs). 
2.5.3.  Variable terms and conditions for credit associated with the distribution of 
inputs to farmers  
90.  We have already emphasised that the distribution of inputs to farmers is made almost 
exclusively on credit, with cash sales accounting for insignificant amounts.  Most 
often, the credit set aside for this is collective, attributed to a group of smallholders in 
which a joint liability mechanism operates to deal with repayment defaults by certain 
members. The interest rate is not always specified. It should be noted that distributors 
other than the cotton companies may apply higher interest rates (e.g. OPCC in 
Cameroon or cooperatives in Côte d’Ivoire). This is an indication of the possible 
dangers of separating different activities, which limits the possibilities for mutual 
support between them, also known as crossed-subsidies.  
91.  It is unusual for the banks to finance input credit to smallholder groups. It is found 
only in Burkina Faso and Mali where the agricultural banks replace the cotton 
company cotton companies for input credit. These banks pay the cotton companies 
immediately after input delivery to the villages, and are repaid by the latter when the 
seedcotton is sold.  
2.5.4.  Similarities, diversity and negative trends in the terms and conditions of 
buying seedcotton from smallholders.   
92.  An early announcement of the buying price for seedcotton is made in all 
countries, but there is a tendency to delay this announcement, so that it comes before 
marketing and not before planting as the farmers would prefer. The use of new 
formulas for calculating the buying price is strengthening this trend (Côte d’Ivoire).   
93.  Differential prices according to seedcotton quality are also widespread but with 
variable differentials (lowest in Cameroon and highest in Benin). The fact that 
virtually all the production is classed as first grade raises the question of the efficacy of 
seedcotton classification, a process in which farmers are often involved, but an explicit 
relationship between seedcotton grades and cotton lint types exist nowhere. In all the 
countries the ginners are associated with the process of judging the quality of the 
seedcotton at purchase, except in Benin where they only discover the quality after 
delivery at the mill. This can lead to disagreements and disputes over payment. 
94.  In all countries except Ghana, the marketing seedcotton is done through farmer 
groups, for which they are paid on a specified basis. Cameroon differs in that it has 
adopted a system of varied premiums paid depending on how well the village 
groups carry out this function.  
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geographical proximity to the farmers. This is also the case in Ghana where it is in 
the ginners’ interest to go to the villages for purchasing in order to reduce the risk of 
seeing the production being sold to others. 
96.  In all these cases, the transaction costs associated with the marketing of seedcotton 
are at the charge of the ginners, but where the operations have been transferred to 
the village groups the ginners have the possibility of reducing costs while creating a 
source of income for the village groups. This is a win-win situation.  
97.  A certain tendency to late payment of seedcotton is apparent, with delays well over the 
usual 2 -3 week period to which the farmers are accustomed (such as in Benin, and 
particularly with a private operator in Côte d’Ivoire). In the francophone countries, the 
privatisation of ginning is contributing to these delays, but other factors intervene as 
well, such as the extension of procedures (such as in Benin with the ginners’ payment 
to the CSRP prior to effective payment to the farmers) or financial difficulties of the 
cotton companies (Mali). 
98.  It is fairly unusual for the banks to be involved in the payment to the producers, except 
in Mali and Burkina Faso, where this is also connected to the fact that the banks have 
taken over the input credit in these countries.   
2.5.5.  On the conditions of funding seedcottton purchases  
99.  A few countries profit from financing by off-shore banks (Burkina Faso, Mali and 
Cameroon) which give them the benefits of favourable conditions on the international 
financial markets. The other countries are not necessarily cut off from benefiting in the 
same way, especially those where the privatisation of ginning mills has opened the 
door to multinational actors.   
2.5.6.  On the  conditions of delivery  
100.  Concerning input supply, delivery is most often made in warehouses shops belonging 
to the cotton companies. In Benin delivery is made in warehouses belonging to village 
groups. This development leads to greater efficiency by reducing the re-loading when 
it works well, but unfortunately this is not always the case, and delivery is made 
through the farmers' unions at the district level.  
101.  Inputs are distributed to smallholders close to their farms when they are needed. 
Delays are sometimes observed in cases when the sector is in financial difficulty 
because of delayed orders (Mali) or dissention during procedures of ordering inputs 
(Benin).   
102.  When cotton lint is exported, positions of delivery change and may even be reversed. 
Delivery in FOB position overrides the CIF position, a change related to the increased 
involvement of traders. This also applies to seed export, especially in Benin.  
103.  For local sales of lint or seed, delivery is made at the ginning mill, with the spinners 
and grinders organising the transport. 
2.5.7.  Important role of advance sales in lint export  
104.  For all the countries, forward sales for the export of lint are important, and sales may 
be contracted very early, often 4-5 months before sowing, that is 8 months before 
picking. This type of sale compensates for the impossibility of sales on future market, 
but the importance of this is positively correlated to the total volume of production.  
2.5.8.  Condition of financing local sales of cotton products  
105.  In those countries where the ginners grant supplier credit, this only concerns the sale of 
lint – it does not apply to the sale of seeds, which must be paid for on delivery.  
27 3 RESPECTABLE PARTIAL PERFORMANCE REGARDING THE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS  
106.  The work undertaken aims at identifying indicators of performance correlated with the 
development goals, and it is founded on the hypothesis that these indicators reveal the 
effectiveness of coordination: when high, they indicate high efficiency, when low they 
indicate coordination failure. 
107.  The indicators are appreciated qualitatively and relatively, in partial reference to the 
values observed in other countries: very favourable situation, favourable situation, 
unfavourable situation, very unfavourable situation. They are attributed marks so as to 
facilitate graphic representation: 7  = very favourable situation  ; 5 = favourable 
situation; 3 = unfavourable situation; 1 = very unfavourable situation. Graphs are thus 
obtained for performance levels with regard to development goals (poverty alleviation, 
environmental sustainability and international competitiveness).  
108.  In a synthetic approach, performance refers to the partial development objectives of 
level 2, the state of performance is given in three forms reproduced on the CD-ROM: 
•  The raw data presented in tabular form  : these are synthetic marks on 
performance for each technical stage and for the goals of poverty alleviation, 
environmental sustainability and international competitiveness (Chapter 3.2 of 
the summary of documents and output from each country). This table is 
derived from the marks given by each national team on the  indicators and, by 
using the methodology developed, the relationships established between the 
development goals, the technical stages of the commodity channel and the 
indicators.    
•  A table presenting an analysis of performance in the form of commentaries 
made by each national team. This table provides a general appreciation of the 
performance, the technical stages of the commodity channel that contribute 
positively or negatively to this performance and the most significant indicators 
for each of the general goals of development (Chapter 7.5 of the general 
summary of the CD-ROM).  
•  Illustrations of performance in the form of graphs presenting each of the three 
general development goals. “Imaginary” situations, based on the best results or 
the worst results observed over the entire network of countries, are presented 
on each graph for comparison (Chapter 3.3 of the summary of documents and 
output from each country). The best results thus correspond to the «  class 
genius » (not the outright champion in the world of cotton). This clearly legible 
presentation enables each country to compare its performance with the others.  
109.  It should be emphasised that the there are two drawbacks to the qualitative and 
relative evaluation of the performance indicators. The first relates to a certain 
amount of missing data in the data set that the national teams were able to collect. BY 
retaining the option of attributing a mark to any missing indicator that gives an 
unfavourable appreciation, there is a tendency (but this is intended to be interpolative) 
to penalise a perception of performance that cannot correspond to reality. The second 
drawback relates to qualitative appreciation, which is subjective, even when guidelines 
are established as a support to this appraisal. The risk is even greater when the 
exercise is carried out individually rather than collectively: this justifies the need 
for a collective approach to carrying out the qualitative appreciation of the 
indicators.   
110.  The effect of imprecision, or incorrectness, of appreciation may however be 
diminished (but not totally eliminated) when it stems from the fact that a large number 
of indicators are considered inducing then some compensation effect. Indeed, the 
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development goals and the performance indicators, and this increases the further up  
we go in the tree of objectives that we have constructed.   
111.  In this report we have chosen to restrict ourselves to commenting on the analysis of the 
graphs available on the CD-ROM in Chapter 3.3 of the country summaries, some of 
which are presented here. The detailed analyses found in appendixes  1.2.and 3 
identify, for each partial objective of level 2, the technical stages which have a positive 
or negative effect on the observed performance and the indicators that illustrate this 
effect. We will also comment on the differences between countries. Nonetheless, given 
the two drawbacks related to the exercise of indicator appraisal, there is a risk that the 
results are biased and so not fully representative of reality. 
112.  We analyse performance according to global development goal, concentrating on 
maximal and minimal levels of performance for each partial objective of development 
and emphasising the most outstanding differences between the countries in the 
network. 
3.1.  Performance on improving the contribution made by the sector to poverty 
alleviation 
113.  We present the graph for Cameroon, along with the graphs for the imaginary « class 
genius » and « class dunce ».  
114.  According to our marking system, the periphery of the “spider web” corresponds to the 
overall performance of the “world champion” with a maximal level for each of the 
partial objective of development. We find that the “class genius” of Résocot  (here on 
known as ‘max curve’) is still a long way from this coveted performance, more or less 
dependant on the partial objectives, except for “increase cotton income from the least 
advantaged cotton farms”. 
115.  Without being perfect, the overall performance of the max curve is still very 
respectable, corresponding to a mark of 5 or 6 in general on a scale of 7. Thus, for 
the network as a whole, the target of poverty reduction is correctly attained for 
each of its components. 
•  Especially for the partial objective « increase the income share of the worst-off 
producers” as indicated earlier, proof of a choice for a certain degree of equity 
that is useful to point out.   
•  But also for the partial objectives : 
•  « increase income by decreasing the cost of inputs »  
•  "increase income by improving the productivity of producers» , 
•  "reduce the risks due to natural factors", 
•  "improve food security", 
•  "increase the number of cotton producers", 
•  "improve road infrastructure", 
•  "improve the service of training /extension" 
•  on the other hand, the level is only just above average for the following partial 
objectives: 
•  "increase the income by increasing the price to the producers" 
•  "reduce economic risks" 
116.  Among the countries of the network, none can pretend to be the « class genius » 
since the curve of no one country follows that of the «max curve ». In fact, it is the 
francophone countries that contribute to plotting the level of the ‘max curve’ -  each of 
29 them contributes a maximum performance unattained by the others. In other words, 
each of these countries is a positive point of reference which can serve as inspiration 
for the others.    
117.  It should be emphasised however the exception of the partial objective « increase 
the income share for the worst-off producers» for which the maximal 
performance is attained by all the francophone countries except Benin. 
118.  Other maximum performances (among the countries in the network) for the partial 
objectives are attained by several countries. These are : 
•  « improve the income by increasing the price to the producers » attained by 
Mali and Burkina Faso, 
•  « increase incomes by improving the productivity of producers » by Burkina 
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and  Mali, 
•  « improve food security » by Burkina Faso and Mali, and 
•  «  improve the service quality of training/extension» by Benin and Côte 
d’Ivoire.   
Figure 1.  Performance of Cameroon regarding the contribution of various factors to 
poverty reduction  
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119.  No country in the network can be chosen as the « class dunce » either, even if the 
curve for Ghana is close to the ‘min curve’.  Neither are the performances 
corresponding to this curve catastrophic (i.e. corresponding to grade 1), except for the 
objective « improve the income share for the worst-off producers ». What we find is 
that within the network, the most marked opposition between countries concerns 
this objective, which deals with the differentiation process between smallholders.  
This objective aside, the differences between the max and min curves are not so great. 
120.  It is important to note that the francophone countries also contribute to the minimal 
performances, but in different ways, indicating that good performance for certain 
partial objectives does not protect against poor performance for other objectives. 
Thus: 
30 •  Benin contributes to the minimal performance of  “improve food security” and 
“improve road infrastructures" 
•  Burkina Faso, Mali and Cameroon contribute to the minimum performance of 
“improve the service of training/extension" 
3.2.  Performance in providing guarantees of a sustainable environment /public 
health  
121.  We present the graph for Ghana to demonstrate that the optimal performance is quite 
far from the edges of the ‘web’, but is still respectable with a mark of 5 (on a scale of 
7) for the four objectives concerned. 
Figure 2.  Graph 2 Performance of Ghana regarding environmental sustainability   
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122.  The ‘max curve’ shows that no individual partial objective stands out. The differences 
with the ‘min curve’ are also similar, except for the objective « prevention of the direct 
risks of poisoning of the rural population” for which the difference is smaller.   
123.  Among the countries in the network, none can be designated as «  class genius  ». 
Ghana stands out for displaying maximum performance for two objectives 
(“prevention of water pollution by chemical products” and « prevention of the risks of 
direct poisoning of the rural populations”), but also the lowest for the objective 
“Protect the cultural aptitudes of the soil” . 
124.  The countries do not show a common pattern of performance. Cameroon’s 
performance is the opposite to that of Ghana, while the other countries most often 
show average performance for each of the four partial objectives. 
125.  It should be noted that there are fewer relationships between the objectives and 
indicators, which makes the evaluation of performance more sensitive to the pitfalls of 
the appreciation of the indicators, particularly because a certain amount of data is 
missing.  
3.3.  Performance in strengthening international competitiveness  
126.  We present the graph for Benin to demonstrate that the ‘max curve’ is distinct from the 
“world champion” except for the partial objective «  adapt the classing of lint to 
31 international standards”. The level of performance for the partial objective “supply 
cotton corresponding to the requirements of the cotton lint users » is also very good.  
Figure 3.  Performance of Benin regarding competitiveness on the international 
market. 
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127.  In general, the level of the « max curve » is highly respectable with marks of at least 
5 (on a scale of 7) for all the objectives, excepting « strengthen competitiveness by 
obtaining better prices in the local sale or in the export of cotton seeds  », due in 
particular to the fact that not much data was transmitted for this by the stakeholders in 
the sectors. This remark also applies to several other partial objectives, which leads us 
to emphasise that these results should be treated with some reserve. 
128.  Among the countries in the network, none can claim to be the «  class genius  », 
although Benin does stand out well by supplying five of the maximum performances 
observed. Two of these owe much to the use of HVI equipment for the classification of 
cotton lint even though it does not yet concern all the production. 
129.  Several countries contribute to the observed maximal performances :  
•  Burkina Faso and Mali for the partial objective ‘reduce lint production costs » 
•  Burkina Faso, Mali and Benin for the objective « strengthen competitiveness 
by obtaining better prices in the local sales or in the export of lint  » and 
« strengthen competitiveness by obtaining better prices in the local sales or in 
the export of cotton seeds ».  
130.  In short, 3 countries - Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali - constitute the leading group 
concerning the objective of international competitiveness, with the proviso that the 
data communicated was inadequate.    
131.  On the other side, Ghana’s performance is almost identical to the « min curve », except 
for a slight difference for a single objective. It is probable that this performance 
suffered a great deal from lack of data, but not necessarily more than for the other 
countries. 
32 132.  The differences in performance between the “max” and “min” curves vary more 
depending on the partial objective – they are particularly great for the objectives “adapt 
lint classification to international standards” and “strengthen competitiveness through 
obtaining better prices for the local sale of lint”.  
3.4.  Partial conclusion   
133.  It is clear that the evaluation of performance regarding the general goals of 
development by breaking these down into partial objectives is worthwhile.  The 
maximum performance obtained for each of the general objectives (marked on a scale 
of 7) was highly respectable.  
134.  The possibility of dividing up the evaluation of the general performance of the 
cotton sectors of the different countries is an originality of the Résocot project. 
This partial approach is carried out on two levels, one referring to the performance of 3 
general goals of development, and the other, within each of these general goals, 
referring to the corresponding partial objectives. This approach makes it possible to 
stop talking about performance loosely or referring to development goals in general, 
but to place performance at the level of stated objectives that are less general and less 
distant. 
135.  Within the Résocot project, there is no « class genius » who reaches the maximum 
performance for all the partial objectives.  Certain countries manage to accumulate the 
best performance for several partial objectives, but they are not often the same ones.  
This result indicates that, in practical terms, the countries can take inspiration from 
each other to fill the gaps in performance that may exist between them.  
136.  There is not really a “bottom of the class” even if Ghana stands out with performances 
that are often identical to the minimum level observed. 
137.  It is observed that, for each of the general goals of development, the fact that one 
country manages to attain maximal levels of performance for certain partial objectives 
does not protect it from having minimal performance for others. This may indicate a 
tendency to give priority to certain partial objectives, with a negative impact on 
the others. It follows that balance between the partial objectives is not the same in 
every country, and could hardly be same for all countries.  It may be that the balance 
found in any country is the explicit or implicit choice of a dominant stakeholder.  
138.  With evolution towards a more collective, inter-professional management of the 
sectors, the possibility arises for aiming at obtaining a negotiated balance.  We 
believe that the initial results of the Résocot project help to decide the 
composition of groups of objectives, or even to help rank them to arrive at a 
balance that is acceptable for all the stakeholders.  
139.  Finally, it is useful to bear in mind that the evaluation of the most general 
performances depends on that of the indicators, which can suffer from a lack of 
transmitted data. Through the analytical approach of linking the objective and the 
indicators of performance which leads to a large number of relationships, certain 
robustness is given to the analysis through the effect of compensation between the 
indicators. Nonetheless, the lack of communication (to various extents in the different 
countries) during the Résocot project concerned a considerable amount of data and 
there is therefore a degree of imprecision in the results of analysis undertaken. We do 
not believe that this makes the methods and the tools developed any less worthwhile if 
the pitfalls related to the evaluation of the indicators can be avoided (as mentioned 
above).   
33 4 THE EFFECT OF THE ORGANISATION MODE ON THE 
PERFORMANCES OBTAINED 
4.1.  Reminder of the method used and the approach taken in to produce the 
regional synthesis  
140.  We present here a short description of the method followed. For more details, refer to 
chapter 5.5.1 of the CD-ROM.   
141.  To define the effect of the organisation mode on the performance of the cotton sector 
in each country, we approached the problem through a study of qualitative 
considerations for each of the development goals (at level 1 of partial objectives), 
combining performance indicators and elements corresponding to the organisation of 
the sectors. In order to have sufficient precision, a large number of qualitative aspects 
are retained. General key factors of performance were defined to convey the effects of 
the organisation mode. There were 9 of them, each corresponding to a sub-set of 
well-identified qualitative considerations. These key factors relate to the capacity to 
improve performance :  
•  The capacity to adapt to market fluctuations through maintaining price 
competitiveness, 
•  The capacity to resist market fluctuations through  maintaining competitiveness in 
quality, 
•  The capacity to raise productivity in cottonseed production, 
•  The capacity to mitigate the effects of changing natural conditions, 
•  The capacity to promote sustainable production that preserves human health and the 
environment, 
•  The capacity to maintain farmers' commitment to cotton production, 
•  The capacity to maintain the commitment of other players to cotton production, 
•  The capacity to provide public/collective goods and services, 
•  The capacity to avoid or to manage conflicts between cotton sector stakeholders. 
 
142.  Key factors are distinct combinations of qualitative considerations, and these 
combinations vary according to the development objectives to which they refer. So, a 
change in the organisation mode will modify the levels of some qualitative 
considerations which spill over only on some key factors but not necessarily with 
regard to the whole set of development goals.  
143.  Resorting to this approach of passing through qualitative considerations results from 
the concern of going beyond a static assessment of performance with no clear 
connection with the organisation modes. Levels of key factors correspond somewhat to 
indications of performance if the organisation mode remains unchanged, they show 
also how such levels could be improved or depreciated in case the organisation mode 
evolves in a positive or a negative direction. It is nevertheless not easy to link the key 
factors levels with the levels performance indicators of the former section. 
Performance indicators levels refer directly to development objectives, with no clear 
connection with organisation mode while levels of key factors are more directly 
influenced by organisation modes but are only linked indirectly to development 
objectives. 
144.  The main lessons relating to the effect of the organisation mode on performance are 
derived as follows :  
34 •  Firstly, by an analysis of the qualitative considerations contributing to each of 
the partial objectives of level 1, with indications of any differences between 
countries and descriptions of the effect of the organisation mode on the 
observed differences. 
•  Then, by an analysis of the levels of the key factors. This additional analysis is 
required in order to avoid the artefact of considering the partial objectives as 
being separate from each other (when in fact they can be in synergy or 
opposition). It is also needed because the headings of the key factors are far 
more general than those of the qualitative considerations, and there is even a 
certain universality about them which will facilitate comparisons with analyses 
of other sectors. This type of analysis gives a more dynamic view of 
performance: the performance that might be expected in the short term if the 
organisation mode remains unchanged, or the prospects for improvements if 
the organisation mode were to evolve.    
145.  It should be noted that we are addressing the partial objectives of level 1, a level above 
the partial objectives of level 2 that were analysed in the previous chapter. Of course, it 
would, theoretically, have been possible to define the qualitative considerations related 
to the partial objectives for level 2 also, but this would have greatly increased the 
workload.  
146.  In our analysis, the reference to different organisation modes poses a problem of 
semantics. It is not possible to talk of a liberal mode because this type of mode, in its 
pure form, operates in none of the countries of the Project. Nor is it possible to speak 
of organisation modes with monopolies in the francophone countries, since they are 
quite different from each other. To avoid giving the false impression that we oppose 
the anglophone and francophone countries in our analysis, we must also avoid, as far 
as possible, referring to the countries in these terms. Therefore, we use the long 
expressions “organisation mode oriented by liberalisation (Ghana) and « organisation 
mode not oriented by liberalisation” (francophone countries). Now and again we will 
also refer to the “organisation mode oriented by privatisation  » (Benin and Côte 
d’Ivoire fall into this category).  
4.2.  No fixed effect of the organisation mode to achieve the goals of 
development (partial objectives of level 1)  
147.  In accordance with the process of qualitative and relative evaluation, the qualitative 
considerations are assessed by the national teams, with marks and comments to justify 
them.  The guidelines for assessing the qualitative considerations can be found on the 
CD-ROM (chapter 5.5.3) along with the summary tables of the marks and the 
comments on the 6 countries concerned (chapters 7.6 and 7.7). 
148.  In this report we aim to identify the differences between countries for the way 
qualitative considerations contribute to the development goals (more specifically, the 
partial objectives of level 1) and to define the impact of the variations in the 
organisation mode of the national sectors in order to explain the observed differences. 
4.2.1.  Several advantageous factors for increasing producers’ income from cotton   
149.  The evolution of the price of seedcotton cannot be considered as being positive in 
any of the 6 countries in the network due to fluctuations over the last three seasons, 
and is even expressed as a decline (Côte d’Ivoire). In none of the countries is there 
price competition for seedcotton. While this is not surprising for the non-liberalised 
(francophone) countries, the absence of price competition in Ghana, even before 
Zoning (decision to attribute local monopolies as from the 2000-2001 season), is a 
negation of liberal economic theory. Farmers do however have a say in the 
administration of the buying price, by taking part in the discussions to fix this 
price. This participation is effective in all the countries, even in Ghana, but it must 
35 be admitted that the degree of impact to the advantage of the smallholders varies 
from country to country.  This degree of impact depends less on the system of 
coordination (monopoly of sales or not) than on the characteristics (age, how it is run) 
of the farmers' association or cooperative and whether a federative approach has 
helped to reach adequate recognition of farmers' institution. In this, the countries of 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire are ahead of Mali, then Cameroon, with Ghana 
(where the presence of farmers in price negotiations is more symbolic), trailing behind. 
The age of the association is an important factor, since time is required for the farmers 
to build up the strength of their institutions. This not only concerns the relationships 
between the farmers and the cotton companies, but the duration of the relationships 
between farmers within the associations. However, the liberal principle which 
encourages the farmers to turn to the highest bidder and change partners each year 
pushes them to working out relationships on a yearly basis. It is to be feared that this 
will work against the establishment of long-term relationships.  
150.  In all the countries, the smallholders now only benefit from a minimum in the 
stabilisation of the buying price of seedcotton, in the form of the fixed and unique 
price throughout the season and in all cotton zones. This was true in Ghana, even 
before the adoption of the ‘zoning’   system, when the sale of seedcotton was 
liberalised and operators were supposed to be competing for prices throughout the 
selling period. In the countries where the sale of seedcotton is not liberalised (the 
francophone countries), the institution of  inter-annual stabilisation has 
disappeared  due to the cessation of all procedures for supplying the stabilisation 
funds. In practice however, there is still some scope for this through the mechanisms of 
annual negotiation of the buying price, in which the farmers participate.  Out of this 
process “political prices” have emerged that are higher than what world market 
indicators would have allowed (the case of Mali in 2000/2001, which is even cited by 
the ICAC). 
151.  Efficiency in the marketing and processing cotton products does not have clear impact 
on the price paid to smallholders, even though efficiency is not in the least penalised 
by the system of export taxes on cotton lint for example. This is undeniably the case in 
Ghana where private operators are not subject to outside control of their activities and 
also for the countries where sales have not been liberalised. Regarding terms of 
payment, in the liberalised-country of Ghana, smallholders benefited from short 
terms (since it was in the ginners’ interest to arrive early for buying and to pay the 
farmers in case the farmers were tempted to sell to another ginner), in accordance with 
neo-liberal theory. Owing to severe financial crisis of cotton companies in this country, 
payment have be greatly delayed. In the non-liberalised countries this payment term 
tends to be getting longer than before, especially in the those countries where 
ginning is privatised (the case of Mali is different, due to financial difficulties in the 
sector).   In these countries, price systems with two-step payment dates, either 
following the "refund principle" (Mali especially), or according to the new modes of 
calculating the buying price in reference to the world price and the production costs 
incurred by the smallholder. Such an application means that marketing and processing 
efficiency can in theory be passed on to the price paid to the smallholders, and the set 
up for inter-professional discussion should allow this to be applied. In practice, the 
knock-on effect of the refund system has been actually advantageous, it is harder to 
comment on the new modes of calculating the buying price of seedcotton, which are 
more recent and which were put in place at a bad time for the world market. In 
general, it can be said that coordination by the market alone in a liberal system 
cannot allow smallholders to benefit from the efficient marketing and processing 
of cotton products. In non-liberalised trading systems, the knock-on effect is not 
36 automatic but can be favoured by a price fixation mechanism that takes it into 
consideration.  
152.  The evolution in input costs paid by smallholders is perceived in various ways. In none 
of the countries is this penalised by fiscal pressure, especially since the enforcement of 
the ECOWAS tax measures. However, in no country do the smallholders benefit 
explicitly from an input subsidy. They pay the true price for inputs, especially in 
Ghana where any, including strong, variation in exchange rates and inflation rates, is 
passed on in its entirety to the smallholders. In nominal terms, input costs have 
increased and it is this perception which comes out of the francophone countries, 
despite the increased number of input suppliers (especially for pesticides, less so for 
fertiliser supply, which is dominated by 2 main operators). In these countries, input 
prices are determined through inter-professional negotiation, in which the 
smallholders participate and the decision is ratified in an official announcement by 
the government. The possibility of an implicit subsidy that would benefit farmers 
cannot therefore be excluded. Once again, it is less the system of coordination by the 
market (liberalisation) or by the State (monopoly) which makes the difference than the 
place taken by the farmers in the decision-making bodies. 
153.  In general, the smallholders in francophone countries have better access to inputs, 
although the situation in Ghana is also adequate on the whole. In all the countries, 
whatever the organisation mode, the smallholders can obtain good quality products, on 
time, delivered close to them and on credit. Quantities used have increased. This is 
because the area planted to cotton has increased, while unit dosage per area has tended 
to remain stable, or even to decrease. While it is possible to state that, for the countries 
with non-liberalised markets, all the smallholders who want them can obtain the inputs 
they need, and the number of cotton producers has increased in these countries, it is 
less certain in Ghana where the phenomenon of “input and output deviation
3” leads the 
cotton companies to identify the “good” and “bad” farmers and to drop the latter. This 
phenomenon is seen in all the countries where marketing has been liberalised, and it is 
therefore justified to say that this is a risk that is frequently associated with this type of 
liberalisation. Smallholders in Ghana also suffer from very high bank interest rates 
(45%) at the acquisition of inputs by the cotton companies. In contrast, in several 
francophone countries the farmers benefit from advantageous conditions from their 
suppliers, due in particular to the large volumes imported and the lower uncertainty 
that these suppliers see in the system of monopoly trading for seedcotton. Thus it can 
be seen that the farmers of one coastal country with a liberalised economy can 
have to bear input prices that are higher than elsewhere. On the other hand, in 
terms of technical support for input use, the countries with non-liberalised trading do 
not necessarily provide an adequate service in the eyes of the smallholders (complaints 
most forthcoming in Côte d’Ivoire and even in Benin).  
154.  Farmers have not benefited from a real increase in productivity (productivity of 
the land, in terms of yield) and all the countries do not have the same prospects for 
improvement.  Everywhere, yields have at best stagnated, if not declined : this 
statement is nevertheless to be balanced by the fact that the area under cotton and the 
number of producers have increased in many countries. Yield levels are certainly 
higher in the francophone countries than in Ghana, but the prospects of evolution 
depend on the quality of the extension and research services. On this subject, the 
countries that have clear mechanisms for financing these services (Côte d’Ivoire and 
Benin) based on defined criteria that are indexed on performance indicators for the 
sector (the best example is Burkina Faso) offer the best prospects, whereas there is 
                                                 
3 Input deviation benefits to food crops and therefore to food security, it should not be regarded as a mere 
wastage. 
37 little hope on the horizon for Ghana.     What emerges is that it is not the 
organisation mode (market or State) that counts, but the supply of public goods 
by collective initiatives that are more far reaching than price discussions alone.   
155.  Because differentiated prices are applied according to seedcotton grades while most of 
the production is graded at the best quality (usually over 95% of the production of 
seedcotton), it can be stated that the smallholders are rewarded for the quality 
they produced in all the countries, whatever the organisation mode of the sector. 
Some uncertainty remains concerning Ghana where information on the proportions of 
different qualities is lacking. Nevertheless, such a high proportion of first grade 
seedcotton, in spite of the high volumes produced, could also point to certain 
inefficiency at discriminating between qualities at a time when a decline in at quality 
has been indicated (especially in Benin). In a nutshell, the different organisation modes 
do not supply the same level of information to help assess how the small farmer 
benefits from the quality he produces. It is not possible to state that the organisation 
modes in the francophone countries are optimal for ensuring that farmer is paid 
equitably for the quality produced (to some extent farmers are benefiting from some 
complacency).  
156.  As indicated in the analysis concerning the evolution of input costs or knock-on effects 
of marketing and processing efficiency, tax barriers are no longer an indirect handicap 
to the producers. The only case of discord concerns Mali, where smallholders disagree 
with the application of the TAF ("Taxe sur les activités financières" or tax on financial 
activities) to the input credit accorded to villages. 
4.2.2.  Too few factors for risk reduction  
157.  Farmers’ perceptions of the risks related to natural factors do not dissuade them 
from planting cotton, even though there has been much work done to inform people 
about declining levels of soil fertility and the evolution of pest pressure (resistance for 
certain pests, sudden infestation of others in some years and not others). The way the 
sector is organised does not influence this perception. In contrast, economic risks are 
perceived more serenely in those modes of organisation where farmers effectively 
participate in making decisions over prices (seedcotton and inputs). 
158.  Farmers have no means of reducing the effects related to the risks from natural factors, 
or when they do, they remain at limited scale. In none of the countries is there a system 
of insurance to limit the effects of natural disasters, although this is under discussion in 
Mali. In all the francophone countries, actions to counter soil erosion, or to manage 
rural community areas, have been initiated, but widespread diffusion is still hesitant. In 
most of these countries, a new chemical control programme to prevent and manage 
resistance of one pest to pyrethrinoids has been started; an approach resembling a 
programme of rational control (Staggered and Targeted control, or "lutte étagée ciblée" 
or LEC) is being applied on a small scale in only 2 countries (Benin and Mali). In 
conclusion, smallholders everywhere are ill-equipped to reduce the effects of natural 
disasters, but they can be assisted to prevent the occurrence of some of these disasters, 
where the organisation mode allows research and extension to really get involved, and 
where there is coordination for the acquisition of the necessary inputs. From this last 
point of view, the mode based on liberalisation is not necessarily the most 
advantageous. 
159.  The removal of all subsidies aimed explicitly at inputs in all the countries does not 
help reduce the effects of economic risks.  The organisation modes that integrate 
mechanisms for negotiation including an effective role for the representatives of 
farmers’ institutions are, however, more advantageous through the possible influence 
on price fixation, which reduces economic risks, and even on the adoption of implicit 
subsidies for inputs. These modes are in operation where the commercialisation of 
38 seedcotton is not liberalised, but what counts, as mentioned earlier, is the real power 
wielded by the farmers’ representatives, established on longstanding relationships 
between the stakeholders.  
160.  To cope with this risk environment, the 6 countries have some common reactions, and 
some divergent reactions, which have a certain relation to the way the sectors are 
organised.  The intention to diversify agricultural production is often proclaimed but 
rarely put into effect on a large enough scale, since this would imply setting up, or 
consolidating, new commodity chains, demanding willpower, means and time. The 
reduced use of bought inputs is noticeable everywhere, but this is not compensated by 
an increased use of other inputs, such as organic manure (requiring high labour costs, 
animals and transport, and the quantities produced are inadequate). In general, the 
number of cotton producers is increasing except in Ghana where late payments are 
too great (also the case with a private operator in Côte d’Ivoire). The same distinction 
is found concerning the increased area planted to cotton, which is very clear in at 
least two countries (Mali and Burkina Faso), although this may be a manifestation of 
migration towards zones of higher or less erratic rainfall (Burkina Faso and 
Cameroon).  Quality is apparently being maintained, although there are already 
some signs of a decline (Côte d’Ivoire and Benin). All in all, there is less farmers' 
commitment to cotton production in Ghana, where the organisation mode is strongly 
pervaded by privatisation and liberalisation, even though the farmers lack an 
alternative cash crop here. 
161.  Food security does not suffer from cotton production in any of the countries concerned 
and it even benefits from it in some countries, although there is a lot of room for 
improvement. This situation results from cash income from cotton which enables 
investment for improving food production. This effect is still modest, because it is 
recognised that food production is more often increased by increasing the area under 
cultivation than by improving yields, access to inputs intended specifically for food 
crops is still poor, and technical support for food production is still inadequate. Mali 
stands out from the rest, especially in the zones where land shortage has reached a 
stage where it is difficult to further expand the area under cultivation. There is also 
little incentive to increase food production through improved infrastructures for the 
commercialisation of food crops. The improvement of food security calls for the 
supply of public goods (technical support, commercialisation infrastructures) that 
there is no hope of obtaining from the market alone. Neither will they 
automatically come from coordination by the State, or from collective inter-
professional coordination because it all depends on what priority and means are 
given to it. Up till now, apart from declarations of intention, the priority given to this 
in practice has been modest, and the current principles of concentrating activities 
strictly around cotton leaves little hope of a change in the present situation.  
4.2.3.  Absence of discrimination as a factor of improving equity between producers 
in terms of cotton income  
162.  In terms of the number of smallholders concerned by cotton income, the situation of 
equity is good in the countries where the number of producers has increased, that 
is, in the francophone countries (although this is qualified a statement for Côte 
d’Ivoire), but not in Ghana. This general increase in the number of producers must not 
be allowed to mask the phenomenon of geographical displacement of production, 
which means that certain farmers no longer concerns benefit from cotton income 
(Cameroon, Burkina Faso). 
163.  Among the farmers drawing income from cotton, the application of a single 
buying price for all wherever they may live is an element of equity. This also 
applies for access to inputs and input credit, but this should be less true in Ghana 
where there is a hint that farmers may be selected. Theoretically, equal access to 
39 technical advice is another element of equity, but in practice, this statement is 
mitigated by two factors. The first is that the reduction of extension schemes, along 
with the inadequate standard of extensionists, means that it is no longer possible to 
reach all the farmers efficiently (Benin and Ghana). The second is that where many 
cotton companies operate with different strategies of technical support to cotton 
production (Côte d’Ivoire), it is unclear just how equal the farmers are with respect to 
the services to which they have a right. All these factors of equity, some needing 
qualification, do not eliminate the phenomenon of the difference in income related to 
differences between farm structures (in particular farm size, equipment). Mali is the 
only country to dispose of a series of statistics for four classes of farm which are 
retained. These statistics can help to evaluate the incidence of this structural 
differentiation on cotton income and, in return, the incidence of this income on the 
accentuation of this structural differentiation.  One salient fact concerns the decline in 
support for production equipment for which agreed efforts are weak, and without 
which it is the ‘initial wealth’ of a farm that allows it to become better equipped, 
whereas the others are condemned to a type of farming that is quasi-manual.    
164.  Another dimension of equity for the farmers concerns the evolution of the added value 
they obtain from the cotton production and the farmers’ share of the total added value.  
The fact that smallholders have an effective voice in fixing prices, and on the correct 
execution of the services they require is an advantage. This is not the case with the 
organisation mode dominated by the principle of liberalisation; neither is it automatic 
with the organisation modes that do not follow this principle. Where inter-professional 
administration is beginning to take shape all the elements of equity emphasised here 
are not yet entirely taken into consideration. This is particularly true for production 
equipment. This difference in the organisation mode explains why, even among the 
countries that are not oriented by the principle of liberalisation, the evolution of the 
level of added value is perceived differently (positively in Benin, Burkina Faso and 
Côte d’Ivoire, mixed or negative in Mali). On the other hand, farmers' appreciation of 
the share of the total added value they get suffers from the lack of necessary 
information, in such a way that this appreciation still refers implicitly to the level of 
the seedcotton buying price in most countries. 
4.2.4.  Negative trend for improvements to the provision of public services   
165.  In the field of communication networks (roads and tracks), the level is in general 
considered to be insufficient, except in Ghana where the poor condition of the network 
is particularly emphasised.  There is no systematic improvement to this network (an 
improvement of this type is only mentioned for Burkina Faso and Benin) and this 
evolution is caused by two different factors related to the organisation mode. Where 
the principle of liberalisation dominates, maintenance and improvement of 
communication infrastructures are the responsibility of the public authorities (since it 
concerns public goods) and the cotton companies are not concerned. With the other 
organisation modes, the roles are shared between the State and the cotton companies, 
but the lack of means attributed to state services means that the cotton companies have 
to make all the effort themselves, within their means (which the situation of the world 
market limits to a large extent). In fact, in the first organisation mode the risk of 
degradation of the network becomes a certainty, whereas the others only limit the 
damage, which is neither sufficient nor satisfactory. 
166.  In the field of the provision of training and extension services, the degree of 
satisfaction divides the 6 countries into two groups in relation to the organisation 
modes in the countries concerned.  The appreciation is negative for the organisation 
mode oriented by the principle of liberalisation (Ghana), but it is also negative in two 
countries that have not chosen this principle but that of privatisation (Benin and Côte 
d’Ivoire). A few more years are needed before the responsibility for this service by 
40 inter-professional bodies in the latter two countries can be judged.  Even though the 
cotton companies or inter-profession may, in theory, share this role with the public 
bodies, it is the former that intervene in practice, essentially for cotton cultivation. 
Thus, the principle of liberalisation does not ensure public services (in accordance 
with neo-classical theory) and greater efficiency is not guaranteed by the 
involvement of private operators   (in contradiction to neo-classical theory), even in 
a context which protects private enterprise from competition. Intervention by public 
monopolies does not appear to be worse, as opposed to what is often proclaimed, even 
if it could be improved. 
4.2.5.  Small scale actions to guarantee sustainable management of the cultivated 
areas  
167.  The perception of how land resources are evolving is globally negative, but is not 
directly affected by the organisation mode of the sectors. In all the countries, the 
question of declining soil fertility is raised, while land availability is often more 
limiting, and is even the source of serious conflicts over land tenure in certain 
countries (Côte d’Ivoire), although not in Ghana.   
168.  The means for conserving the cropping aptitude of the soils are still limited and 
rarely adopted on a large scale. People are aware that there is a real need for soil 
conservation, but the trend is towards lower fertility and this is not counter-balanced 
by increased fertiliser use, or by greater use of organic manure, or by an extension of 
anti-erosion activities, and even less by the introduction of new cultural techniques. 
The countries with a organisation mode non-oriented by the principle of 
liberalisation have nonetheless made more efforts to promote these actions, with 
results varying among the different countries. Mali stands out for actions on the 
prevention of soil erosion and the promotion of organic manure, while Cameroon 
is exceptional in its large-scale adoption of non-conventional cultural techniques.  
169.  It is also in the countries with a organisation mode non-oriented by the principle of 
liberalisation that there have been attempts at collective approaches to the problem of 
fertility (through actions against erosion or land management at the level of the 
villages), but since large- scale diffusion is blocked, the individual approach seems to 
be more realistic. 
170.  The perception of how pest pressure is evolving is negative in all the countries, in 
terms of higher degrees of infestation, incidence of some resistance to some 
insecticide, or sudden heavy attacks of secondary pests  at certain times (for example, 
whitefly in Burkina Faso) sometimes associated with physiological disorders (red 
cotton disease in Mali). It is hard to establish a direct link between these changes and 
the organisation of the cotton sectors. 
171.  The effect of the organisation mode can be expressed through certain ways of 
reducing pest pressure. All the countries have access to insecticides of good 
quality,  but these products may be contaminated by the influx of products from 
neighbouring countries (Ghana). The negative impact of this is all the greater as the 
difference in prices is large and the distribution of products poorly coordinated among 
the actors. Training in the correct use of pesticides is available in all the countries, but 
the quality of the training may be criticised where this is taken care of by private 
operators (Côte d’Ivoire). The promotion of chemical control programmes with 
alternating active ingredients (“window programmes”) to prevent and manage 
resistance from American bollworm (H. armigera) is working well in all the 
francophone countries, but not in Ghana. Research is also underway to develop new 
pest control programmes, which have yet to produce results, but the means allotted to 
this differ between countries – in Ghana they are apparently insignificant because the 
cotton companies lack interest in research, or rather in funding it. 
41 172.  The approach taken for controlling pest pressure is still generally an individual one in 
all the countries except Mali and Cameroon. Mali stands out because it aims to diffuse 
a new method of chemical control (Staggered and Targeted Control or "Lutte étagée 
ciblée" or LEC) which may be more effective, more sustainable, and cheaper but 
which requires that practices be coordinated at village level and that farmers undergo a 
rather laborious training (Benin has also opted for this direction, but on a smaller 
scale). Cameroon is setting up a distinct system for the distribution of insecticides with 
cost evaluated for villages rather than on the level of individuals, with aim of inciting 
farmers to carry out the number of treatments entered in the calculation of costs. This 
is also an expression of a collective approach to managing pest pressure, even if it does 
go against the principle of rational use of chemicals. The initiatives in all three 
countries arise from organisation modes that are not oriented by the principle of 
liberalisation, and it is reasonable to ask whether they could take place within different 
modes.  
4.2.6.  Positive trend for the prevention of harm from chemical products  
173.  In all the countries, little information is available on water pollution by chemical 
products (e.g. pesticide residues). Studies have been carried out in the cotton 
producing regions of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, but their very existence is little 
known.  
174.  To avoid this type of pollution, information is disseminated and integrated in the 
training of insecticide use. However, the training given does not appear to be 
appropriate enough or well attended in certain countries (Ghana). It is in the countries 
where the organisation mode is not oriented by liberalisation that a positive change 
towards the use of less toxic and less persistent products is seen. These changes follow 
the recommendations of international or regional organisations, whereas elsewhere 
cost seems to be the most important factor (Ghana). In this context, the continued use 
in the former countries of endosulfan, an old product, in the application of the 
« window programmes » is somewhat contested by outside experts.  
175.  Information is also lacking on the situation concerning the harmful effects of pesticides 
on human health. A lot of noise was made a few years ago over cases of human death 
in Benin, and even if things seem to calmed down, this is a sign that there is much to 
be done in the field of information and training so as to reach more people, and not 
only cotton producers.  
176.  The adoption of regulations for product certification and the interdiction to use 
uncertified products are positive moves towards the prevention of harmful effects on 
human health, which go beyond the concern of the cost of the product that the 
application of the principle of liberalisation may push to consider solely.    
4.2.7.  Little action to increase competitiveness through adaptation to the qualitative 
requirements of the users 
177.  Concerning the situation of the quality of lint production, Ghana differs from the other 
countries in that it does not have a quality appraisal system. It is therefore difficult to 
appreciate the situation of quality in Ghana, whereas this appreciation is good on the 
whole for the countries whose organisation mode is not oriented by liberalisation, with 
a certain amount of fluctuation over time. There seem to be few complaints regarding 
quality in these latter countries, but this should be taken with reservation since it is a 
sensitive subject for which information is not fully communicated. On the other hand, 
it must be true that Ghana does not receive complaints from its clients over quality, 
since this is determined by the clients themselves. However, this does not guarantee 
that Ghana produces a good quality or that it benefits equitably from the payment for 
the quality it produces.  
42 178.  On the subject of quality improvement by the smallholder, apart from the application 
of differentiated prices according to the quality grade of seedcotton, which is practiced 
in all the countries, no other actions are evident except in Burkina Faso, which aims to 
develop varieties of a new type (that shed their leaves early). This type of action may 
only be envisaged in the organisation modes where funding is allotted to research on a 
long-term basis. On the other hand, none of the organisation modes appear to be 
capable of imagining additional actions for improving quality.  
179.  To conserve the quality of seedcotton after commercialisation, it is important that it be 
taken quickly to the ginneries to avoid damage by rain. This is a key issue in those 
countries where cotton production is important. The conservation of quality during 
ginning is taken care of by modern ginning equipment in all the countries with a 
organisation mode non-oriented by liberalisation (ginning speed adapted to the 
installed capacity, humidifiers). This concern does not emerge from Ghana, where the 
volume produced does not warrant large capacities of investment for modernisation. 
180.  With respect to making the most of the quality produced, all the countries demonstrate 
a certain hesitancy, but this varies between the countries with a organisation mode not 
oriented by liberalisation. All the countries are attached to the sale of lint according to 
the conventional classification (visual and manual « pulling », to estimate fibre length), 
even if some countries possess HVI machines (though not enough of them) for 
automatic classing, integrating a large number of technological characteristics of the 
fibre.  None of the countries have a policy of marketing that gain advantage from the 
quality of its cotton. The organisation mode that protects from domestic competition 
does not appear to induce greater commercial aggressiveness or greater dynamism for 
conforming to changing standards of classification.  
4.2.8.  The influence of the volume produced for increasing competitiveness by 
reducing production and marketing costs of lint  
181.  In the field of the cost of seedcotton acquisition, the countries with a organisation 
mode non-oriented by liberalisation that transferred the farm gate collection to village 
organisations a long time ago are recognised for having low costs, but the diminution 
obtained in Mali in the last few years shows that further reduction is possible. 
182.  Concerning the reduction of ginning costs, the necessary information was not often 
supplied, meaning that it is not possible to provide an up-to-date appraisal of the 
situation. The organisation mode has an indirect effect, via the volume of production to 
be ginned induced by it. It is when the ginning capacities are not fully used that costs 
increase. This is the case in Ghana, where liberalisation prompted the installation of 
ginning capacity without inciting the increase in production hoped for, but it is also the 
case in the countries where ginning is privatised (Benin and Côte d’Ivoire). In 
addition, the modernisation of ginneries, while leading to gains in quality and ginning 
outturn, has a specific cost that is felt all the more when the investments are recent.   
183.  The information needed for judging the state of costs related to the export of cotton lint 
is also lacking. These costs are no longer weighed down by heavy taxation, but most of 
the countries suffer from a situation of established oligopoly of warehouse and port 
transit operators before export. The countries can do little against this situation, but 
two actions were noted. One consists in improving the efficiency of the way domestic 
transport is organised (Mali). The other aims at demanding greater fluidity in the 
circulation of people and goods in the sub-region (Burkina Faso). The effectiveness of 
these actions is not directly influenced by the organisation mode of the sectors, but 
rather by the volume of production and the economic importance arising from it.  
4.2.9.  Little information on the local sale and export of lint  
184.  The price information needed for producing  an up-dated appraisal were not often 
obtained, as much for the country with a organisation mode oriented towards 
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centralised in the countries with organisation modes that are not oriented towards 
liberalisation. It can therefore be used to help form an objective view of the price 
competitiveness achieved, even if this is a difficult question, with world prices 
fluctuating wildly and trading spread throughout the year.  
185.  The francophone countries often pride themselves on the good image of their cotton, 
without real support from objective indicators such as a level of price competitiveness 
for a particular type of cotton. Moreover, there is a passive attitude towards promoting 
the image of cotton in these countries, as mentioned above.  
186.  On the other hand, since it is impossible to turn to the forward market, the recourse to 
advance trading is potentially all the more efficient as the volume produced is large 
and easily anticipated. From this standpoint, the organisation modes non-oriented by 
liberalisation have an advantage. This advantage also works in the direction of a 
diversification in clients, while at the same time maintaining the loyalty of traditional 
customers. In all the francophone countries, this type of diversification seems to be 
established, even though the lack of information prevents a finer appreciation of the 
situation, this result  is related to the diversification of the terms and conditions of 
sales, with sales by commission agents being added to by sales to traders. 
187.  No organisation mode automatically ensures efficiency in domestic sales that satisfy 
both the buyers and sellers of cotton lint. The system of price fixation chosen by 
Burkina Faso, a variant of which has been adopted in Cameroon, allows the risks 
linked to anticipating the world price to be shared. This proves that a win-win situation 
is possible. The organisation mode does not seem to have a direct influence on the 
success of this type of system, but rather that success is built on mutual respect 
between the stakeholders concerned and the desire to work together in the long term. 
4.2.10. Little possibility for obtaining better prices in local sale and export of 
seedcotton.   
188.  The situation regarding the competitiveness of seedcotton price for local sales depends 
on the country, and more specifically on the distance to the sea for export. Benin 
stands out for sales that are considered more competitive on the export market than for 
sale on the local market, due to the State administration of prices to benefit supply to 
the oil mills. The organisation mode of the cotton sector can also be judged as being 
disadvantageous to the ginners, and the opposite by the oil extractors. 
189.  The influence of taxation on the evolution of price competitiveness is not easy to 
estimate. The estimation may be positive because export sales are not affected very 
much by taxes while local sales are subjected to VAT without preferential rate. 
190.  Private trading between ginners and oilseed crushers, sometimes with government 
control (Benin), determines price competitiveness and rarely ends in satisfaction for 
both buyers and sellers (dissatisfaction dominates in Benin and Côte d’Ivoire) while in 
Cameroon the fact that ginning is totally integrated with oil extraction enables these 
conflicts to be avoided, with the risk that the under-evaluation of seedcotton will 
penalise the farmers. 
4.2.11. Partial  conclusion 
191.  The analyses and lessons that we have been able to derive from an approach via the 
qualitative considerations tend to confirm the advantage of this approach which 
enables us to: 
  tackle legitimate questions relating to the sustainability of the cotton sectors,  
  do this while keeping the goals of development in sight, 
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observed performances. 
192.  It can be observed that, independently from the organisation modes in place, there are 
positive signs, which vary between the 6 countries, to attain the following objectives :  
  Increase the income of the producers, 
  Improve equity in terms of the distribution of cotton income among the 
producers, 
  Prevent the harmful effects related to chemical use. 
193.  On the other hand, still with some variation between countries, the signs are negative 
for  attaining the following objectives: 
  Reduce risks, 
  Guarantee the sustainable management of the cultivated areas, 
  Strengthen competitiveness through an adaptation to the qualitative 
requirements of the users, 
  Strengthen competitiveness by obtaining better prices (these last two objectives 
were penalised in our analysis by the lack of information transmitted).  
194.  In addition, there is a negative trend for the provision of public services. 
195.  The positive trends for the three objectives cited above arise (despite differences in the 
organisation mode regarding the principle of liberalisation) from  
  Price administration, 
  The continued provision of a service to make sure that chemical products are 
used properly, 
  The refusal to discriminate between farmers through price differentiation. 
196.  Of course, achievements and prospects differ from country to country. The effects 
prove to be greater when the farmers’ institutions are involved, taking a meaningful 
part in discussions concerning the steerage of the sectors, prices and beyond.  
197.  Coordination by the market alone is not found, even within the institutional 
frameworks that would have allowed it to do so. Prices are not adjusted according to 
transaction costs, for example those resulting from the remoteness of the farms. Yet 
this is what safeguards the positive trends in relation to a few of the important 
objectives. This contradicts the hypotheses or expectations that are the basis of 
restructuring policies of several countries in Africa.  
198.  Nevertheless, the identification of the insufficiencies regarding several other, equally 
important, objectives is a good demonstration that there is still much effort to be made 
for all the organisation modes in place. 
4.3.  Concordant and complementary results arising from the analysis by level 
of key factor   
4.3.1.  An approach towards a vision of the levels attained for key factors  
199.  The identification of qualitative considerations by relating them to the development 
goals on one hand, and by specifying the connection between proposed key factors and 
the identified qualitative considerations on the other, enables the key factors to be 
linked with the goals of development.  The levels of the key factors (or capacities) thus 
provide an indication of the performance that will be obtained in the short term if the 
organisation mode is not modified. This indication arises from the evaluations given of 
qualitative considerations, through marks (1, 3, 5, and 7), and it is calculated 
automatically through the links between the Excel tools for marking the qualitative 
considerations and the constructed databases.  
45 200.  The levels of key factors necessary for achieving the goals of development can be 
presented either for all three general development goals combined, or for each target 
separately.  The strategy of attributing marks to the qualitative appraisals was chosen 
in order to produce the graphs in form of ‘spider webs’ where the axes correspond to 
the 9 factors proposed. Four of such graphs can be produced for each country, 
corresponding to the 3 global goals of development, taken individually and globally.  
201.  Since the aim was to develop a tool by which each country could compare its 
performance to the others while the plot of 6 curves on a single graph is not easy to 
read, we chose to set each curve within the boundaries delimited by two curves – 
‘max’ and ‘min’ - corresponding to 2 ‘virtual’ countries obtained from the highest and 
lowest levels of performance, respectively, for all the key factors. These curves do not 
therefore correspond to the absolute maxima and minima, which are situated on the 
outside and the centre of the web, respectively.  Countries are not compared 
specifically by this method, but rather they are situated in relation to the group, so that 
they work towards becoming the « class genius » or to avoid becoming the « class 
dunce ». According to the marking system adopted, the level improves towards the 
periphery of the ‘web’, becoming progressively poorer as the centre is approached.  
4.3.2.  Analysis of the gaps in levels of key factors  
202.  We have limited ourselves to the presentation of those graphs that correspond to all the 
development goals and to the goal of international competitiveness for the assessment 
of the ‘max’ and ‘min’ levels of the key factors and differences between them. 
Additional graphs can be found on the CD-ROM (chapters 5.5.6 to 5.5.10 of the 
general summary).  
203.  For all the objectives taken together, and for most of them taken individually, the 
‘max’ levels do not merge with the periphery (grades of around 5 compared with an 
absolute maximum of 7), demonstrating that there would be room for improvement, 
even if one country were to have the same curve as the « class genius » (a situation 
which does not arise). ‘max’ levels are closest to the absolute maximum for the 
objective of contributing to poverty reduction. 
204.  For all of the goals combined, the differences between the ‘max’ and ‘min’ points are 
relatively constant and relatively small. This indicates that the differences between 
countries, in the present state of the organisation modes of their sectors, are not so 
great. But these differences can be bigger when the development goals are taken 
separately, as can be seen in the graph relating to competitiveness on the international 
market. This graph is also intentionally presented to illustrate how finely the 
considerations are graded, and how errors in evaluation can lead to surprising and 
questionable results: in graph 6 the ‘max’ level for increased productivity meets the 
absolute maximum. This is all the more surprising for the fact that this result comes 
from the grade attributed to Ghana. This suggests that the present evaluations must be 
discussed and reviewed in certain cases. 
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Figure 4.  ‘max’ and ‘min’ levels for key factors of all development goals combined  
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Figure 5.   ‘max’ and ‘min’ levels for the target of poverty alleviation 
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Figure 6.  ‘max’ and ‘min’ levels for the target of international competitiveness  
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4.3.3.  No outright champion among the countries 
205.  Given the large number of graphs produced to enable each country to situate itself in 
comparison to the ‘max’ and ‘min’ references, it is not possible to present all of them 
here and the interested reader is invited to find them in the CD-ROM (chapter 3.3 of 
the summaries dealing with the documents from individual countries).  
206.  In the present report, we limit ourselves to the presentation of 3 graphs to emphasise 
that none of the countries can claim to be « top of the class ». Even though recent 
studies have given Burkina Faso the reputation of being efficient, and this is confirmed 
by the Résocot Project, this does not mean that it is top of the class in every way. In 
fact, Burkina Faso, Mali and Cameroon, and even Benin, attain levels that are close to 
the ‘max’, either for the same key factors, or different ones, and this whether the 3 
objectives are taken together or considered separately. It should also be noted that, as 
shown in the graph for Benin, attaining a ‘max’ level for certain key factors does not 
exclude the possibility of obtaining the level ‘min’ for others. The graphs proposed 
here should help each of the countries, in the spirit of the Resocot Project, to situate 
itself and to decide what actions should be taken.    
207.  However, the results show that Ghana stands out with the lowest levels of key factors, 
whether all the goals of development are considered together or taken separately.   
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the gaps between ‘max’ and ‘min’ levels are 
generally not very great, so the obtained results should not be taken as a sign that there 
is no future for cotton in Ghana. 
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Table 1.  Countries obtaining maximum grades for the key factors according to 
development target 
 
Figure 7.  Levels of capacities for all the development goals taken together for Ghana  
208. 
All the goals Poverty 
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Synthetic view of the key factors in reaching the global development objectives
 
49 Figure 8.  Levels of capacity for all the objectives taken together, for Burkina Faso  
209. 
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Figure 9.  Levels of capacities for achieving the objective of environmental 
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Synthetic view of the key factors in reaching the objective 
of environmental sustainability and public health
4.3.4.  Effect of the levels of key factors on reaching the targets 
211.  The levels of the key factors are analysed in respect to how well the development goals 
are reached (partial objective of level 1), with attention drawn to differences between 
th e that Ghana is most 
212. 
e francophone countries when these occur, in the knowledg
often distinguished  by having lower levels, a particularity which we will not dwell 
upon. Details may be found in Appendix 4.  
In general, for all of the key factors, the levels attained are fairly often  
  good for the following objectives   
50 •  ‘increase cotton income of producers’,  
•  ‘improve equity in terms of the distribution of  cotton income among 
  whil h
• 
ublic/collective goods or utilities",  
petitiveness by reducing the costs of production and 
he users". 
4.3.5.  Effect of   
213.  This effect is  key factor by identifying the qualitative 
c . We do 
n s. Since 
214. 
 negatively in all countries. In other words, for all 
the countries involved in the Resocot Project, the first set of qualitative considerations 
215. 
ways in the different countries. That is 
to say, these are the qualitative considerations that differentiate the countries for the 
216. 
ey factors. A significant number of qualitative 
considerations are highlighted whose effects differed between countries, for each key 
217. 
 market fluctuations through maintaining price competitiveness’, we 
show that several of the qualitative considerations contribute differently in the 
 
the producers’  
•  ‘guarantee sustainability by the prevention of harmful effects related to 
the use of chemicals’,  
e t ey are rather poor for   
"reduce risks",  
•  "improve the supply of p
•  "strengthen com
marketing lint"  
•  "strengthen competitiveness through an adaptation to the qualitative 
requirements of t
the qualitative considerations on the levels of the key factors 
briefly analysed for each 
onsiderations whose contributions to the key factors are positive or negative
ot dwell on those qualitative considerations that make average contribution
the impact of the organisation modes has been analysed already, this action leads on 
indirectly to emphasising the organisation mode on the levels of the key factors. The 
details can be found in Appendix 5. 
For each of the key factors, some qualitative considerations contribute positively in all 
countries, whereas others contribute
should be conserved, and the second set improved. In the interest of brevity, we have 
not reported on the qualitative considerations that had average contributions in all the 
countries, but it may be useful to take these into account in order to improve their 
effect, or prevent this effect from deteriorating.  
On the other hand, for all the key factors, we show that a considerable number of 
qualitative considerations contribute in different 
levels of key factors, and that must be maintained or improved in order to maintain or 
improve the level of performance.  
The following table indicates the number of qualitative considerations as a function of 
their effect on the level of the k
factor. These qualitative considerations may thus point the way for countries hoping to 
improve their performance, by indicating how other countries arrive at better results 
for the key factors. 
The procedure is best illustrated by working through an example. For the fey factor 
‘capacity  to adapt to
different countries, of which ‘Do farmers participate more in the mechanisms that 
determine their cotton income’ whose contribution is very positive in Benin and Côte 
d’Ivoire, whereas it is inadequate, or very inadequate in the other countries. It is in the 
interest of the latter countries to find out what makes the difference in the other two. 
The preceding analysis of the effect of the mode of organisation on the appraisal of the 
qualitative considerations put the accent on the importance of implementing measures 
by which the inter-professional discussions and steering mechanisms are made 
effective, but this needs a certain amount of time for getting the farmers organised.  
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5 V
SS FOR PERFORMANCE  
Approach taken for comparing the countries 
ich it is 
importance of failures of 
coord rdination failures, performance 
219. 
ny restructuring of the 
220. 
2.  Number of qualitative considerations as a function of their effects on the key 
factors. 
 
ARIOUS MANAGEMENT OF CO NATION FAILURES AND 
maintaining competitiveness in quality 2 3 3 3 11
Capacity to raise productivity in seedcotton 
production 4 5 7 18
Capacity to promote sustainable production that 
preserves human health and environment 3 6 4 14
Capacity to mitigate the effects of changing 
natural conditions 3 3 2 11
Capacity to maintain farmers' commitment to 
cotton production 6 10 9 30
Capacity to maintain the commitment of the 
other players to cotton production 2 2 6 10
Capacity to provide public/collective goods or 
services 1 1 9 1 12
Capacity to avoid or to manage conflicts 
between cotton sector stakeholders 4 3 8 5 20
Key factor Negative effect Positive effect Average effect Variable effect
 to
through m e competitiveness
Capacity to resist market fluctuations through 
Total
Capacity  adapt to market fluctuations 








218.  The execution of the Resocot Project relied on a strong hypothesis in wh
considered that the performance obtained reveals the 
ination. In a sector with no prevalence of coo
would be optimal, and where performance is not optimal this indicates that 
coordination failures actually prevail and impact negatively.   
To show that coordination failures exist in the cotton sectors of the countries studied, 
the fact that the indicators of performance are not at optimal level confirms the 
reality of coordination failures, and is a warning against a
sectors that does not take this into account. But since the aim is to find practical 
solutions, it is not enough to know that coordination failures exist, but to identify these 
failures and to find out how they may be overcome. This is the objective that justifies 
the present analysis to: a) link the performance indicators to potential coordination 
failures and b) then examine the performance indicators to trace the origins of those 
failures that did indeed happen. In the analytical approach taken, care was taken to 
distinguish the potential failures that were more specific to coordination by the State 
and those that were more specific to coordination by the market.   
In practice, an indicator with a low mark shows that failure weighed heavily on it, 
which is correspondingly assessed by a mark 7. Conversely, a very positive indicator, 
with a mark 7, shows that there is virtually no coordination failure that impacts on it, 
so the corresponding failure rating takes the minimum mark of 1. In reality, several 
indicators may point do the same coordination failure. For this reason the mark of a 
coordination failure, from a qualitative and relative evaluation, result from the 
combined marks (means) of the corresponding indicators. The same coordination 
failure may also apply to several technical stages of the cotton sectors and the 
combination of corresponding indicators may differ from one stage to another. In brief, 
any statement on the coordination failure  in this case would be imprecise – the 
technical stage and the development target concerned also need to be specified.  
Thus, a coordination failure can be termed as ‘the absence of an effective policy on 
52 competition
4’ in general, or for a specific technical stage if it is only valid for that 
stage. 
It was possible to evaluate the indicators of performance based on the data collected by 
the teams of the South, and we now turn our attention to the lessons that these 
indicat
221. 
ors give concerning the coordination failures being detected. Before proceeding 
222. 
f the data 
223. 
 the CD-ROM were drawn, as mentioned above.  
ndicators 
224.  An eno
conceiv
restrict entials in the present debate on the 
225. 
State or the market towards a balance which must be found between these two forms 
                                                
further, it should be remembered that it was hard to access certain information, and 
data collection suffered in consequence, so that certain pertinent information could not 
be obtained. This situation affects how the coordination failures are assessed, since it 
had been decided that a missing indicator should be rated negatively (by giving it the 
mark of 1.4, so distinguishing it from mark 1 but giving it the equivalent value in the 
construction of the figures). This way of operating implies that a strong influence of 
coordination failure may be indicated due to the absence of pertinent information, 
although this is not necessarily the case. We have seen that, even when the information 
was obtained, it may be incorrectly evaluated (by a single actor), and this is passed on 
to the evaluation of the weakness in coordination. We have ourselves noted that 
marking was not always coherent.  For this reason, the discussion developed below on 
coordination failures should be considered bearing in mind that there are some 
reservations about how well the performance indicators were evaluated. 
The marks given to coordination failures and the tables on the failures identified by 
key factor and by development goal may be found in chapters 4.4 and 4.5 of the 
country summaries on the CD-ROM. Tables presenting regional summaries o
(in which the data from all the countries are combined) may be found in the general 
report of the CD-ROM, from chapter 7.9 onwards. These tables are formed by 
identifying, for each key factor and each development target, weaknesses in 
coordination which have the potential to affect them.  The advantage of the tables in 
the CD-ROM is that they provide a general view, but because of this, they are not very 
helpful when it comes to answering specific questions relating to the real influence of 
the coordination failures and how this influence varies according to the modes of 
organisation encountered. 
This explains why an additional examination of the results was needed (not included in 
the CD-ROM), leading to:  
  A large table of mean values for coordination weaknesses for all the potential 
weaknesses related to the development targets. This is the table from which the 
marks reproduced in
  A document presenting the marks for coordination failures for all 6 countries 
for the development goal (partial objective level 1), the technical stage, the 
type of coordination weakness (market or State) and the associated i
of performance. This document was put together using the databases 
constituted by the Project, and makes it possible to trace back to the original 
data in order to understand how any particular value for coordination failures 
was formed (this being derived from several indicators), i.e. to the marks in the 
table indicated in the preceding paragraph. 
rmous amount of information has been obtained and, at this stage, is not 
able to fully exploit of all the lessons contained within it. We have chosen to 
 the exploitation in order to provide the ess
restructuring of the cotton sectors.  
The debate has moved on from antagonism between coordination exclusively by the 
 
4 Such a failure pertains to the inefficiency of the State to set up an economic framework favourable to the 
competition between private operators to provide private goods or services. 
53 of coordination or towards the right dose of regulation. This evolution stems from the 
recognition that failures exist in both forms of coordination (we will deal with 
226. 





line indicates that in 2 countries with a mode of organisation 
coordination failure of market type vs of State type). The market is not good at 
managing public /common goods and it can also create defects, due to economies of 
scale for example, which may lead on to situations of natural monopoly. On the other 
hand, coordination by the State is subject to the risks of rent-seeking or of wastefulness 
which are sources of inefficiency. From these angles, it seems that, more coordination 
failures of the market type should be found in the organisation modes oriented by 
liberalisation and more coordination failures of  the State type in the organisation 
modes of organisation oriented by the monopoly.  
From another point of view, by recognising that certain amount of regulation is 
necessary and that this regulation calls on the State, which may or may not respond, 
coordination failure of the State type may equally arise in the organisation modes 
oriented by liberalisation, particularly concerning 
goods. In addition, since none of the organisation modes are subjected exclusively to 
coordination by the State, i.e. that coordination by the market can come into play even 
in the modes of coordination non-oriented by  liberalisation, the hypothesis that 
coordination failures of the market type exist cannot by excluded. The relative 
importance of failures due to these two types of coordination appears in reality more 
variable and their distribution may be less Manichean than what is generally thought. 
In order to bring the rudiments of a response to the questions posed at the start of the 
Resocot Project, we have composed tables (Appendix 6) for each of the development 
goals (partial objective level 1), giving the number of countries (classified according to 
the orientation of mode of organisation of their cotton sectors) in which there wer
judged to have been actually submitted to coordination failure or not (level 4 was taken 
as the threshold above which it was judged that failure had occurred). We placed 
Ghana in the category of the mode of coordination oriented by liberalisation and the 
other 5 countries in the other category. The number of countries in this second 
category means that the differences observed between them may be discussed. This, 
unfortunately, is not the case for the first category, in which there is only one country.  
The following example is presented to help explain our approach and to follow the 
lessons drawn from it.   
This table refers to the precise objective of «Strengthening competitiveness by 
obtaining better prices in the local sale or in the export of cottonseed ». The sum of all 
the figures on each line is 6 because there are 6 countries in the Resocot Project. Thus, 
the figure 2 on the first 
orientated towards monopoly, the failure « production inefficiency in the search for 
buyers of cotton lint or cottonseed”, pertaining to coordination by the State, was not 
established the technical process “local sale of cottonseed”. The figure 3 next to this 
signifies that this failure was established in three countries, as well in the sole country 
oriented by liberalisation. 
54 Table 3.  Number of countries with failures being established or not established with 
regard to a precise objective of development.  
NB Pays Libéralisation? réalité_défail
Monopoly oriented Orientation libéralisation
Technical process Failure type Failure Fail. Established Fail. Not-establ. Fail. Established Fail. Not-establ.
CottonSeed local 
Purchase State
Ineffectiveness in the 
search of buyers for 




Oligopoly of the 





Ineffectiveness in the 
search of buyers for 




Oligopoly of the 
cotton lint or 
cottonseeds traders
141
230.   
231.  Some useful conclusions can be drawn from these tables, but few words or concepts 
must be clarified. In the area of analysing the running of commodity channels  or 
sectors, many research works deal with the concepts of regulation, competition and 
coordination with more or less extended scope and which can overlap. Regulation 
usually calls for actions from the State, but this is not always necessary since there is 
also reference to private-regulation and self-regulation. Other research works oppose 
competition to coordination, considering competition as rules related to the normal 
functioning of the market and coordination as rules resulting from private agreement 
between players, what can be called also collective rules, and which has connection 
with what other people called private regulation. It comes out clearly that terminology 
is not definite and there are some variation in the way authors use the same words. In 
the Resocot Project, we consider that coordination could derive from three types of 
actions : actions from the State, from the running of the market and collective rules. 
Each type of coordination actions could be subjected to failure and could be corrected 
or controled by actions of other types if not of the same type. This observation has lead 
us to deal with "coordination failure by the State (or of the State type)" and 
"coordination failure by the market (or of the market type)". 
5.2.  No iron rule on coordination failure  
5.2.1.  Few potential coordination failures are not actually established  
232.  Very few of the potential failures identified were not found to be not established. 
These include
5,  
  In the field of failures related to coordination by the State : 
•  Ineffective quality control and certification of inputs, 
•  Production inefficacy in the negotiation of contracts, 
•  Production inefficacy in the packaging of inputs,  
•  Monopsony buying price for seedcotton, 
•  Lack of resources for buying seedcotton, 
•  Rent-seeking in the quality grading of  seedcotton, 
  And in the field of failures of coordination by the market :  
                                                 
5 but the headings of coordination failures ought to be cited relative to the development objectices concerned by 
them; we have chosen otherwise for reasons of brevity, except for a few specific cases 
55 •  Agreements between seedcotton buyers (this is astonishing, whereas in 
Ghana there seems to be agreement, this case illustrates a certain 
degree of sensitivity to flaws in the way the indicators were evaluated. 
233.  Possible explanations as to how these failures were avoided may be found in the 
processes of calls for tender with strict terms and conditions and the processes for 
including the farmers in deciding prices. This point will be further elaborated. 
5.2.2.  Rare, but highly informative, cases of coordination failure occurring in all 
countries  
234.  The other potential failings identified (and they form a long list), were found 
established in at least one of the 6 countries. It is, however, extremely rare for a 
failure to happen in all the countries at the same time. These rare common 
failings are all in the field of coordination by the market:  
•  The common-good nature of technical know-how on cotton 
cultivation, 
•  The common-good nature of the arable reserve, 
•  The absence of market for arable land, 
•  The imperfect market for information (on quantities produced and 
available), 
•  The imperfect market of insurance, 
•  The oligopoly feature of customs clearing operators at harbour. 
235.  The fact that coordination failures of the market type also appear in the countries 
whose sectors are not coordinated by market liberalisation signifies that these failings 
have not been corrected by State action or collective rules.   
236.  Conversely, the fact that no coordination failures of the State type were common 
to all countries signifies that they may be corrected by collective rules or by the 
market.  
237.  There were no coordination failures of the State type being found established all the 
countries whose organisation mode was not oriented by liberalisation, but not 
established in the country with the other type of organisation : this signifies that there 
were no failures of coordination by the State that the market can correct better 
than collective rules.  
238.  On the other hand, the opposite is also true, that is, that regulation by the State or by 
actions of the sector enabled several failures to be avoided in all the countries,  
  These are, in the field of coordination failures of the State type:  
•  Difficulties in evaluating the characteristics of fertilisers and 
pesticides,  
•  Absence of a market of arable land (relating to the objective of 
guaranteeing sustainable management of cultivated areas), 
•  Sale of seedcotton at the price set by the monopsony (regarding the 
objective of increasing competitiveness through the reduction of 
production and marketing costs of lint)  
•  Ineffective protection of arable areas, 
  And in the field of coordination failures of the market type: 
•  imperfect financial markets, 
•  oligopoly of input suppliers, 
•  oligopoly of buyers of seedcotton in unregulated competition. 
56 5.2.3.  Fatality of some coordination failures of the market type 
239.  Our results show that the coordination failures of the State type are not inevitable, but 
that some coordination failures of the market type may be inevitable, they all pertain to 
the common-good nature of the goods or services to be provided or the national or 
international macroeconomic environments. Put another way, all the sectors with 
organisation modes that are not liberalisation-oriented are not subjected to the same 
coordination failures by the State, or to the same levels of these failures, because of the 
actions they have undertaken.  
5.2.4.  Importance of collective rules to prevent from occurrence of coordination 
failures 
240.  We have already described the elements of coordination that several sectors have put 
in place in these different fields, in the paragraphs dealing with the description of how 
the sectors are organised and in the analysis of the effects of mode of organisation on 
performance. 
241.  Appendix 7 presents the actions we identify for having contributed to control 
coordination failures from occurring. These actions are classified as regulations from 
the State, as reactions from the market and collective rules resulting from collective 
actions. The following table shows that collective rules prevail mainly in preventing 
potential coordination failures from occurring actually. These collective rules pertains 
to those that the cotton sector stakeholders achieve to set up. 
Table 4.  Number of actions identified to have prevent coordination failures from 
occurring, according to the type of failures involved 







Failures of the State  15 53 17
Coordination 
Failures of the  46 0 1 1
 
242.  Analysis of the collective rules actually involved leads to observe that they correspond 
to functioning modes that have been long acknowledged to be specific in many 
francophone countries : 
•  Information collection on the farmers' needs in inputs by involving farmers' 
organisation 
•  joint liability in input credit provision 
•  Integration of supplier credit as a specification inserted to call for tenders 
•  Integration of research and extension financing within the price mechanism 
seedcotton purchase 
•  Integration of the rural track maintenance within the price mechanism of 
seedcotton purchase … 
243.  These specificities are commonly recognized of contributing to the positive 
achievements of the francophone countries. It is sound to find them back as actions to 
overcome potential coordination failures. This is a sign of the relevance of the 
methodology followed. It implies also that improvement of performance must derive 
from additional actions to help overcome established coordination failures. 
244.  It may seem strange that some actions by the State could help correct or prevent 
coordination failures by the State. In reality, activities within a cotton sector are inter-
connected. A State failure in terms of lack of financial means to take charge of the 
57 maintenance of rural tracks could be corrected by the regulation of integrating such 
maintenance costs within the seedcotton price fixing mechanism. 
245.  It is noteworthy that market reactions may contribute from occurrence of potential 
coordination failures. Detailed analysis of the Appendix 7 enables to realize that they 
pertain to reactions from international markets which compensate imperfections of 
national markets. They are observed in the francophone countries where the scope of 
business proposed (in terms of volumes of demand or volumes of output) becomes 
attractive to international players to come in. 
5.2.5.  Higher frequency of occurrence for coordination failures of the market type  
246.  To find out how often coordination failures occurred, we chose to consider that such a 
failure had occurred when it was found in at least 3 of the 5 countries with the mode of 
organisation non-oriented by liberalisation. The question is also pertinent in countries 
with modes of organisation oriented by liberalisation, but results would be only 
indicative since with they derive from a single country. 
247.  This procedure enabled us to extract the following table on the failures encountered 
within the two types of coordination. This table indicates that, for the group of 
countries with the mode of organisation non-oriented by liberalisation, a significantly 
higher rate of occurrence was found for failures related to coordination by the market 
(49% against 29%). The fact that failures related to coordination by the market were 
found in this group of countries is not totally surprising, since coordination is not 
exclusively by the State in these countries.   
248.  The difference in frequency between these two types of failure suggests that potential 
failures of the State type are controlled better in the countries with modes of 
organisation non-oriented by liberalisation. 
Table 5.  Greater frequency of occurrence of coordination failures of the market type (all 
the technical stages taken into account)  
249. 
State Market State Market
Yes 31 61 65 105
No 75 71 41 27
Total 106 132 106 132
Did failure 
occur ?
Monopoly Orientation Liberalisation Orientation
Failure type Failure type
 
250.  Even though the results concerning the case of countries (the unique country of Ghana) 
with a organisation mode oriented by liberalisation must used prudently, it should be 
stressed that both types of coordination failure are encountered and also that the 
frequency of occurrence is higher for the coordination failure of the market type. 
Moreover, the degree of occurrence is far higher than for the other group of countries. 
This result suggests that a organisation mode directed by liberalisation is indeed 
subjected to coordination failures of the market type that public action cannot mitigate 
and that these actions are also more subjected to the coordination failures of the State 
type. 
251.  For a more accurate analysis, it is necessary to centre on the technical stages that are 
more specifically affected by the non-liberal character of the organisation modes that 
are not directed by liberalisation. These stages concern: 
•  technical advice (extension, technical message dissemination) 
•  input distribution 
•  commercialisation of seedcotton, 
58 •  transport of seedcotton  
•  ginning 
•  classification of cotton lint, 
252.  The following table obtained confirms the former results. For the organisation modes 
non-oriented by liberalisation, frequency of occurrence is lower for the coordination 
failures of the State type as compared to the failures of the market type (17% vs 31%). 
These frequencies are also lower than those obtained in the unique country of the 
opposite organisation mode (29% and 46% for the types of coordination failures) 
Table 6.  Greater frequency of market failures in the stages that are more concerned by the 
monopoly system  
253. 
State Market State Market
Yes 8 17 24 42
No 40 37 24 12
T o t a l 4 85 44 85
Did failure 
occur ?
Monopoly Orientation Liberalisation Orientation
Failure type Failure type
4  
5.2.6.  Over-estimation of the frequency of occurrence of coordination failures 
254.  To proceed further, the nature of each of these failures, whether or not they did indeed 
occur, would need to be addressed. We reported yet the results regarding the 
coordination failures that were not established and we identified the actions that helped 
prevent them to come real.  
255.  For the coordination failures found to have been established, related listing is reported 
in Appendix 8. Examination of this listing leads to observe some inaccuracy  with 
some failures being revealed wrongly. This lack of accuracy is not astonishing owing 
to the approach followed to reveal occurrence of coordination failures. This approach 
is based on performance indicators and their qualitative assessment by giving marks 
which are sensitive to the fact that information may miss. A coordination failure may 
then be found established wrongly as a result of missing information 
256.  We do not think that the relevance of the approach followed is not questioned by the 
pitfall we point out here since it would be overcome by better information obtaining. 
Nevertheless, frequencies of occurrence of coordination failures we calculate are over-
esitmated. Under the current circumstances, the approach followed is robust to 
ascertain coordination failures which did not occur and less for those which are found 
established. 
257.  The pitfall we point out leads also to wonder whether the difference in occurrence 
between the two types of coordination failures is not over-estimated too. In order to 
have piece of answer, we made calculations by modifying the threshold in asserting 
that a coordination failure has a tendency to come established (passing to 4 countries 
out of the 5, instead of 3). This is a way of escaping somewhat from the bias 
introduced by the lack of information although it does not protect against the case 
where the same information is missing in the 5 countries concerned (cases actually 
encountered). We come to the two following tables which are similar to the previous 
ones and in which only figures have changed for the organisation modes non-oriented 
by liberalisation. The number of failures revealed as having occurred is greatly reduced 
with the new threshold retained, at a greater extent than the few cases of inconsistency 
indicated in Appendix 8: our approach to evaluate the degree of over-estimation of 
failure occurrence is then not very satisfactory. 
59 258.  With in mind the reservation mentioned above, the occurrence remains more frequent 
(but with a reduced gap) for the coordination failures of the market type when all 
technical stages are taken into account, but this difference vanishes when are only 
considered the technical stages most affected by liberalisation. We do not think that 
lack of information affected less these stages so that wholly speaking we still think that 
there is a greater occurrence of the coordination failures of the market type. 
Table 7.  Slightly greater occurrence of the coordination failures of the market type (all 
technical stages, threshold of 4 countries out of 5) 
State Market State Market
Yes 15 28 65 105
No 91 104 41 27
Total 106 132 106 132
Did failure 
occur ?
Monopoly Orientation Liberalisation Orientation
Failure type Failure type
 
Table 8.  Non difference in coordination failure occurrence (selective technical stages, 
threshold of 4 countries out of 5) 
State Market State Market
Yes 5 6 24 42
No 43 48 24 12
T o t a l 4 85 44 85
Did failure 
occur ?
Monopoly Orientation Liberalisation Orientation
Failure type Failure type
4  
5.3.  Performance: Margin for progress  
259.  In defining the key factors of performance and evaluating the levels reached for these 
factors with respect to the development goals (partial objectives of level 1), the notion 
of margin for progress appears. This notion is rendered even clearer in the graphic 
representation chosen: since the periphery of the web corresponds to the maximal 
performance, the distance between the curve of a country and this periphery represents 
the margin for progress.   
260.  This margin illustrated on the web is only the potential margin. It is impacted by the 
occurrence of coordination failures associated, , and so will be influenced by the 
actions taken to correct or overcome these failures. In the short term, it is not realistic 
to consider that these coordination failures can be successfully overcome, either for 
each failure in its entirety, or for all the failures involved. For this reason, it seemed 
useful to evaluate realistic margins that took into account the failures involved. 
261.  A rigorous method would be to examine each of the failures and assess the degree of 
difficulty to be overcome, but this is very complicated, so we chose a simpler method 
which seemed good enough to show up the notion of difference between the potential 
and realistic margins for progress. To do this, we made the hypothesis that a failure is 
all the more difficult to overcome in the short term if it weighs heavily (with a mark of 
strong difficulty, i.e. 5 to 7). In this case it is sufficient to weight the levels of key 
factors based on the corresponding average marks of failure difficulty. The effect of 
this weighting is to deduce the curves of the realistic margins of progress from those of 
the levels of capacity, which are established for a global target of development or for 
60 all of these global goals together. The end result is that the realistic margin is smaller 
than the potential margin
6. 
262.  Below we present the realistic margins for progress for the three countries (Benin, 
Burkina Faso and Ghana) for which we have produced the capacity (or key factor) 
curves. To understand these curves, it should be remembered that margins decrease as 
they approach the periphery. Thus, it is found that the curves related to capacity levels 
are closer to the periphery.  
Figure 10.  Realistic margins of progress for performance in Burkina Faso for all 
development goals  
263. 
Synthetic view on the progress margin
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Figure 11.  Realistic margins of progress for performance in Ghana for all 
development goals  
264. 
Synthetic view on the progress margin
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6 For simplicity, we have chosen to weight the grades for the factor levels by adding 0, 0.5, 1 et 1.5 respectively 
to the grades of failure corresponding to 1,3,5 and 7. This is way of weighting is arbitrary, others could be used.   
61 Figure 12.  Realistic margins of progress for performance in Benin for the objective of 
environmental sustainability/public health  
265. 
Synthetic view on the progress margin
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266.  In general, the margins are still small, either because the level of capacity is already 
good, leaving little room for improvement, or because the level of capacity is poor and 
there are difficult failures to overcome.  In practical terms, the stakeholders in the 
sector can decide to concentrate on finding possible actions in the fields where the 
margins for progress are big. On the graph for the goal of environment 
sustainability/public health in Benin, all the margins are large, except for factors A2 
and A5 (competitiveness through quality, reduction of the effects of changes in natural 
factors. 
62 6 CONCLUSION 
6.1.  Methods and materials developed relating to the chosen theoretical basis  
267.  The Résocot Project is an attempt to fully exploit a specific theoretical basis and 
to assess the performance of the cotton sectors with respect to development goals. 
The initial choice of the neo-institutional theory sets this project apart from numerous 
other studies founded more or less implicitly on neo-classical theory, which tends to 
mask the effects of coordination failures. These failures do exist however, and are a 
burden to the cotton sectors: the Résocot Project has helped to reveal them. The 
approach that consists in relating performance to the development goals also 
distinguishes this project from the usual way in which performance is mentioned 
without explicit points of reference. 
268.  The first step in the exploitation of neo-institutional theory consists in developing a 
detailed methodology whose output corresponds to  
  a proposed description of the sectors under 5 headings (stakeholders and 
competition regime, horizontal coordination, vertical coordination, price 
formation and terms of transactions), 
  the decomposition of the global development goals into partial objectives that are 
more practical and that can be achieved in the short-term,  
  the identification of potential coordination failures, 
  the deduction of pertinent indicators of performance pertaining to the 
objectives of development.  
269.  We believe this methodology to be applicable to other commodity chains, with the 
necessary adjustments to integrate the specificities of the sectors concerned, but 
several aspects remain to be improved: 
  by amending the list of development objectives (making this list more precise 
by developing the question of gender and development, human development, 
and the sustainable exploitation of natural resources for example), 
  by clarifying the approach to retain partial objectives for which it is possible to 
obtain data (should those partial objectives for which it is known that the data 
is unobtainable be excluded, or kept anyway?) 
  by integrating coordination through collective actions to complete the 
definition of performance indicators. This would make it possible to integrate 
variables related to organisation of the sectors as performance indicators. 
270.  The methodology developed was also used for proposing a way of obtaining global 
visions, by from a large amount of information, through : 
  a qualitative and relative evaluation of performance,  
  qualitative considerations for defining the effect of the organisation modes of 
the sectors on the performance,  
  the identification of 9 key factors of performance, which could be applied to 
other commodity chains. 
271.  This application also required that new computing materials be developed in order 
to facilitate the exploitation of the data collected, the use of which needed to be simple 
enough as to be accessible to the national participants without the requirement of 
onerous training. These tools include :  
  A set of working databases, at national and regional levels,  
  Spreadsheets for producing global views, 
63   Interfaces for referring back to the original data contributing to the obtained 
global vision, 
  Figures illustrating the position of countries relative to the network. 
272.  The use of the methods and materials developed by the project also led to several 
useful and informative products for helping to adjust the restructuring process of the 
sectors. These are: 
  A description of the 6, rather different, sectors, according to their organisation 
modes on a common grid. 
  A representation of the performance of the sectors, giving information on 
the state of performance in reference to the development goals. These 
representations are not perfect however, because some data was missing 
(data to which the national teams were denied access) and the limits of a 
qualitative assessment by a singe actor (research) while this type of 
appreciation must be carried out collectively by all the stakeholders. At a later 
stage, when all the actors of the sector are associated in the application of 
these methods and materials, it may be possible to list the numerous 
identified variables in order of importance and weight them according to 
recommendations made by the stakeholders. 
  Each country has a tool by which it can situate itself in relation to the 
group of countries, in terms of present performance and the prospects for 
performance in the short term if the organisation mode of its cotton sector stays 
the same or if this mode should be adjusted (notion of margin of progress 
linked to changes in the organisation mode). On the practical side, each 
country can identify the qualitative considerations, or more generally, the key 
factors of performance, that contribute positively or negatively to the 
development goals. The possibility also exists to find out which qualitative 
considerations make the difference between the performance of different 
countries, to trace back to the elements of the organisation mode that influence 
these qualitative considerations and to derive inspiration from them to adjust its 
cotton sector. 
273.  Despite the fact that this exploitation of the mass of results is neither exhaustive nor 
definitive, lessons have been drawn from them in several areas.   
6.2.  Organisation modes: an abundance of changes and adjustments  
274.  Concerning the organisation mode, we stress that  
  There is no exclusive recourse to coordination by the market in the country 
(Ghana) that liberalised its sector nearly fifteen years ago (to turn from it in the 
past 2 seasons). As an example, price competition between the ginners in 
liberalised systems is illusory. The formation of prices directly affecting the 
farmers (input prices and selling price of seedcotton) under the liberalised 
system has very quickly become very similar to that observed in monopoly 
systems. It also arises from a price administration that is entirely private, and 
the participation of the farmers without institutional representation or 
associative rights is essentially symbolic.  
  On the other hand, monopoly systems are not rigid and the great diversity 
observed in the 5 countries concerned is shown in  
•  the terms and conditions of transactions (for the transfer of input credit 
to the banks for example)  
•  price formation (in supply to the local textile industry for example)  
64 •  and the actions of horizontal coordination (concerning measures for 
managing public resources for example) and in particular the power to 
take decisions obtained by the farmers’ institutions in certain countries.  
275.  Within the systems of monopoly, there may be some recourse to competition, but only 
in specific ways. 
276.  The diverse ways in which the organisation modes non-oriented by liberalisation 
function, of which we have presented a general idea, testify to their rich potential 
for evolving differently, a potential that is too often overlooked.  
277.  Overall, no system is totally liberal and no system is a total monopoly; in practice only 
adjustments to these systems exist. It would be futile and perverse to continue to 
discuss these extreme systems of coordination by the market or the State. It is far more 
important to look for the type of orientation (liberalisation or monopoly) favourable to 
the factors that will usher in greater economic, social and environmental sustainability 
to the cotton sectors.  
278.  We find that one of these factors is the effective participation of the farmers’ 
institutions in the decisions, as observed in certain countries where the organisation 
mode is not oriented by liberalisation. It should be emphasised that the participation 
sought is a product of long-term bi-lateral relations between different types of actor on 
one hand and between actors of the same type on the other. Such conditions do not 
apparently flow from the principle of liberalisation, which pushes farmers to sell to the 
highest bidder and change commercial partner from year to year. 
6.3.  The advantage of appraising performance related to the development 
goals  
279.  For the appraisal of the cotton sectors’ performance, the Resocot Project took the 
original choice of breaking down the overall performance into partial 
performances. This partial approach is done on two levels, the first referring 
performance to 3 global development goals, and the second referring to the partial 
objectives that constitute these global goals. This approach creates the possibility of 
moving away from a vague discourse on performance or general reference to 
development goals, to situate performance at the level of stated objectives that are less 
general and distant. 
280.  Among the countries of the Resocot Project, there is no « class genius » who manages 
to attain maximal performance for all the partial objectives. Certain countries manage 
to collect the best performances for several partial objectives, but rarely do two 
countries excel for the same partial objectives. This result indicates that, in practical 
terms, the countries can take inspiration from each other in order to reduce the gaps in 
performance between them. There is not really a “bottom of the class”, although 
Ghana does attract attention with its levels of performance that are often the same as 
the observed minima.  
281.  For each of the global goals of development, we see that the achievement of maximal 
performance levels for some objectives does not prevent a country from suffering from 
minimal levels of performance for others. This may indicate that certain partial 
objectives were given priority, and that this has a negative impact on others. It 
follows that there is a balance between the partial objectives.  
282.  With the evolution towards a more collective, inter-professional, management of the 
sectors, the possibility arises to aim for a negotiated balance. We believe that the 
initial results of the Resocot Project are useful in making decisions on the composition 
of groups of objectives, or even to put them in order of importance for achieving a 
balance that is acceptable to all stakeholders.  
65 6.4.  Operational consequences of using qualitative considerations and key 
factors of performance  
283.  Concerning the effect of the organisation modes on the extent to which a 
development objective is attained, we proceeded by analysing the identified 
qualitative considerations and the key factors of performance associated with 
them. This enabled us to  see that, independently of the organisation modes in 
place, there are positive signs, with variations between the 6 countries, for attaining 
the following objectives :  
  increase cotton  income of the producers, 
  improve equity in terms of distribution of  cotton income among the producers, 
  reduce the harmful effects related to the utilisation of chemical products. 
284.  In contrast, still with some variation among countries, the signs that the following 
objectives are being achieved are negative: 
  reduce risk, 
  guarantee a sustainable management of the cultivated areas, 
  strengthen competitiveness through an adaptation to the qualitative 
requirements of the users, 
  strengthen competitiveness by the obtaining of better prices (this and the 
preceding objective suffered from a lack of communicated information)  
285.  The positive direction taken for the three objectives cited above, regardless of the 
organisation mode, comes from  
  price administration, 
  the maintenance of a service to oversee the correct use of chemicals, 
  the refusal to discriminate between smallholders through price differentiation. 
286.  Of course, differences are found between countries with respect to their achievements 
and prospects. Some qualitative considerations contribute positively to the levels of 
key factors in all the countries, other qualitative considerations contribute negatively, 
and still others have different effects in different countries. On the practical level of 
how to improve performance, the first should be consolidated, the second should be 
improved, and is by studying the latter groups that inspiration may be gained from the 
countries where they have a positive impact. 
287.  We have found that the effects are greater when the farmers’ institutions are 
effectively involved in the discussions pertaining to the steerage of the sectors, 
concerning decisions about prices, and beyond. However this is not enough on its 
own – the identification of inadequacies relating to several other objectives, equally 
important, clearly shows that efforts must still be made in all the organisation modes in 
place. 
6.5.  Market type of coordination failures are more likely to occur 
288.  The methodology carried out by the Resocot Project enables to assess the reality of 
coordination failures. To our knowledge, this is a bare empiric attempt is this regard. 
The approach being followed is robust to point out coordination failures which do not 
materialized, but less to assert on the failures which come real because it is sensitive to 
the way to implement assessment in case of missing information on performance 
indicators. This reservation must be kept in mind in going through what follows. 
289.  Coordination failures are a real handicap to the performance of the sectors. Very few 
of the identified potential failings were not found in reality in at least one country, in 
these concerned are coordination failures of the State type.  
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290.  Cases of failures occurring in all the countries are also rare and they concern the 
type of failures due to coordination by the market. 
291.  The actions conducted in the organisation modes non-oriented by liberalisation do not 
enable all the possible failures to be overcome. Neither are there cases of coordination 
failures that the market was able to overcome better that collective rules resulting from 
collective actions. On the other hand, the converse is true, since failures that 
organisation mode oriented by liberalisation had not managed to overcome were 
successfully overcome by the organisation modes non-oriented by liberalisation.  
292.  Finally, coordination failures of the market type appear to be more inevitable. The 
frequency of occurrence of this type of failures is greater, whether all the technical 
stages are taken as a whole or just those that are affected to a greater extent by the 
systems of monopoly in seedcotton marketing. This difference is observable and the 
levels at which the failures occur can be seen to be higher with the organisation modes 
oriented by liberalisation. These are only indications owing to the insufficient number 
of countries with organisation modes liberalisation-oriented and to the lack of 
information on some performance indicators. 
6.6.  Two important lessons for restructuring the cotton sectors 
293.  In terms of what has been learnt concerning the restructuring of the cotton sectors, 
the output of the Resocot Project can be resumed in two points: 
  The cotton sectors with organisation modes non-oriented by liberalisation have 
shown a good deal of creativity in implementing different actions of 
coordination. This is a capacity to evolve from a common ground plan towards 
different models that is kept in the sidelines in previous studies, whose 
conclusions are therefore highly debatable.    
  The failures of coordination handicap the performance of the sectors. Some of 
these failures can be overcome, particularly by new processes of coordination 
which associate the farmers’ institutions more. This is not sufficient for 
overcoming all the failures, especially those related to the market, and 
above all in organisation modes oriented by the principle of liberalisation.  
294.  The insistence on the positive feature of integrating farmers’ institutions in decision-
making, known as ‘empowerment’, lends support to the present aims of the 
international aid agencies. The importance of effective integration should be stressed 
however, and this depends on a long-term associative or cooperative, then federative, 
movement of the farmers. This is a condition that the modes of orientation non-
oriented by liberalisation have been able to fulfil but that seems to be harder for other 
modes. 
6.7.  Requirement for a collective application of the methods and tools being 
carried out 
295.  Finally, the results obtained and presented here are only transitory (this is only the 
pilot phase of the project). It is hoped that they are sufficiently convincing that the 
proposed methods and tools will be applied by all the stakeholders in the cotton 
sector so that they may be more precisely assessed. It seems that this is a step that must 
be taken before deciding whether to adopt the proposed methods and tools as 
informative elements to be maintained as supports for discussions between 
stakeholders within specific exchange device. This decision could be made by 
individual countries, but it would be preferable if it were made on a regional level to 
avoid losing the comparative dimension of the evaluation of performance.  Annexe 1.  Les indications par une approche comparative : 
Objectif de contribution à la réduction de la pauvreté 
1.  L'accroissement du revenu par l'augmentation du prix au producteur  
1.  Cet objectif partiel est relativement satisfait par l'ensemble des pays francophones bien 
qu'à un degré moyen. Le Burkina et le Cameroun sont les deux pays dont le niveau de 
performance est le plus élevé. En effet, la situation est favorable globalement pour 
l'ensemble des étapes techniques. Il semble que les points faibles au Cameroun et au 
Burkina soient en partie liés à un  manque d'information sur les transaction d'achat des 
graines de coton : au Cameroun, les prix de vente des graines, le nombre de clients pour 
l'achat de graines… au Burkina les coûts du transport des graines… 
2.  Le Mali la Côte d'ivoire et le Bénin constituent un autre groupe de performance 
inférieure. Là aussi on peut expliquer en partie la faiblesse du niveau de performance 
par un manque d'information sur les coûts de transport de fibre et de graine, du stockage 
de la fibre, du transit.  
3.  En Côte d'Ivoire, il y a un manque d'informations sur les coûts de commercialisation de 
la fibre et de la graine (stockage, assurance, transit…) alors que des niveaux compétitifs 
peuvent se répercuter favorablement sur le prix à payer au producteur. Il y a également 
un manque d'information sur l'état des infrastructures routières, mais on peut constater 
que le coût du transport est relativement faible par rapport aux autres pays du réseau. 
4.  Le Bénin possède un atout du fait que le coton qu'il produit est en majorité supérieur ou 
égal au type correspondant à l'indice A (indicateur : part de la production en référence à 
l'indice A). Par contre, la sous-utilisation des capacités installées des usines dans ce pays 
est un élément de coût qui ne joue pas en faveur d'un meilleur prix au producteur. 
5.  Globalement, pour l'ensemble des pays francophones, la faiblesse des ventes de fibre sur 
le marché local constitue un élément défavorable à l'accroissement du revenu des 
paysans. Par contre la fiscalité au niveau de l'égrenage et de la vente de la fibre à 
l'export et sur le marché local est favorable.  
6.  Le Ghana est le pays qui est en situation la plus défavorable pour cet objectif partiel 
avec un prix au producteur franchement défavorable. Là aussi il y a un manque 
d'information en terme de coûts de commercialisation du coton-graine. Cependant, pour 
ce qui concerne l'achat du coton-graine, la situation est favorable, en terme de délai de 
paiement des paysans, de coût pour l'évacuation du coton-graine… 
2.  L'accroissement du revenu en diminuant les coûts des intrants :  
7.  Au niveau des étapes techniques concernées, l'importation/acquisition locale des intrants 
est globalement correcte, avec une relative stabilité du prix des intrants aux producteurs. 
La production locale des semences se fait également dans des conditions correctes. 
8.  En ce qui concerne l'importation des intrants, la mise en place du TEC au niveau de 
l'UEMOA s'est traduite par une baisse de la fiscalité appliquée aux intrants importés se 
répercutant favorablement dans la réduction du coût des intrants au niveau des paysans. 
Cela peut par contre jouer contre la formulation des engrais à partir d'ingrédients 
importés en vrac et qui seraient davantage taxés (Bénin)  
9.   La situation est plutôt favorable au Burkina Faso et en Côte d'Ivoire, moyennement 
favorable au Mali, et tendant vers la situation défavorable au Bénin et au Cameroun. 
L'ensemble des étapes techniques depuis l'importation des intrants à leur distribution est 
favorable. Au Bénin, cependant, on rapporte des problèmes d'acheminement et de retard 
dans la mise en place des intrants. Les indicateurs : différentiel prix cash/prix à crédit 
1 des intrants, le ratio quantité d'intrants obtenus à crédit par rapport aux besoins, le taux 
de remboursement du crédit intrants sont d'un bon niveau.  
10.  Le Mali, le Bénin et la Côte d'Ivoire présentent un manque d'information sur les coûts 
du transport des intrants. Le Cameroun par contre, présente des coûts de transport 
défavorables.  
11.  Le Ghana est le pays qui présente la situation la plus défavorable du réseau, avec un 
nombre d'importateurs défavorable et un accès au crédit intrants défavorable : faible 
nombre de bénéficiaires de crédit, taux de crédit intrant élevé, taux de remboursement 
faible.... Pour ce qui concerne les coûts de transport, les informations ne sont pas 
disponibles. Les délais de livraison des intrants sont cependant bons, on n'a pas relevé 
de réclamations se rapportant aux intrants livrés en terme de quantité ou qualité, le coût 
de la semence est favorable (coût en kg du coton graine pour semer 1 ha de coton). La 
recherche étant défaillante dans ce domaine  : on note un faible nombre de variétés 
enregistrées et un faible nombre de variétés nouvelles produites par la recherche.  
3.  L'accroissement du revenu des paysans par une amélioration de la 
productivité  
12.  La performance est globalement bonne pour l'ensemble des pays francophones, avec 
cependant des variations.  
13.  Globalement ce qui semble essentiellement distinguer les pays est la performance de la 
recherche. La recherche aurait joué un rôle important dans l'amélioration de la 
rentabilité du travail par unité de produit par la production de variétés améliorées à bon 
niveau de rendement. Le ratio de nombre important de producteurs par agent technique 
pénalise l'appréciation de la performance de certains pays.  
14.  Le Ghana est le pays qui présente la situation la plus défavorable du réseau, avec une 
recherche  insignifiante en termes de budget, nombre de chercheurs, production variétale 
(nombre de variétés en cours d'enregistrement) et s'exprimant par un rendement très 
faible. 
4.  Réduction des risques liés aux facteurs naturels :  
15.  La performance est plutôt moyenne dans l'ensemble des pays. La recherche propose 
dans l'ensemble des pays francophones des paquets technologiques aux producteurs 
ainsi qu'un certain nombre d'innovations permettant de réduire les risques liés aux 
facteurs naturels. L'appréciation du conseil technique est pénalisée par un nombre très 
élevé de paysans par agent de conseil technique. C'est en Côte d'Ivoire qu'on note le 
degré de performance le plus faible du fait de la pauvreté du budget recherche, du faible 
nombre de conseillers techniques, ainsi que de la  faible adoption de techniques 
nouvelles par les paysans.  
16.  Les ventes à l'export souffrent globalement des services d'assurance en relation avec une 
absence de marché concurrentiel. 
17.  Au Ghana, le bon niveau de performance relatif (équivalent aux pays francophones pour 
cet objectif) est attribuable à l'adoption massive par les paysans de la protection 
chimique pour se prémunir contre les risques naturels (attaque parasitaire…). L'appui 
technique et la recherche y sont déficients, aussi les rendements sont-ils très 
défavorables. Les informations  sur les services d'assurances sont manquantes. 
5.  Réduction des risques économiques :  
18.  La performance vis à vis de cet objectif procède de la stabilisation intra-annuelle des 
prix aux producteurs. 
2 19.  Le Cameroun et le Mali apparaissent en situation très favorable alors que le Bénin, le 
Burkina et la Côte d'Ivoire tendent vers la situation défavorable. Les deux premiers sont 
plus performants pour les étapes techniques de production de coton-graine et d'achat 
local de coton-graine. La performance du Bénin pâtit d'un manque d'informations sur le 
financement et sur l'achat/export de coton-fibre mais a bénéficié d'une stratégie de 
diversification et de multiplication des clients (issus d'un grand nombre de pays). De 
même, la multiplication des institutions de micro-finances et de crédit intrants ou de 
crédit pour le matériel agricole sont des éléments positifs pour la gestion des risques au 
niveau des paysans.  
20.  La diversification des productions de vente comme moyens de gérer les risques 
économiques ne ressort favorablement qu'au Bénin, au Cameroun et en Côte d'Ivoire. Le 
niveau moyen des prix des produits vivriers et le manque de moyens pour organiser la 
commercialisation de ces produits sont cependant des éléments de contre-performance 
en terme de diversification des productions. 
21.  Le Ghana est le pays qui présente la situation la plus défavorable du réseau avec un prix 
moyen des produits vivriers et des quantités de produits vivriers commercialisés 
défavorables. L'accès au crédit de consommation y est également non favorable. Un 
manque important d'informations sur les conditions du crédit de consommation et sur 
l'accès aux outils de couverture des risques de marché a tiré vers le bas l'évaluation du 
niveau de performance de ce pays pour ce qui relève des risques économiques. 
6.  Améliorer la sécurité alimentaire  
22.  Globalement favorable dans les pays francophones, du fait qu'ils bénéficient d'une 
recherche et d'un conseil technique relativement satisfaisant qui intègrent les cultures 
vivrières. La production vivrière par habitant y est également relativement satisfaisante.  
23.  Le Ghana est le pays qui présente la situation la plus défavorable du réseau, avec une 
faiblesse de l'appui technique pour les cultures vivrières et un manque d'informations sur 
la production vivrière. 
7.  Augmenter le nombre de producteurs de coton 
24.  Globalement, la performance du système de distribution des intrants et du système de 
crédit intrants a été à l'origine de l'accroissement du nombre de producteurs de coton, 
dans les pays francophones. La Côte d'Ivoire, le Burkina Faso et le Mali se distinguent 
par un meilleur niveau de performance que les autres, et ce grâce à une bonne 
performance des étapes de distribution d'intrants (différentiel prix de l'intrant cash et à 
crédit, nombre de bénéficiaires de crédit intrants, taux de remboursement…), et de 
production de coton graine (évolution des surfaces, évolution du nombre de 
producteurs). Le Bénin se trouve moins bien loti en raison des lacunes en termes 
d'information sur la densité du réseau d'agents de conseil technique, l'évolution du coût 
total des intrants utilisés pour la production cotonnière et du faible nombre de 
producteurs 
25.  Le Ghana est le pays qui présente  la situation la plus défavorable du réseau. En 
témoigne le niveau défavorable des indicateurs suivants pour les étapes techniques de 
distribution d'intrants, conseil technique et production de coton-graine: prix des intrants, 
taux de remboursement des crédits, différentiel des prix de cession des intrants cash et à 
crédit, évolution de la valeur ajoutée dans la production de coton graine, évolution des 
coûts des intrants utilisés pour la production de coton, rendement, nombre de 
producteurs de coton par agent de conseil technique, évolution de la surface cotonnière, 
nombre de producteurs de coton,  
3 8.  Augmentation de la part de revenu des exploitations cotonnières les 
moins bien loties,  
26.  L'ensemble des pays cotonniers du réseau est en position très favorable en particulier la 
Côte d'Ivoire, le Mali et le Burkina. Cela est dû de manière générale à l'équité dans 
l'accès aux intrants et crédits intrants puisque les producteurs y ont accès dans les 
mêmes conditions, quelle que soit la taille de leur exploitation (indicateur : taux de 
bénéficiaires de crédit intrant par type de producteur). L'appréciation de la performance 
du Bénin et du Cameroun serait pénalisée par l'absence d'information. 
27.  Le niveau défavorable de performance du Ghana est lié au manque d'informations en la 
matière. 
9.  Amélioration des infrastructures routières :  
28.  L'ensemble du réseau de pistes et de routes des zones cotonnières des pays francophones 
étudiés est en mauvais état et mal entretenu. Au Burkina, au Mali et au Cameroun, le 
nombre de kilomètres de routes goudronnées et de pistes profilées est correct, alors qu'il 
est faible au Bénin et en Côte d'Ivoire. Cela génère des coûts de transport élevé. Il faut 
noter que les informations sur les coûts du transport (intrants, fibre, graine) manquent en 
général. 
29.  Le Ghana se distingue par un niveau de performance supérieur à celui des autres pays du 
réseau du fait de son réseau routier relativement important. Les coûts de transport de 
coton-graine et de fibre sont manquants, par contre le coût du transport des graines de 
coton est très favorable. 
10.  Amélioration du service de formation/vulgarisation :   
30.  Le service de formation/vulgarisation souffre globalement, bien qu'à des degrés 
différents, de la faible densité de l'offre du service d'appui technique, alors que 
l'interprofession s'implique de plus en plus dans le conseil agricole et qu'il existe des 
formations à l'utilisation des pesticides.   
31.  Le Ghana, comme pour l'objectif partiel précédent, est en meilleure position que les 
autres pays, car la densité du réseau de conseiller techniques, au regard du nombre de 
producteurs, est supérieur à plusieurs pays francophones du réseau, et l'usage d'engrais 
sur production vivrière y est très favorable. 
4 Annexe 2.  Les indications par une approche comparative : 
Objectif de durabilité environnementale/santé publique 
11.  Préservation des aptitudes culturales des sols :  
32.  Le niveau de performance est globalement correct avec une tendance défavorable pour 
certains pays. Le Burkina, la Côte d'ivoire et le Mali sont en situation favorable du fait 
de  la recherche (nombre de chercheurs travaillant sur le coton, recherche sur l'érosion, 
budget recherche). L'appréciation de la performance du Bénin et du Cameroun est 
pénalisés par un conseil technique déficient ou par un manque d'information en la 
matière.  
33.  La gestion de l'érosion est variable d'un pays à l'autre : assez diffuse au Bénin, plus 
importante en Côte d'Ivoire par l'existence d'un programme de gestion durable des sols 
même si la portée en est relativement faible (la gestion des sols faisant partie du paquet 
technologique que véhicule le conseil agricole). Au Cameroun les actions contre 
l'érosion des sols sont intégrées dans le programme DPGT (Développement Paysan et 
Gestion des Terroirs). Le maintien de la fertilité minérale est globalement bon car cette 
dernière bénéficie des conditions favorables d'accès aux engrais coton et de la recherche, 
mais la tendance à l'extension demeure. 
34.  Le maintien de la fertilité organique des sols est également correct, bien qu'au Bénin 
cela soit peu répandu avec une faible diffusion des pratiques d'association 
agriculture/élevage. La recherche joue un rôle favorable en développant les pratiques qui 
favorisent le statut organique des sols. Au Cameroun, il y a une promotion importante de 
l'association agriculture/élevage.  
35.  Au Ghana, la situation est nettement défavorable par rapport aux autres pays du réseau. 
Il y a peu ou pas d'actions contre l'érosion. De plus, les précautions ne sont pas prises 
pour préserver les sols : Les opérations de labour avec tracteurs sur des terrains fragiles 
sont devenues des pratiques courantes.  
12.  Contrôle de la pression parasitaire :  
36.  Cet objectif est globalement atteint de manière satisfaisante. Le nombre de traitements 
est conforme globalement aux normes vulgarisées par les services agricoles.   
37.  Le Bénin et le Burkina sont en tête parmi les pays francophones avec un dispositif 
performant de distribution d'intrants (période de livraison favorable, fourniture de 
crédit), une recherche orientée vers la lutte intégrée, des pratiques en terme de doses 
d'insecticides et de fréquence des traitements, conformes aux prescriptions de la 
recherche et du conseil technique.  
38.  En Côte d'Ivoire, le raisonnement du nombre de traitements recueille encore peu 
d'attention. La quantité globale d'insecticides utilisés demeure assez élevée, tout comme 
au Burkina Faso.  
39.  Globalement on utilise les bons insecticides au bon moment , mais il manque encore une 
orientation pour un meilleur raisonnement du contrôle chimique par une approche 
collective, une véritable mise en œuvre de la lutte intégrée. 
40.  Le Ghana est, pour cet objectif, en situation relativement favorable. Malgré l'absence de 
pratique de lutte intégrée, et de programme d'approche collective de la lutte chimique, 
l'indication de travaux menés sur le thème de la lutte intégrée, la composition des 
insecticides, les doses et fréquences des traitements pratiqués, le ratio des paysans à 
protection chimique concourent à conférer à ce pays un bon niveau de performance en 
terme de contrôle de pression parasitaire. 
5 13.  Prévention de la pollution des eaux par le produits chimiques  
41.  Globalement le niveau de performance est bon. Bien qu'un certain nombre d'éléments 
soient favorables comme la formation et l'information des paysans à l'emploi des 
insecticides, elles ne sont pas suffisantes : au Cameroun, le nombre de paysans formés 
directement est faible. On note globalement une insuffisance d'actions de formation et 
d'information sur les risques de pollution des eaux et une rareté des analyses des eaux 
souterraines. Le Ghana a un niveau de performance favorable pour cet objectif, au 
même niveau que le Bénin. 
14.  Prévention de l'empoisonnement des populations rurales 
42.  Globalement le niveau de performance est bon. 
43.  Les indicateurs sont l'existence d'information/formation à l'emploi des insecticides, le 
pourcentage de paysans formés à l'emploi des insecticides, la composition des 
insecticides (sélection au niveau de l'importation de produits à faible toxicité). On relève 
malgré tout des cas d'empoisonnement qui peuvent être attribués à la faiblesse de 
l'information/formation conduisant à l'usage indu de certains insecticides pour le 
stockage des vivres. 
44.  Le Ghana est aussi performant pour cet objectif partiel. 
6 Annexe 3.  Les indications par une approche comparative : 
Objectif de compétitivité internationale 
15.  Adaptation de la classification aux normes internationales de qualité  
45.  La performance est globalement favorable pour l’ensemble des pays francophones. 
Cette performance est fondée sur la performance de l’étape de classification avec des 
coûts de classement favorables ( sauf au Burkina et au Mali où on note une absence de 
l’information correspondante), des équipements de classification globalement corrects à 
quelques exceptions près, et des litiges relatifs à la qualité du coton fibre jugés 
proportionnellement peu importants. 
46.  Le Bénin se distingue par un niveau de performance nettement supérieur du fait 
d’équipements HVI adapté aux normes internationales permettant d'avoir une visibilité 
sur la qualité du coton, en nombre plus important qu'en Côte d'Ivoire et au Burkina Faso, 
alors que le Cameroun n'en a pas encore. 
47.  Le coton fibre du Cameroun fait l’objet de litiges en terme de qualité (collage ne 
particulier) avec les clients.  
48.  Le Ghana est en situation très défavorable pour cet objectif partiel. Il y a un manque 
d’information notoire sur l’existence de litiges relatifs à la qualité et leur ampleur. Dans 
ce pays, il n'y a pas de classification de la fibre qui dépend de l'appréciation des clients.  
16.  Se conformer aux exigences qualitatives des utilisateurs : 
49.  La situation est globalement favorable pour les pays francophones, avec un avantage 
évident pour le Burkina et le Bénin. Globalement, il n'y a pas ou peu de conflits relatifs 
à la qualité (selon les déclarations recueillies). De manière générale, la recherche et la 
vulgarisation sont déterminants pour la satisfaction de cet objectif.. 
50.  Au Burkina et au Bénin le différentiel de prix du coton-graine en fonction du choix est 
assez incitatif, aussi la répartition de la production totale en faveur de la meilleure 
qualité est excellente. 
51.  Le Bénin, comme pour l’objectif de développement précédent, occupe une place de 
choix : 95 % du coton au niveau bord champ est classé en 1
er choix. Les opérateurs ont 
opté avec succès pour le principe d'unicité  de la classification (une seule unité existe et 
est gérée par la SONAPRA ) pour mieux contrôler le coût et la qualité finale du produit. 
Aussi, plus de la moitié du coton béninois est classé dans la catégorie correspondant à 
l'indice A. Les litiges relatifs à la qualité y sont rares. 
52.  Au Mali, la recherche et la vulgarisation ont une contribution positive à cet objectif 
respectivement par la production de variétés adaptées, et la promotion de bonnes 
techniques culturales; la performance vis à vis de cet objectif est cependant moyenne, du 
fait d’une faible part de la production du coton fibre en référence à l’indice A et un taux 
défavorable de litiges à l’exportation de fibre. 
53.  En Côte d'Ivoire le taux de 1
er choix dans le coton-graine collecté est supérieur à 60 %. 
Le système de différentiel de prix associé au grade de coton-graine semble constituer un 
élément favorable.  
54.  Le Cameroun est le pays le moins performant du groupe des pays francophones, le 
différentiel de prix associé au grade de coton-graine étant plus faible, l'incitation à la 
production de qualité est plus faible. Le nombre de litiges relatifs à la qualité du coton 
fibre est très défavorable. 
55.  Le Ghana est en situation clairement défavorable pour cet objectif   en absence de 
dispositif de classification, en raison d'une recherche très réduite qui ne produit pas de 
7 variétés adaptées, un conseil technique déficient, un faible différentiel de prix d’achat du 
coton graine en fonction de la qualité. La commercialisation du coton-graine se fait, 
cependant, de manière à éviter la dégradation par les pluies de même que l'égrenage 
intervient assez rapidement après l'arrivée à l'usine afin d'écourter le stockage qui peut 
avoir des effets directs sur la qualité. 
17.  Réduction des coûts de production de la fibre 
56.  La situation est moyennement favorable pour l’ensemble des pays francophones. Le 
groupe constitué par la Côte d’Ivoire, le Cameroun et le Burkina est en position 
relativement meilleure que celui constitué par le Mali et le Bénin. Cela revient à 
l'efficacité de la commercialisation  (durée des opérations d'achat du coton-graine, de 
l'évacuation du coton-graine…) et donc des frais de commercialisation favorables (coût 
du transport, du stockage…), et à des coûts d'égrenage et de classification corrects. 
Globalement les activités d'égrenage et de vente de la fibre localement ou à l'export sont 
faiblement taxées voire pas du tout et les coûts de classification bas. 
57.  Le nombre de sociétés de transit et le nombre d’acheteurs de coton fibre  est 
globalement défavorable pour l’ensemble  des pays francophones du réseau.  
58.  Le manque d’informations sur les coûts (transport de coton graine, stockage du coton 
graine avant égrenage, égrenage, stockage du coton fibre, classement, transport des 
balles, assurance de mise à CAF, transit) fait baisser l’évaluation de la performance pour 
certains pays. Le coût du transport du coton-graine jusqu’à l’usine est défavorable au 
Burkina et au Cameroun. 
59.  Au niveau du Bénin, les opérations de stockage, transit et assurance contribuent 
négativement à la réduction des coûts (coût des opérations de transit, nombre des 
sociétés de transit…). Dans ce pays, on est en situation de sur-capacité en terme d’unités 
d’égrenage, ce qui ne joue pas en faveur d'une réduction des coûts d'égrenage, 
contrairement à la Côte d'Ivoire où la capacité des unités de production des usines est 
pleinement utilisée.  
60.  Le Ghana a la situation la plus défavorable par rapport aux autres pays, pour cet objectif, 
du fait notamment d’une absence globale de données. Les coûts disponibles en terme de 
commercialisation du coton-graine, de taxes à l’égrenage sont cependant favorables. 
18.  Renforcer la compétitivité par l’obtention de meilleurs prix à la vente 
du coton fibre à l’export  
61.  Globalement pour les pays francophones, la performance pour cet objectif est moyenne 
(Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroun) à défavorable (Bénin, Côte d’ivoire). On note pour cet 
objectif, un manque important d’informations, ce qui explique le niveau de performance 
des deux derniers pays.  
62.  Le différentiel du prix de vente du coton-fibre avec l’indice A pour le coton du type 
indice A est globalement favorable, ainsi que la fréquence de plaintes relatives au 
collage, à part en Côte d’Ivoire où l’information est manquante.  
63.  Le nombre d’acheteurs de coton fibre est globalement défavorable. La part de la 
production en référence à l’indice A est défavorable au Burkina et au Mali. 
64.  Pour le Ghana, on manque totalement d’information à ce sujet.  
19.  Renforcer la compétitivité par l’obtention de meilleurs prix à la vente 
locale du coton fibre  
65.  La situation est moyennement favorable pour le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Cameroun, 
alors que pour le Bénin et la Côte d’Ivoire, l’évaluation de la performance est obérée par 
une faible disponibilité d’informations. La part de la production en référence à l’indice 
8 A est toutefois défavorable au Burkina et au Mali alors qu’elle est favorable en Côte 
d’Ivoire et au Bénin. L’indicateur fréquence de plaintes relatives au collage est 
globalement favorable pour l’ensemble des pays francophones. Au Mali et au Cameroun 
le nombre de clients de coton fibre par type de vente est défavorable. 
66.  Pour le Ghana, on manque totalement d’information à ce sujet.  
20.  Renforcer la compétitivité par l'obtention de meilleurs prix à la vente 
locale ou à l'export des graines de coton  
67.  Pour cet objectif le Burkina et le Mali sont performants, le Bénin l’est moyennement.  
68.  Le nombre de clients à la vente de graines de coton est très favorable au Mali et au 
Burkina alors que le prix de vente des graines par position l’est pour le premier et pas 
pour le second. Au Bénin, le prix de vente des graines de coton par position est 
favorable. 
69.  En Côte d’Ivoire, le nombre d’acheteurs de graines de coton et le nombre de clients à la 
vente de graines de coton sont très défavorables.  
70.  Au Ghana , les données sont rares, cependant l’indicateur «  nombre d’acheteurs de 
graines de coton » est très favorable. 
21.  Renforcer la compétitivité par la participation aux mécanismes de 
gestion du risque   
71.  La performance est défavorable au Burkina et en Côte d’Ivoire, clairement favorable au 
Cameroun et au Mali, et non  informée pour le Bénin et le Ghana. Elle est évaluée en se 
basant sur l’indicateur : part de la production par type de vente.  
72.  Au Bénin, seule la diversification des clients (issus des différents continents) constitue 
un élément positif, alors que la faible diversité des contrats constitue un élément négatif. 
Nul n'accède au marché à terme.  
 
9 Annexe 4.  Incidence des niveaux de capacités sur l'atteinte 
des objectifs 
1.  Les niveaux du facteur clé "capacité à s'adapter aux fluctuations du marché par une 
compétitivité prix" sont en général : 
  favorables pour les objectifs de  
•  "accroître le revenu coton des producteurs"  
•  et "améliorer l'équité en termes de distribution de revenu coton 
entre les producteurs",  
  mais défavorable pour les objectifs de  
•  "réduire les risques" (moins pour le Burkina Faso et le Mali)  
•  et " renforcer la compétitivité en réduisant les coûts de 
production et de commercialisation de la fibre" (du fait de la 
non-communication des informations nécessaires), mais le 
Burkina Faso se distingue positivement.  
  Ces niveaux ont une incidence plutôt moyenne pour les autres objectifs 
concernés  
•  améliorer la fourniture des services publics,  
•  renforcer la compétitivité en s'adaptant aux exigences 
qualitatives des utilisateurs, 
•  renforcer la compétitivité par l'obtention de meilleurs prix à la 
vente locale ou à l'exportation du coton fibre), mais cela peut 
être due à la non-communication des certaines informations 
nécessaires. 
2.  Les niveaux du facteur clé "capacité de résister aux fluctuations du marché par la 
qualité" sont en général : 
  favorables pour les objectifs de "réduire les risques" et "garantir la durabilité 
par la prévention des effets néfastes de l'utilisation des produits chimiques",  
  défavorable pour l'objectif de "renforcer la compétitivité en s'adaptant aux 
exigences qualitatives des utilisateurs".  
  Ces niveaux ont une incidence moyenne sur les objectifs de  
•  "accroître le revenu coton des producteurs" 
•  "améliorer la fourniture de services publics" 
•  "améliorer l'équité en termes de distribution de revenu coton 
entre les producteurs" 
•  "renforcer la compétitivité en réduisant les coûts de production 
et de commercialisation de la fibre". 
3.  Les niveaux du facteur clé "capacité à gagner en productivité à la production de coton-
graine" sont en général : 
  favorables pour les objectifs de  
•  "accroître le revenu coton des producteurs" 
•  "améliorer l'équité en termes de distribution de revenu coton 
entre les producteurs",  
  ils ont une incidence moyenne sur les objectifs de  
•  "réduire les risques" (le Bénin se distinguant négativement) 
•  et " garantir une gestion durable des espaces cultivés".  
  Par contre, les pays ont des niveaux différenciés vis à vis des objectifs de  
1 •  "améliorer la fourniture de services publics" (le Cameroun et le 
Mali se distinguant positivement) 
•  et "garantir la durabilité par prévention des effets  néfastes de 
l'utilisation des produits chimiques" (le Bénin et la Côte 
d'Ivoire se démarquant négativement). 
4.  Les niveaux du facteur clé "capacité à tempérer les effets d'évolution et de fluctuation 
des facteurs naturels" sont en général : 
  favorables pour les objectifs de  
•  "améliorer l'équité en termes de distribution de revenu coton 
entre les producteurs"  
•  et "accroître le revenu coton des producteurs",  
  défavorables pour l'objectif "réduire les risques",  
  mais d'une incidence moyenne sur les autres objectifs concernés  
•  "améliorer la fourniture de services publics" (Le Cameroun, et 
même le Mali, se démarquant positivement), 
•  "garantir une gestion durable des espaces cultivés"  
•  et "garantir la durabilité par la prévention des effets néfastes de 
l'utilisation des produits chimiques". 
5.  Les niveaux du facteur clé "capacité à promouvoir une production durable et à 
préserver la santé " sont en général : 
  favorables pour les objectifs de  
•  "accroître le revenu coton des producteurs",  
•  "réduire les risques"  
•  et "améliorer l'équité en termes de distribution de revenu coton 
entre les producteurs",  
  d'une incidence moyenne pour les objectifs de  
•  "améliorer la fourniture de services publics" 
•  "garantir une gestion durable des espaces cultivés", 
  par contre, les niveaux sont différenciés entre les pays pour l'objectif de 
"garantir la durabilité par la prévention des effets néfastes de l'utilisation des 
produits chimiques" (le Bénin se distinguant de manière négative). 
6.  Les niveaux du facteur clé "capacité à entretenir l'adhésion des paysans à la production 
cotonnière" sont en général  
  favorables pour les objectifs de  
•  "accroître le revenu coton des producteurs"  
•  et "améliorer l'équité en termes de distribution de revenu coton 
entre les producteurs"  
  et d'une incidence moyenne sur les autres objectifs concernés  
•  "réduire les risques",  
•  "améliorer la fourniture des services publics",  
•  "garantir la durabilité par la prévention des effets néfastes de 
l'utilisation des produits chimiques,"  
•  "renforcer la compétitivité en s'adaptant aux exigences 
qualitatives des utilisateurs". 
7.  Les niveaux du facteur clé "capacité à entretenir l'adhésion des autres acteurs à la 
production cotonnière" sont en général : 
2   favorables pour les objectifs de  
•  "accroître le revenu des producteurs"  
•  et "garantir la durabilité par prévention des effets néfastes de 
l'utilisation des produits chimiques"  
  et d'une incidence moyenne sur les autre objectifs concernés  
•  "améliorer la fourniture des services publics" 
•  "renforcer la compétitivité en s'adaptant aux exigences 
qualitatives des utilisateur" 
8.  Les niveaux du facteur clé "capacité à fournir les biens et services publics/collectifs" 
sont en général d'une incidence moyenne  
  pour les objectifs de  
•  "accroître le revenu des producteurs",  
•  "améliorer la fourniture de services publics",  
•  "garantir une gestion durable des espaces cultivés" 
•  et "garantir la durabilité par la prévention des effets néfastes de 
l'utilisation des produits chimiques",  
  mais ils sont différenciés entre les pays pour les objectifs de  
•  "réduire les risques" (Cameroun, Mali et Côte d'Ivoire se 
distinguant positivement) 
•  et "améliorer l'équité en termes de distribution de revenu coton 
entre les producteurs" (la Côte d'Ivoire se démarquant de 
manière négative) 
9.  Les niveaux du facteur clé "capacité à prévenir et à gérer les conflits entre les acteurs " 
sont en général  
  favorables pour l'objectif de "renforcer la compétitivité en s'adaptant aux 
exigences qualitative s des utilisateurs",  
  défavorables pour les objectifs de  
•  "réduire les risques",  
•  "améliorer la fourniture de services publics"  
•  et "renforcer la compétitivité en réduisant les coûts de 
production et de commercialisation de la fibre",  
  et d'une incidence moyenne sur les autres objectifs concernés  
•  "accroître le revenu coton des producteurs" (la Côte d'Ivoire se 
démarquant négativement),  
•  "améliorer l'équité en termes de distribution de revenu coton 
entre les producteurs" (Côte d'Ivoire et Burkina Faso se 
détachant positivement), 
•  "garantir la durabilité par la prévention des effets néfastes de 
l'utilisation des produits chimiques"  
•  et "renforcer la compétitivité par l'obtention de meilleurs prix à 
la vente locale ou à l'exportation du coton fibre". 
 
3 Annexe 5.  Incidence des considérations qualitatives  
sur les niveaux des facteurs clés 
1.  Pour le niveau du facteur clé de "capacité de s'adapter aux fluctuations du marché par 
une compétitivité prix", les considérations qualitatives qui, en général,  
  contribuent positivement sont "L'équité entre les paysans est-elle soutenu par 
une politique de péréquation territoriale du prix d'achat du coton-graine et du 
prix des intrants" et "Y-a-t-il une réduction par une fiscalité plus favorable",  
  celles qui contribuent négativement sont "Y-a-t-il eu une amélioration des 
moyens pour réduire les effets résultant des risques liés aux facteurs 
économiques", "Quelle est l'évolution de la démarche pour préserver la 
ressource terre", "Y-a-t-il une réduction des coûts dans l'égrenage du coton-
graine", "Y-a-t-il une réduction des coûts de transaction à la vente du coton-
fibre", "Quelle est l'évolution des moyens pour gagner en compétitivité prix du 
coton fibre" et "Quelle est l'évolution des moyens pour gagner en compétitivité 
prix du coton fibre".  
  Il y a par contre une variation entre les pays pour l'incidence des considérations 
suivantes : "Les paysans bénéficient-ils d'un mécanisme de stabilisation du prix 
d'achat du coton-graine", "Les paysans participent-ils davantage aux dispositifs 
qui déterminent les facteurs de leur revenu coton", "Quelle est l'évolution de 
l'image sur le prix obtenu à la vente du coton fibre" et "quel est l'état de la 
compétitivité prix". 
2.  Pour le niveau du facteur clé de "capacité à résister aux fluctuations du marché par la 
qualité", les considérations qualitatives qui, en général, 
  contribuent positivement sont "Quel est le comportement global des paysans 
face aux risques des facteurs naturels et économiques", "Quel est l'état de la 
qualité de la qualité du coton fibre produit" et "Quelle est l'évolution des 
moyens pour préserver la qualité après l'achat"  
  celles qui contribuent négativement sont : "Y-a-t-il une réduction des coûts 
dans l'égrenage du coton-graine" et "Quelle est l'évolution de l'image sur le 
prix obtenu à la vente du coton fibre"  
  alors qu'il y a une variation entre les pays pour l'incidence des considérations 
suivantes : "Quelle est l'évolution de la valeur ajoutée que les paysans retirent 
de la production cotonnière", "Quel est l'état de la qualité du coton fibre 
produit" et "Quelle est l'évolution des moyens pour améliorer la qualité au 
niveau des paysans"  
3.  Pour le niveau du facteur clé de "capacité à gagner en productivité à la production de 
coton-graine", les considérations qualitatives qui, en général, 
  contribuent positivement sont "Le revenu des paysans a-t-il bénéficié d'un 
meilleur accès aux intrants", "Quel est le comportement global des paysans 
face aux risques des facteurs naturels et économiques", "L'équité entre les 
paysans est-elle soutenu par une politique de péréquation territoriale du prix 
d'achat du coton-graine et du prix des intrants", et "Y-a-t-il un égal accès des 
paysans au conseil technique" 
  celles qui contribuent négativement sont : "Y-a-t-il eu une amélioration des 
moyens pour réduire les effets résultant des risques liés aux facteurs 
économiques", et "Quelle est l'évolution de la démarche pour préserver la 
ressource terre", 
  alors qu'il y a une variation entre les pays pour l'incidence des considérations 
suivantes : "Les paysans participent-ils davantage aux dispositifs qui 
déterminent les facteurs de leur revenu coton", "Y-a-t-il un égal accès des 
paysans au conseil technique", "Y-a-t-il un égal accès des paysans aux 
1 équipements de production", "La fourniture de conseil technique par la 
formation/vulgarisation est-elle améliorée", "Quelle est l'évolution de 
l'approche pour gérer la pression parasitaire", "Quelle est l'évolution des effets 
néfastes consécutifs à l'emploi des produits chimiques sur la santé humaine en 
zone rurale" et "Quelle est l'évolution des moyens pour améliorer la qualité au 
niveau des paysans". 
4.  Pour le niveau du facteur clé de "capacité à tempérer les effets d'évolution et de 
fluctuation des facteurs naturels", les considérations qualitatives qui, en général, 
  contribuent positivement sont "Y-a-t-il un égal accès des paysans au conseil 
technique", "Y-a-t-il un égal accès des paysans au conseil technique" et "La 
fourniture de conseil technique par la formation/vulgarisation est-elle 
améliorée"  
  celles qui contribuent négativement sont : "Y-a-t-il une amélioration des 
moyens pour réduire les effets résultant des risques liés aux facteurs naturels", 
"Quelle est l'évolution de la ressource terre" et "Quelle est l'évolution de la 
démarche pour préserver la ressource terre"  
  alors qu'il y a une variation entre les pays pour l'incidence des considérations 
suivantes : "Le revenu des paysans a-t-il bénéficié d'un meilleur accès aux 
intrants", "Quelle est l'évolution de l'approche pour gérer la pression 
parasitaire" et "Quelle est l'évolution de l'image sur le prix obtenu à la vente du 
coton fibre"  
5.  Pour le niveau du facteur clé de "capacité à promouvoir une production durable et à 
préserver la santé", les considérations qualitatives qui, en général, 
  contribuent positivement sont "Quel est le comportement global des paysans 
face aux risques des facteurs naturels et économiques", "Y-a-t-il un égal accès 
des paysans au conseil technique" et "La fourniture de conseil technique par la 
formation/vulgarisation est-elle améliorée"  
  celle qui contribue négativement est : "Quelle est l'évolution de l'état de 
pollution des eaux"  
  alors qu'il y a une variation entre les pays pour l'incidence des considérations 
suivantes : "Y-a-t-il un égal accès des paysans au conseil technique", "Quelle 
est l'évolution de la démarche pour préserver la ressource terre", "Quelle est 
l'évolution de l'approche pour gérer la pression parasitaire" et "Quelle est 
l'évolution des effets néfastes consécutifs à l'emploi des produits chimiques sur 
la santé humaine en zone rurale"  
6.  Pour le niveau du facteur clé de "capacité à entretenir l'adhésion des paysans à la 
production cotonnière", les considérations qualitatives qui, en général, 
  contribuent positivement sont "Les paysans bénéficient-ils d'un mécanisme de 
stabilisation du prix d'achat du coton-graine", "Le revenu des paysans a-t-il 
bénéficié d'un meilleur accès aux intrants", "Quel est le comportement global 
des paysans face aux risques des facteurs naturels et économiques", "L'équité 
entre les paysans est-elle soutenu par une politique de péréquation territoriale 
du prix d'achat du coton-graine et du prix des intrants", "Y-a-t-il un égal accès 
des paysans au conseil technique", "Y-a-t-il un égal accès des paysans au 
conseil technique" et "La fourniture de conseil technique par la 
formation/vulgarisation est-elle améliorée"  
  celles qui contribuent négativement sont : "y-a-t-il une évolution positive du 
prix d'achat du coton-graine aux producteurs", "De manière générale, la 
perception des risques par les paysans engagés dans la production cotonnière 
s'est-elle accentuée", "Y-a-t-il eu une amélioration des moyens pour réduire les 
effets résultant des risques liés aux facteurs économiques", "Quelle est 
2 l'évolution de la ressource terre" et "Quelle est l'évolution des moyens pour 
prévenir contre les effets néfastes sur la santé"  
  alors qu'il y a une variation entre les pays pour l'incidence des considérations 
suivantes : "Le nombre de paysans cotonniers a-t-il augmenté", "y-a-t-il une 
différenciation entre les paysans cotonniers dans le bénéficie qu'ils retirent du 
coton", "Les paysans participent-ils davantage aux dispositifs qui déterminent 
les facteurs de leur revenu coton", "Y-a-t-il un égal accès des paysans aux 
équipements de production", "Quelle est l'évolution de la part des paysans dans 
la valeur ajoutée que les paysans retirent de la production cotonnière", "Quelle 
est l'évolution de la démarche pour préserver la ressource terre", "Quelle est 
l'évolution des effets néfastes consécutifs à l'emploi des produits chimiques sur 
la santé humaine en zone rurale" et "Quelle est l'évolution des moyens pour 
améliorer la qualité au niveau des paysans"  
7.  Pour le niveau du facteur clé de "capacité à entretenir l'adhésion des autres acteurs à la 
production cotonnière", les considérations qualitatives qui, en général, 
  contribuent positivement sont "Quelle est l'évolution des moyens pour 
préserver la qualité après l'achat" et "Y-a-t-il une réduction par une fiscalité 
plus favorable"  
  celles qui contribuent négativement sont : "Y-a-t-il une réduction des coûts 
dans l'égrenage du coton-graine" et "Y-a-t-il une réduction des coûts de 
transaction à la vente du coton-fibre"  
8.  Pour le niveau du facteur clé de "capacité à fournir les biens ou services 
publics/collectifs", les considérations qualitatives qui, en général, 
  contribuent positivement sont "Y-a-t-il un égal accès des paysans au conseil 
technique"  
  celles qui contribuent négativement sont : "Quelle est l'évolution de l'état de 
pollution des eaux"  
  alors qu'il y a une variation entre les pays pour l'incidence des considérations 
suivantes : "Y-a-t-il une amélioration des moyens pour réduire les effets 
résultant des risques liés aux facteurs naturels"  
  mais plusieurs autres considérations qualitatives ont une incidence moyenne 
sur ce facteur clé 
9.  Pour le niveau du facteur clé de "capacité à prévenir et à gérer les conflits entre les 
acteurs", les considérations qualitatives qui, en général, 
  contribuent positivement sont "Les paysans bénéficient-ils d'un mécanisme de 
stabilisation du prix d'achat du coton-graine", "Le revenu des paysans a-t-il 
bénéficié d'un meilleur accès aux intrants" et "Y-a-t-il une réduction par une 
fiscalité plus favorable"  
  celles qui contribuent négativement sont : "De manière générale, la perception 
des risques par les paysans engagés dans la production cotonnière s'est-elle 
accentuée", "Quelle est l'évolution de la ressource terre", "quel est l'état de la 
compétitivité prix" et "Quelle est l'évolution des moyens pour gagner en 
compétitivité prix du coton fibre"  
  alors qu'il y a une variation entre les pays pour l'incidence des considérations 
suivantes : "Les paysans participent-ils davantage aux dispositifs qui 
déterminent les facteurs de leur revenu coton", "Quelle est l'évolution de la part 
des paysans dans la valeur ajoutée que les paysans retirent de la production 
cotonnière", "Quelle est l'évolution de la démarche pour préserver la ressource 
terre", "Quelle est l'évolution de l'approche pour gérer la pression parasitaire" 
et"Quelle est l'évolution des moyens pour améliorer la qualité au niveau des 
paysans". 
3 Annexe 6 Nombre de pays en fonction de l'occurrence des défaillances de coordination
réalité_défailLibéralisation? ype défaillance







Défaillance Etat Marché Etat Marché Etat Marché Etat Marché
Transport 
maritime




Absence de politique de concurrence efficace 23 1
Inadéquation des intrants compte tenu des conditions locales 411
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 5 1
Incomplétude du marché de l'information (sur les quantités 
nécessaires)
41 1
Inefficacité du contrôle qualité et certification des intrants 51
Inefficacité productive dans la négociation des contrats 
d'importation d'intrants
32 1
Manque de ressources pour le financement des achats 
d'intrants
41 1
Oligopole des fournisseurs d'intrants 5 1
Recherche de rente dans l'allocation de licences pour 
l'importation de semences
23 1
Recherche de rente dans l'octroi de licences aux importateurs 41 1
Taxation excessive à l'importation des intrants 312
Fabricant local 
d'intrants
Inadéquation des intrants compte tenu des conditions locales 411
Inefficacité du contrôle qualité et certification des intrants 411
Production de 
semences
Absence de protection de la propriété intellectuelle relative 
aux variétés produites
23 1
Economie d'échelle dans la production et distribution de 
semences
213
Incomplétude du marché de l'information (sur les quantités 
nécessaires)
312
Inefficacité dans la production de semences à capacité 
germinative satisfaisante
32 1
Recherche de rente dans la certification des semences 32 1
Transport 
d'intrants
Inefficacité productive dans l'utilisation des camions 
(surinvestissement, non entretien, détournement)
23 1
Mauvais entretien des routes et des pistes par manque de 
ressources ou par inefficacité
312
Nature de bien public des routes et des pistes 23 1
Distribution 
d'intrants
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 23 1
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réalité_défailLibéralisation? ype défaillance
Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation
Défaillance non avérée Défaillance avérée
Incomplétude du marché de l'information (sur les quantités 
produites et disponibles)
23 1
Inefficacité productive dans le conditionnement des intrants 51
Insuffisance de concurrence dans la distribution des intrants 
aux paysans
32 1
Manque de ressources pour organiser le crédit intrants 41 1
Retards dans le timing de la vente aux paysans 312
Risque moral des emprunteurs de crédit 41 1
Ventes des intrants au paysan à prix et à qualité de monopole 32 1
Recherche Nature de bien commun des connaissances techniques utilisées 
pour la culture
41 1
Nature de bien commun des ressources génétiques 23 1
Recherche de rente dans l'enregistrement des variétés 14 1
Conseil 
technique





Absence de marché de terres cultivables 23 1
Inefficacité dans la protection des espaces cultivables 5 1
Nature de bien commun de la réserve en terre arable du village 5 1
Recherche de rente sur les terres de haute valeur 23 1
Achat local de 
CG
Achat de coton graine au prix de monopsone 5 1
Inefficacité dans l'organisation de la commercialisation du 
coton graine
312
Inefficacité du contrôle de qualité du coton graine 32 1
Manque de ressources pour réaliser l'achat du coton graine 51
Oligopole des acheteurs de coton graine ou concurrence non 
régulée
5 1
Recherche de rente dans la distribution de quotas d'égrenage 
aux égreneurs
411
Recherche de rente dans la fourniture de licences aux 
égreneurs
14 1
Transport CG Inefficacité productive dans l'utilisation des camions 
(surinvestissement, non entretien, détournement)
41 1
Mauvais entretien des routes et des pistes par manque de 
ressources ou par inefficacité
312
Nature de bien public des routes et des pistes 312
Oligopole des sociétés de transport 312
Recherche de rente dans la contractualisation du transport 41 1
Saisonnalité de la demande pour le transport de marchandises 312
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réalité_défailLibéralisation? ype défaillance
Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation
Défaillance non avérée Défaillance avérée
Egrenage Difficulté à évaluer certaines caractéristiques du coton graine 
déterminantes des caractéristiques du coton fibre (collage par 
exemple)
23 1
Existence d'économies d'échelle dans l'activité d'égrenage 23 1
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 23 1
Incomplétude du marché de l'assurance 51
Inefficacité du contrôle de qualité du coton graine 32 1
Inefficacité du contrôle qualité de la fibre 32 1
Inefficacité productive dans le stockage du coton graine 114
Inefficacité productive dans l'égrenage 312
Sous-investissements par manque de ressources pour 
compléter les équipements d'égrenage
411
Taxation excessive sur la filière 411
Classification Difficulté à évaluer certaines caractéristiques prises en compte 
par les utilisateurs finaux (collage, SCF)
41 1
Existence d'économie d'échelle dans le classement 41 1
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 23 1
Incomplétude du marché de l'assurance 51
Inefficacité productive dans la classification du coton fibre 312
Manque de ressources pour investir dans les équipements de 




Inefficacité productive dans la recherche de clients acheteurs 
de coton fibre ou de graines de coton
14 1
Taxation excessive sur la filière 5 1
Transport fibre Inefficacité productive dans l'utilisation des camions 
(surinvestissement, non entretien, détournement)
23 1
Manque de ressources pour financer l'achat des camions 312
Nature de bien public des routes et des pistes 32 1
Recherche de rente dans la contractualisation du transport 32 1
Stockage (au 
port)
Difficultés à s'adapter aux capacités de stockage 23 1
Incomplétude du marché de l'assurance 51
Inefficacité productive dans le stockage du coton fibre 
(surinvestissement, non entretien, détournement)
32 1
Manque de ressources pour investir dans de nouveaux 
entrepôts
14 1
Oligopole des sociétés de stockage au port 14 1
Oligopole des transitaires au port 23 1
Transit Oligopole des transitaires au port 51
Achat export de 
coton fibre
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 23 1
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réalité_défailLibéralisation? ype défaillance
Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation
Défaillance non avérée Défaillance avérée
Incomplétude du marché de l'assurance 14 1
Inefficacité productive dans la recherche de clients acheteurs 
de coton fibre ou de graines de coton
14 1
Nature de bien public de la réputation internationale du coton 
du pays
41 1
Oligopole des négociants de coton fibre ou graines de coton 14 1
Taxation excessive sur la filière 5 1
Achat local de 
graines
Inefficacité productive dans la recherche de clients acheteurs 
de coton fibre ou de graines de coton
32 1
Oligopole des négociants de coton fibre ou graines de coton 114
Taxation excessive sur la filière 14 1
Transport 
Graine de coton
Inefficacité productive dans l'utilisation des camions 
(surinvestissement, non entretien, détournement)
312
Nature de bien public des routes et des pistes 312
Recherche de rente dans la contractualisation du transport 312
Achat export de 
graines
Inefficacité productive dans la recherche de clients acheteurs 
de coton fibre ou de graines de coton
32 1
Oligopole des négociants de coton fibre ou graines de coton 114
Taxation excessive sur la filière 14 1










Imperfection du marché des produits vivriers 5 1
Imperfection du marché du travail 5 1
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 5 1
Incomplétude du marché de l'assurance 5 1
Inefficacité dans l'organisation des marchés vivriers 41 1
Manque de ressources pour organiser la commercialisation des 
produits vivriers
23 1
Nature de bien commun des connaissances techniques utilisées 
pour la culture
411
Finance Absence de marché de terres cultivables 51
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 23 1
Incomplétude du marché de l'information (sur les quantités 
produites et disponibles)
51
Manque de ressources pour fournir le crédit consommation 14 1
Risque moral des emprunteurs de crédit 14 1
Achat local de 
CG
Achat de coton graine au prix de monopsone 51
Réduire les 
risques
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réalité_défailLibéralisation? ype défaillance
Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation
Défaillance non avérée Défaillance avérée
Entente entre les acheteurs de coton graine 51
Egrenage Incomplétude du marché de l'assurance 41 1
Stockage (au 
port)
Incomplétude du marché de l'assurance 213
Achat export de 
coton fibre
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 23 1
Incomplétude du marché de l'assurance 213
Manque de ressources pour le fonctionnement de la filière 23 1
Distribution 
d'intrants
Incomplétude du marché de l'information (sur les quantités 
produites et disponibles)
41 1
Insuffisance de concurrence dans la distribution des intrants 
aux paysans
32 1
Manque de ressources pour organiser le crédit intrants 41 1
Recherche de rente dans le choix des paysans bénéficiaires de 
crédit intrants
41 1
Retards dans le timing de la vente aux paysans 312
Risque moral des emprunteurs de crédit 41 1
Ventes des intrants au paysan à prix et à qualité de monopole 32 1
Conseil 
technique





Nature de bien commun de la réserve en terre arable du village 32 1
Transport 
d'intrants
Mauvais entretien des routes et des pistes par manque de 
ressources ou par inefficacité
23 1
Nature de bien public des routes et des pistes 23 1
Conseil 
technique
Inefficacité de la coordination de la connaissance vulgarisée 
fournie par différentes agences
213
Nature de bien commun des connaissances techniques utilisées 
pour la culture
213
Transport CG Mauvais entretien des routes et des pistes par manque de 
ressources ou par inefficacité
312
Nature de bien public des routes et des pistes 312
Transport fibre Mauvais entretien des routes et des pistes par manque de 
ressources ou par inefficacité
213
Nature de bien public des routes et des pistes 213
Transport 
Graine de coton
Mauvais entretien des routes et des pistes par manque de 
ressources ou par inefficacité
213
Nature de bien public des routes et des pistes 213
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réalité_défailLibéralisation? ype défaillance
Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation




Difficulté à évaluer les caractéristiques des engrais et 
pesticides
411










Difficulté à évaluer les caractéristiques des engrais et 
pesticides
312
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 312
Incomplétude du marché de l'information sur les quantités 
réellement demandées par les paysans et les périodes de 
commande
41 1
Recherche Inefficacité de la gestion de la protection phytosanitaire 411





Inefficacité de la gestion de la protection phytosanitaire 51





Absence de marché de terres cultivables 5 1
Inefficacité de la gestion de la protection phytosanitaire 411
Nature de bien commun de la réserve en terre arable du village 51
Nature de bien commun des nappes phréatiques 23 1




Inefficacité du contrôle qualité et certification des intrants 51





Inefficacité du contrôle qualité et certification des intrants 51
Distribution 
d'intrants










Nature de bien commun des nappes phréatiques 14 1
Recherche Difficulté à évaluer certaines caractéristiques du coton graine 
déterminantes des caractéristiques du coton fibre (collage par 
exemple)
32 1
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réalité_défailLibéralisation? ype défaillance
Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation
Défaillance non avérée Défaillance avérée
Conseil 
technique
Difficulté à évaluer certaines caractéristiques du coton graine 
déterminantes des caractéristiques du coton fibre (collage par 
exemple)
32 1





Difficulté à évaluer certaines caractéristiques du coton graine 
déterminantes des caractéristiques du coton fibre (collage par 
exemple)
32 1
Nature de bien commun des connaissances techniques utilisées 
pour la culture
32 1
Achat local de 
CG
Difficulté à évaluer certaines caractéristiques du coton graine 
déterminantes des caractéristiques du coton fibre (collage par 
exemple)
32 1
Inadéquation de la date officielle d'ouverture de la saison pour 
l'achat du coton-graine (maturité du coton)
41 1
Egrenage Difficulté à évaluer certaines caractéristiques du coton graine 
déterminantes des caractéristiques du coton fibre (collage par 
exemple)
32 1
Classification Difficulté à évaluer certaines caractéristiques prises en compte 
par les utilisateurs finaux (collage, SCF)
41 1
Existence d'économie d'échelle dans le classement 41 1
Inefficacité productive dans la classification du coton fibre 32 1
Manque de ressources pour investir dans les équipements de 
classification conformes aux normes de qualité de la fibre
32 1
Recherche de rente dans l'enregistrement des variétés 23 1
Risque moral sur la qualité vendue de la fibre ou des graines 41 1
Achat local 
coton fibre
Risque moral sur la qualité vendue de la fibre ou des graines 32 1
Achat export de 
coton fibre
Risque moral sur la qualité vendue de la fibre ou des graines 32 1
Achat local de 
graines
Risque moral sur la qualité vendue de la fibre ou des graines 32 1
Achat export de 
graines
Risque moral sur la qualité vendue de la fibre ou des graines 32 1
Achat local de 
CG
Achat de coton graine au prix de monopsone 5 1
Bien collectif des points de ramassage 41 1
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 41 1
Incomplétude du marché de l'information (sur les quantités 
produites et disponibles)
41 1
Inefficacité dans l'organisation de la commercialisation du 
coton graine
41 1
Inefficacité productive dans le stockage du coton graine 114
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réalité_défailLibéralisation? ype défaillance
Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation
Défaillance non avérée Défaillance avérée
Recherche de rente dans la classification du coton graine 51
Transport CG Inefficacité productive dans l'utilisation des camions 
(surinvestissement, non entretien, détournement)
5 1
Mauvais entretien des routes et des pistes par manque de 
ressources ou par inefficacité
41 1
Nature de bien public des routes et des pistes 312
Oligopole des sociétés de transport 312
Saisonnalité de la demande pour le transport de marchandises 312
Egrenage Difficulté à évaluer certaines caractéristiques du coton graine 
déterminantes des caractéristiques du coton fibre (collage par 
exemple)
23 1
Existence d'économies d'échelle dans l'activité d'égrenage 23 1
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 23 1
Incomplétude du marché de l'assurance 51
Inefficacité du contrôle de qualité du coton graine 32 1
Inefficacité productive dans le stockage du coton fibre 
(surinvestissement, non entretien, détournement)
114
Inefficacité productive dans le stockage du coton graine 114
Inefficacité productive dans l'égrenage 312
Sous-investissements par manque de ressources pour 
compléter les équipements d'égrenage
411
Taxation excessive sur la filière 51
Classification Difficulté à évaluer certaines caractéristiques prises en compte 
par les utilisateurs finaux (collage, SCF)
41 1
Existence d'économie d'échelle dans le classement 41 1
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 23 1
Incomplétude du marché de l'assurance 51
Inefficacité productive dans la classification du coton fibre 23 1
Manque de ressources pour investir dans les équipements de 
classification conformes aux normes de qualité de la fibre
41 1
Nature de bien public des routes et des pistes 32 1
Achat local 
coton fibre
Taxation excessive sur la filière 5 1
Transport fibre Inefficacité productive dans l'utilisation des camions 




Difficultés à s'adapter aux capacités de stockage 23 1
Incomplétude du marché de l'assurance 51
Oligopole des sociétés de stockage au port 14 1
Oligopole des transitaires au port 23 1
sation de la 
fibre 
jusqu'à la 
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réalité_défailLibéralisation? ype défaillance
Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation Orientation monopole Orientation libéralisation
Défaillance non avérée Défaillance avérée
Transit Oligopole des transitaires au port 51
Achat export de 
coton fibre
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 23 1
Incomplétude du marché de l'assurance 14 1
Nature de bien public de la réputation internationale du coton 
du pays
41 1
Oligopole des négociants de coton fibre ou graines de coton 14 1
Taxation excessive sur la filière 5 1
Achat local de 
graines
Taxation excessive sur la filière 14 1
Transport 
Graine de coton
Inefficacité productive dans l'utilisation des camions 
(surinvestissement, non entretien, détournement)
312
Achat export de 
graines
Oligopole des négociants de coton fibre ou graines de coton 114
Taxation excessive sur la filière 14 1
Achat local 
coton fibre
Inefficacité dans l'adaptation du timing des ventes aux 
périodes où prix le plus élevé à l'export
23 1
Nature de bien public de la réputation internationale du coton 
du pays
41 1
Achat export de 
coton fibre
Incomplétude des marchés financiers 23 1
Incomplétude du marché de l'assurance 14 1
Inefficacité dans l'adaptation du timing des ventes aux 
périodes où prix le plus élevé à l'export
23 1
Inefficacité productive dans la recherche de clients acheteurs 
de coton fibre ou de graines de coton
14 1
Nature de bien public de la réputation internationale du coton 
du pays
41 1
Oligopole des négociants de coton fibre ou graines de coton 14 1
Recherche de rente dans les services de transit 23 1
Achat local de 
graines
Inefficacité productive dans la recherche de clients acheteurs 
de coton fibre ou de graines de coton
32 1
Oligopole des négociants de coton fibre ou graines de coton 32 1
Achat export de 
graines
Inefficacité productive dans la recherche de clients acheteurs 
de coton fibre ou de graines de coton
32 1
Achat local de 
graines
Inefficacité productive dans la recherche de clients acheteurs 
de coton fibre ou de graines de coton
23 1
Oligopole des négociants de coton fibre ou graines de coton 23 1
Achat export de 
graines
Inefficacité productive dans la recherche de clients acheteurs 
de coton fibre ou de graines de coton
32 1



















Page 9 de 9Annexe 7 Les actions identifiées pour avoir empêcher l'occurrence des défaillances de coordination
Etape technique Défaillance









marchés financiers Intégration de la 
condition de crédit 
fournisseur de 200 à 
360 jours
octroi de crédit 
fournisseur dans 
l'acquisition des 
intrants sur appel 
d'offres
Incomplétude du marché 










fournisseurs par appel 
d'offres internationales
caractère captif du 
marché des intrants 
des filières 




Incomplétude du marché 










concurrence dans la 
distribution des intrants 
aux paysans
Régulation de la 
distribution dans le 




Risque moral des 
emprunteurs de crédit
Application de la 
caution solidaire au 
sein des organisations 
paysannes chargées de 
la gestion du crédit 
intrant
Recherche Nature de bien commun 
des connaissances 
techniques utilisées pour 
la culture
Prise en charge du 
financement 
conséquent de la 




Nature de bien commun 
des connaissances 
techniques utilisées pour 
la culture
Prise en charge du 
financement 
conséquent de la 




Nature de bien commun 
de la réserve en terre 
arable du village
Règles traditionnelles 
de gestion des terres 
dans les villages
Achat local de 
CG
Oligopole des acheteurs 




monopole à l'échelle 
nationale ou locale
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Etape technique Défaillance
action d'état action collective Réaction du marché
Transport CG Nature de bien public 
des routes et des pistes
Prise en charge du 
financement de 
l'entretien et de la 
maintenance des pistes 
rurales par la filière 
cotonnière
Oligopole des sociétés de 
transport Pouvoir de négociation 
des sociétés cotonnières 
disposant d'un parc 
autonome de camions 
de taille suffisante
Saisonnalité de la 
demande pour le 
transport de 
marchandises
Caractère captif du 
marché de transports 
des filières 
cotonnières pour les 
transporteurs 
nationaux
Classification Difficulté à évaluer 
certaines 
caractéristiques prises en 






phytosanitaire et bon 
réglage de l'égrenage 
pour éviter les 
problèmes de collage et 
de SCF
Existence d'économie 
d'échelle dans le 
classement
Option d'un mode de 
classement 




Nature de bien public 
des routes et des pistes
Prise en charge du 
financement de 
l'entretien et de la 
maintenance des pistes 




Nature de bien public de 
la réputation 
internationale du coton 
du pays
Adoption d'un système 





Nature de bien public 
des routes et des pistes
Prise en charge du 
financement de 
l'entretien et de la 
maintenance des pistes 
rurales par la filière 
cotonnière
Recherche Nature de bien commun 
des connaissances 
techniques utilisées pour 
la culture
Prise en charge du 
financement 
conséquent de la 
recherche par la filière 
cotonnière
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Etape technique Défaillance
action d'état action collective Réaction du marché
Conseil 
technique
Nature de bien commun 
des connaissances 
techniques utilisées pour 
la culture
Prise en charge du 
financement 
conséquent de la 




Imperfection du marché 
des produits vivriers
fonctionnement de 
longue date des 
marchés ruraux dans 
les villages
Imperfection du marché 
du travail
pratique traditionnelle 
de l'entr'aide et 
réduction de la 
demande en travail par 






bétail en cas de 
nécessité
Nature de bien commun 
des connaissances 
techniques utilisées pour 
la culture
Prise en charge du 
financement 
conséquent de la 
vulgarisation par la 
filière cotonnière
Achat local de 
CG
Entente entre les 
acheteurs de coton 
graine
Régulation par 
l'octroi du monopole 
aux acheteurs de 
coton graine
Egrenage Incomplétude du marché 
de l'assurance
Accès au marché 
international découlant 










Incomplétude du marché 
de l'information (sur les 








concurrence dans la 
distribution des intrants 
aux paysans
Régulation de la 
distribution dans le 






Risque moral des 
emprunteurs de crédit
Application de la 
caution solidaire au 
sein des organisations 
paysannes chargées de 
la gestion du crédit 
intrant
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Etape technique Défaillance
action d'état action collective Réaction du marché
Production de 
CG
Nature de bien commun 
de la réserve en terre 
arable du village
Règles traditionnelles 
de gestion des terres 
dans les villages
Transport CG Nature de bien public 
des routes et des pistes
Prise en charge du 
financement de 
l'entretien et de la 
maintenance des pistes 









procédures de contrôle 





souhaite fournir dans 










procédures de contrôle 





souhaite fournir dans 









procédures de contrôle 





souhaite fournir dans 








Incomplétude du marché 
de l'information sur les 
quantités réellement 
demandées par les 




besoins en intrants 
impliquant les 
organisation paysannes
Recherche Nature de bien commun 
des connaissances 
techniques utilisées pour 
la culture
Prise en charge du 
financement 
conséquent de la 




Absence de marché de 
terres cultivables
Règles traditionnelles 
de gestion des terres 
dans les villages
Nature de mal commun 
de la pression parasitaire accès de tous les 
paysans à la maîtrise 
technique de la 
protection 
phytosanitaire et aux 
insecticides nécessaires
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Etape technique Défaillance
action d'état action collective Réaction du marché
Distribution 
d'intrants




procédures de contrôle 





souhaite fournir dans 





Nature de bien commun 
des connaissances 
techniques utilisées pour 
la culture
Prise en charge du 
financement 
conséquent de la 
vulgarisation par la 
filière cotonnière
Recherche Difficulté à évaluer 
certaines 
caractéristiques du coton 
graine déterminantes des 
caractéristiques du coton 






éviter la dépréciation 
de la qualité
Nature de bien commun 
des connaissances 
techniques utilisées pour 
la culture
Prise en charge du 
financement 
conséquent de la 




Difficulté à évaluer 
certaines 
caractéristiques du coton 
graine déterminantes des 
caractéristiques du coton 






éviter la dépréciation 
de la qualité
Nature de bien commun 
des connaissances 
techniques utilisées pour 
la culture
Prise en charge du 
financement 
conséquent de la 




Difficulté à évaluer 
certaines 
caractéristiques du coton 
graine déterminantes des 
caractéristiques du coton 






éviter la dépréciation 
de la qualité
Nature de bien commun 
des connaissances 
techniques utilisées pour 
la culture
Prise en charge du 
financement 
conséquent de la 
vulgarisation par la 
filière cotonnière
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Etape technique Défaillance
action d'état action collective Réaction du marché
Achat local de 
CG
Difficulté à évaluer 
certaines 
caractéristiques du coton 
graine déterminantes des 
caractéristiques du coton 






éviter la dépréciation 
de la qualité
Egrenage Difficulté à évaluer 
certaines 
caractéristiques du coton 
graine déterminantes des 
caractéristiques du coton 









Classification Difficulté à évaluer 
certaines 
caractéristiques prises en 











d'échelle dans le 
classement
Option d'un mode de 
classement 
conventionnel à faibles 
économies d'échelle
Risque moral sur la 
qualité vendue de la 
fibre ou des graines
Adoption maîtrisée de 
la classification du 





Risque moral sur la 
qualité vendue de la 
fibre ou des graines
Politique de 
fidélisation des clients 




Risque moral sur la 
qualité vendue de la 
fibre ou des graines
Politique de 
fidélisation des clients 
en respectant les 
engagements de qualité
Achat local de 
graines
Risque moral sur la 
qualité vendue de la 
fibre ou des graines
Situation f'réquente 
d'intégration ou de 
quasi intégration qui 




Risque moral sur la 
qualité vendue de la 
fibre ou des graines
Pas d'exportation à 
grande échelle des 
graines
Achat local de 
CG
Bien collectif des points 
de ramassage
Définition de critères 
explicites dans la 
création des points de 
ramassage
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Etape technique Défaillance




d'un grand marché 
pour inciter l'entrée 
d'institutions 
financières offshore
Incomplétude du marché 
de l'information (sur les 






Transport CG Nature de bien public 
des routes et des pistes
Prise en charge du 
financement de 
l'entretien et de la 
maintenance des pistes 
rurales par la filière 
cotonnière
Oligopole des sociétés de 
transport Pouvoir de négociation 
des sociétés cotonnières 
disposant d'un parc 
autonome de camions 
de taille suffisante
Saisonnalité de la 
demande pour le 
transport de 
marchandises
Caractère captif du 
marché de transports 
des filières 
cotonnières pour les 
transporteurs 
nationaux
Classification Difficulté à évaluer 
certaines 
caractéristiques prises en 






phytosanitaire et bon 
réglage de l'égrenage 
pour éviter les 
problèmes de collage et 
de SCF
Existence d'économie 
d'échelle dans le 
classement
Option d'un mode de 
classement 




Nature de bien public de 
la réputation 
internationale du coton 
du pays
Adoption d'un système 




Nature de bien public de 
la réputation 
internationale du coton 
du pays
Adoption d'un système 




Nature de bien public de 
la réputation 
internationale du coton 
du pays
Adoption d'un système 
unique de classement à 
l'échelle nationale
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Etape technique Défaillance
action d'état action collective Réaction du marché
Achat local de 
graines
Oligopole des négociants 
de coton fibre ou graines 
de coton
Situation f'réquente 
d'intégration ou de 
quasi intégration qui 
affranchit de tout 
risque moral
Page 8 de 8Annexe 8 :Les défaillances sont-elles avérées ? (par type et en fonction de l'orientation des modes 
d'organisation, pour toutes les étapes techniques)
Pays à Orientation 
monopole
Pays à Orientation 
libéralisation
Objectif partiel de 
développement
Etape technique Défaillance de type "Etat" de type "Etat"




Absence de politique de concurrence 
efficace
Oui Oui
Recherche de rente dans l'allocation de 





Inefficacité productive dans 
l'utilisation des camions 
(surinvestissement, non entretien, 
détournement)
Oui Oui
Recherche Recherche de rente dans 
l'enregistrement des variétés
Oui Oui
Achat local de CG Recherche de rente dans la fourniture 
de licences aux égreneurs
Oui Oui
Egrenage Inefficacité productive dans le 
stockage du coton graine
Oui Non
Achat local coton 
fibre
Inefficacité productive dans la 
recherche de clients acheteurs de coton 
fibre ou de graines de coton
Oui Oui
Transport fibre Inefficacité productive dans 
l'utilisation des camions 
(surinvestissement, non entretien, 
détournement)
Oui Oui
Stockage (au port) Manque de ressources pour investir 
dans de nouveaux entrepôts
Oui Oui
Achat export de 
coton fibre
Inefficacité productive dans la 
recherche de clients acheteurs de coton 
fibre ou de graines de coton
Oui Oui
Achat local de 
graines
Taxation excessive sur la filière Oui Oui
Achat export de 
graines
Taxation excessive sur la filière Oui Oui
Améliorer la fourniture de 
services publics
Production de CG Manque de ressources pour organiser 
la commercialisation des produits 
vivriers
Oui Oui
Améliorer l'équité en termes 
de distrobution de revenu 
coton entre les producteurs
Manque de ressources pour fournir le 
crédit consommation
Oui Oui
Garantir la durabilité par la 
prévention des effets néfastes 
de l'utilisation des produits 
chimiques
Manque de ressources pour le 
fonctionnement de la filière
Oui Oui
Garantir une gestion 
durable des espaces cultivés
Transport 
d'intrants
Mauvais entretien des routes et des 





Inefficacité de la coordination de la 
connaissance vulgarisée fournie par 
différentes agences
Oui Non
Transport fibre Mauvais entretien des routes et des 





Mauvais entretien des routes et des 
pistes par manque de ressources ou par 
inefficacité
Oui Non
Renforcer la compétitivité en 
réduisant les coûts de 
production et de 
commercialisation de la fibre 
jusqu'à la vente sur le 
marché local ou exportatio
Classification Recherche de rente dans 
l'enregistrement des variétés
Oui Oui
Achat local de CG Inefficacité productive dans le 
stockage du coton graine
Oui Non
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d'organisation, pour toutes les étapes techniques)
Pays à Orientation 
monopole
Pays à Orientation 
libéralisation
Objectif partiel de 
développement
Etape technique Défaillance de type "Etat" de type "Etat"
Egrenage Inefficacité productive dans le 
stockage du coton fibre 
(surinvestissement, non entretien, 
détournement)
Oui Non
Inefficacité productive dans le 
stockage du coton graine
Oui Non
Renforcer la compétitivité en 
s'adaptant aux exigences 
qualitatives des utilisateurs
Classification Inefficacité productive dans la 
classification du coton fibre
Oui Oui
Achat local de 
graines
Taxation excessive sur la filière Oui Oui
Achat export de 
graines
Taxation excessive sur la filière Oui Oui
Renforcer la compétitivité 
par l'obtention de meilleurs 
prix à la vente locale ou à 
l'exportation du coton fibre
Achat local coton 
fibre
Inefficacité dans l'adaptation du timing 
des ventes aux périodes où prix le plus 
élevé à l'export
Oui Oui
Achat export de 
coton fibre
Inefficacité dans l'adaptation du timing 
des ventes aux périodes où prix le plus 
élevé à l'export
Oui Oui
Inefficacité productive dans la 
recherche de clients acheteurs de coton 
fibre ou de graines de coton
Oui Oui
Recherche de rente dans les services 
de transit
Oui Oui
Renforcer la compétitivité 
par l'obtention de meilleurs 
prix à la vente ou à 
l'exportation des graines de 
coton
Achat local de 
graines
Inefficacité productive dans la 
recherche de clients acheteurs de coton 
fibre ou de graines de coton
Oui Oui
Page 2 de 2ERRI_1004_fin Nombre d'usines d'égrenage par zone
Number of ginneries by area
CAMPAIGN Pays (country) Zone (area) Nombre d'usines
(No. ginneries)
1998 COTE D'IVOIRE Global 10
MALI Global 17
1999 BENIN DRE Zone Nord 2
GLOBAL 10
BURKINA FASO  Global 12





Upper West Region 2
MALI Global 17
2000 BURKINA FASO  Global 12
CAMEROUN Global 9





Upper West Region 1
MALI Global 17
2001 BURKINA FASO  Global 12
CAMEROUN Global 9





Upper West Region 1
2002 CAMEROUN Global 9
dimanche 20 avril 2003 Page 1 sur 1ERRI_3020 Taux d'utilisation des capacités d'égrenage, par zone
Ginning capacity use, by area
CAMPAIGN Pays (country) % utilisation
(% use)
Capacité totale, tonnes de SG
(Total capacitie, tons of SC)
Zone  (area)
1998 COTE D'IVOIRE 105,2% 320 000 Global
MALI 94,3% 550 000
1999 BENIN 102,8% 50 000 DRE Zone Nord
60,0% 312 500 GLOBAL
BURKINA FASO 71,1% 400 000  Global
COTE D'IVOIRE 104,2% 115 000 Centre
90,0% 130 000 Nord-est
95,8% 125 000 Nord-ouest
GHANA 49,7% 45 000 Global
18,6% 24 000 Northern Region
19,7% 12 000 Upper West Region
MALI 83,5% 550 000 Global
2000 BURKINA FASO 63,6% 400 000  Global
CAMEROUN 71,1% 270 000 Global
COTE D'IVOIRE 94,1% 115 000 Centre
88,5% 130 000 Nord-est
104,0% 125 000 Nord-ouest
GHANA 20,6% 45 000 Global
34,1% 18 700 Northern Region
19,7% 12 000 Upper West Region
MALI 44,1% 550 000 Global
2001 BURKINA FASO 69,0% 400 000  Global
CAMEROUN 85,3% 270 000 Global
COTE D'IVOIRE 59,1% 115 000 Centre
39,1% 230 000 Nord-est
74,3% 125 000 Nord-ouest
GHANA 20,6% 45 000 Global
35,5% 12 072 Northern Region
17,6% 12 000 Upper West Region
2002 CAMEROUN 270 000 Global
dimanche 20 avril 2003 Page 1 sur 1ERRI-1061_1 Evolution de la surface cotonnière, par zone
Evolution of the cotton acreage, by area
Type producteur
(Producer type)
Small holder                    
Producteur familial             
Campaign Pays (Country) Classe producteur
(Producer sub-type)
Surface coton, ha
(Cotton acreage, ha) Zone (area)
1999 BENIN Global
Global
51 143 ATACORA DONGA
2000 58 396
1999 166 522 BORGOU -ALIBORI
2000 164 778
107 715 DRE  Zone Centre
1999 BURKINA FASO 354 436  Global
2000 245 000
2001 260 000
2000 CAMEROUN 80 079 Extrême-nord
2001 90 952
2002 83 396
2000 179 575 Global
2001 198 559
2002 201 576
2000 99 496 Nord
2001 107 607
2002 118 180
2000 COTE D'IVOIRE 65 488 Centre
2001 65 488






1999 95 199 Nord-ouest
2001 88 888
1999 GHANA 8 590 Northern Region
2000 9 374
2001 4 867
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Evolution of the cotton acreage, by area
1999 GHANA Global
Global
8 767 Upper East Region
2000 6 933
2001 4 507
1999 16 228 Upper West Region
2000 11 809
2001 6 936
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dimanche 20 avril 2003 Page 3 sur 3Répartition de la production entre les différents types d'exploitations 3005 Production shares between various types of sub-producers
Moyenne SEED_COTTON_PRODUCTION PRODUCER_TYPE_FR Sub_producer_FR
Producteur familial             
CAMPAIGN_ID COUNTRY_NAME_FR AREA_NAME Global Sous-type 1 Sous-type 2 Sous-type 3 Sous-type 4
1998 COTE D'IVOIRE Global 337 097
MALI CMDT 483 680 218 649 230 261 34 113 24 530
Global 518 364
OHVN
1999 BENIN ATACORA DONGA 59 619
BORGOU -ALIBORI 174 000
BURKINA FASO  Global 284 400
COTE D'IVOIRE Global 360 800
Nord-est
Nord-ouest 119 827
GHANA Northern Region 1 251
Upper East Region 5 595
Upper West Region 4 948
MALI CMDT 429 989 188 495 233 089 25 594 17 842
Global 459 123
OHVN 39 410
2000 BENIN ATACORA DONGA 69 769
BORGOU -ALIBORI 189 000
DRE  Zone Centre 76 814
BURKINA FASO  Global 254 000
CAMEROUN Extrême-nord 69 100
Global 197 217
Nord 122 000
COTE D'IVOIRE Centre 67 945
Global 400 000
Nord-est 119 000
GHANA Northern Region 1 654
Upper East Region 5 125
Upper West Region 3 847
MALI CMDT 229 641 95 206 101 733 13 680 7 233
Global 242 726
OHVN 13 651
2001 BURKINA FASO  Global 275 000
CAMEROUN Extrême-nord 76 600
Global 230 932
Nord 130 300
COTE D'IVOIRE Centre 67 945
Nord-est 120 000
Nord-ouest 92 837
GHANA Northern Region 377
Upper East Region 2 125
Upper West Region 1 883
MALI CMDT 535 341 217 377 267 157 26 985 18 720
Global 570 874
OHVN 38 533
2002 CAMEROUN Extrême-nord 19 000
Global 236 200
Nord 217 200ERRI-6000et1 Nombre de producteurs et de villages coton 




Small holder                    
Producteur familial             





(Total No. of villages)
Classe de producteur
(Producer sub-type)
%  villages avec coton
(% villagesw/cotton)
1998 COTE D'IVOIRE Global 153 241 3 965 3 965 Global
Global
100%
MALI CMDT 157 877 4 651 3 795 Global
Global
123%
CMDT 36 312 3 795 Sous-type 1
Sub-type 1
CMDT 75 781 3 795 Sous-type 2
Sub-type 2
CMDT 22 103 3 795 Sous-type 3
Sub-type 3
CMDT 25 260 3 795 Sous-type 4
Sub-type 4
1999 BENIN ATACORA DONG 35 297 329 Global
Global
BORGOU -ALIBO 85 500 500 Global
Global
BURKINA FASO  Global 200 000 4 200 4 200 Global
Global
100%
COTE D'IVOIRE Global 162 113 3 518 3 775 Global
Global
93%
Nord-est 1 285 Global
Global
Nord-ouest 51 057 634 634 Global
Global
100%
GHANA Northern Region 16 800 264 7 222 Global
Global
4%
Upper East Regio 12 346 218 4 750 Global
Global
5%
Upper West Regio 28 797 557 5 000 Global
Global
11%
MALI CMDT 154 860 4 767 3 802 Global
Global
125%
CMDT 30 972 3 802 Sous-type 1
Sub-type 1
CMDT 86 722 3 802 Sous-type 2
Sub-type 2
CMDT 17 035 3 802 Sous-type 3
Sub-type 3
CMDT 20 132 3 802 Sous-type 4
Sub-type 4
OHVN 25 601 684 723 Global
Global
95%
2000 BURKINA FASO  Global 200 000 4 200 4 200 Global
Global
100%
CAMEROUN Extrême-nord 165 361 3 208 3 208 Global
Global
100%
Global 321 994 Global
Global
Nord 156 633 Global
Global
COTE D'IVOIRE Centre 1 671 Global
Global
Global 161 265 3 679 3 679 Global
Global
100%
Nord-est 1 358 Global
Global
GHANA Northern Region 18 117 188 7 222 Global
Global
3%
Upper East Regio 10 400 127 4 750 Global
Global
3%
Upper West Regio 23 190 325 5 000 Global
Global
7%
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Small holder                    
Producteur familial             





(Total No. of villages)
Classe de producteur
(Producer sub-type)
%  villages avec coton
(% villagesw/cotton)
2000 MALI CMDT 88 432 3 819 3 801 Global
Global
100%
CMDT 18 571 3 801 Sous-type 1
Sub-type 1
CMDT 45 985 3 801 Sous-type 2
Sub-type 2
CMDT 11 496 3 801 Sous-type 3
Sub-type 3
CMDT 12 380 3 801 Sous-type 4
Sub-type 4
OHVN 25 601 684 723 Global
Global
95%
2001 BURKINA FASO  Global 200 150 4 630 4 630 Global
Global
100%
CAMEROUN Extrême-nord 187 032 3 208 3 208 Global
Global
100%
Global 357 736 Global
Global
Nord 170 704 Global
Global
COTE D'IVOIRE Centre 43 865 1 415 1 415 Global
Global
100%
Nord-est 38 954 1 358 1 421 Global
Global
96%
Nord-ouest 43 156 833 633 Global
Global
132%
GHANA Northern Region 14 017 151 7 222 Global
Global
2%
Upper East Regio 625 129 4 750 Global
Global
3%
Upper West Regio 7 768 330 5 000 Global
Global
7%
MALI CMDT 162 408 5 231 6 242 Global
Global
84%
CMDT 37 354 6 242 Sous-type 1
Sub-type 1
CMDT 87 700 6 242 Sous-type 2
Sub-type 2
CMDT 16 241 6 242 Sous-type 3
Sub-type 3
CMDT 21 113 6 242 Sous-type 4
Sub-type 4
OHVN 684 723 Global
Global
95%
2002 CAMEROUN Extrême-nord 178 932 3 208 3 208 Global
Global
100%
Global 367 473 Global
Global
Nord 188 541 Global
Global
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